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This dissertation seeks to determine how the socio-economic and political 
changes, following the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe, have found reflection 
and led to the emergence of interest groups in the education debate. It looks at the 
reforms initiated by the new ruling .power-elite in Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. This reform process, embodying the value system of the new 
governments, has led, the dissertation seeks to show, directly to new and vibrant 
interest groups on the educational landscape. 
This study identifies the seven prominent interest groups - seeking to satisfy their 
own interests - which engage the government in the education policy making 
arena. This policy making arena, which I refer to as the "arena of power", is 
analysed through focussing on the relationship of power between the seven interest 
groups and the state. The Halasz (1986 : 123) classification of interest groups in 
communist Hungary in 1986, forms the point of departure for my examination of 
post-1989 interest groups. Each chapter highlights the circumstances that 
influenced the development of interest groups and the extent of their participation 
in reforms. The dissertation concludes with a reclassification of post-1989 interest 
groups in Central Europe, in order to facilitate a better understanding of the 
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1. ORIGIN OF THE RESEARCH 
In 1989 Eastern Europe experienced its "third political turn" of the century -
after 1918 and 1945 -as mass pro-democracy demonstrations swept across the 
continent (Anweiler 1991 : 1). Within three dramatic months, six communist 
governments in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
Bulgaria were toppled, tearing down the "Iron Curtain" on four decades of 
West-East conflict. 
Although the international media was blanketed by coverage of the so-called 
"springtime of societies aspiring to be civil" (Zielonka 1991 : 111), I found that 
background material in mid-1990, unfortunately, limited itself to the political 
terrain. There was little information reflecting the tumult and change at the 
educational level in Central Europe (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia). As 
the picture of political transformation began to emerge, I became keenly 
interested in how this situation was impacting on education. By mid-1990 it 
was evident to me that South Africa would within the short term face similar 
far-reaching changes in education. In order to develop my own understanding 
and hopefully to contribute to the understanding of the process of change taking 
place in education in my own country, I decided to undertake research on the 
topic and embarked upon a study tour of Central Europe to gain first hand 
experience. The study tour proved to be both disconcerting and inspiring. 
Impressive as the changes in Eastern Europe proved to be, the weight of several 
decades of intolerance pervaded the environment. It is the tension suggested by 
this condition which is the theme pursued in this dissertation. While there were 
clear signs of democratic changes within the society, there remained 
everywhere evidence of the stultifying censorial style of the old regime. Of 
course, it is easy to overplay the weight of this past. As a corrective to this, 
one needs to be aware of both the depth of the roots of the so-called new 
democratic movement and the deep feelings to which it appealed. There 
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is some hint of this in the academic literature of the field. 
In the post-1989 literature, for example, such as was available, it was of particular 
interest to note the "wave" of opposition to the political and education system 
which the ruling parties were facing within the region, little of which was 
intimated in the pre-1989 literature on education (Davies 1986; Heinrich 1986; 
Hoensch 1989). In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a review of this 
literature suggested that there were vibrant interest groups with vested and long 
standing interests making themselves heard in the changes being experienced in 
education (Darvas 1991:224; Kozakiewicz 1990:46). Striking as the appearance 
of these groups were in the post-1989 period, logic suggests that they must have 
been present earlier, either in embryonic or prototypical form. It is the 
significance of this opposition, in a rapidly changing educational environment and 
its involvement in defining education in the transformational stage in Central 
Europe which is at the heart of this work. I refer to these groups in this process 
as "interest groups", following the work of Halasz (1986) and Howell (1988) on 
the subject. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three features of education literature on Central Europe from behind the wall are 
worth drawing attention to in this review. In the first instance, Soviet ideological 
hegemony kept an effective censorship "lid" on publications in the pre-1989 
period. Secondly, with the exception of Hungary, no literature raising critical 
pedagogical issues could be found. Only in the latter half of 1990, following the 
first democratic elections did journal articles appear that reported on and reflected 
the conflicting viewpoints on education reform from within these countries. The 
third point is that there is little reference to interest groups; only research by 
Halasz (1986) in Hungary and Kozakiewica (1990) in Poland, directly refer to the 
term "interest groups" within the education context. 
A central motivation for this research, as I have stated before, is the absence of 
work on the transition from communism to democracy, and particularly its 
relevance to the sphere of education. It is the role which interest groups have 
played in shaping the contours of this transition which is important for this 
~ 
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dissertation. This work, therefore is an attempt at addressing the lack of 
research on the emergence and participation of interest groups in this process, 
especially in light of the fact that the Halasz classification only reviews 
Hungarian interest groups within the period of communist hegemony up to 
1986. 
In this review, I look at the literature on a country-by-country basis. I begin 
with Hungary, move to Poland and conclude with Czechoslovakia. While there 
are other more general studies, Howell's (1988) work is a useful introduction to 
the Hungarian scene for the purposes of this dissertation. He documented the 
initial moves towards educational decentralisation in that country, which was 
incidentally the first in Central Europe to do so, and the participation of local 
communities in school councils. The article's preoccupation with the 
decentralisation debate in Hungary does not, however, shed specific light on the 
contending interest groups and leaves the reader without much insight to 
ground-level (e.g. at schools) tensions and perspectives on the reform process. 
Darvas' (1991:244-245) work which appeared one year after the democratic 
election, addressed this difficulty somewhat. It was the first to identify 
academic experts, educators and political parties as central role-players in 
education. Darvas, however, refrained from identifying these groups as 
specific interest groups and rather chose to give a historical perspective on their 
development. The work has value nonetheless, in that it gives an insight to how 
the inherited traditions of groups influence the articulation of their initiatives. 
Szunyogh's (1991:9) contribution, although written earlier, gives a detailed 
description of emerging professional teacher associations and reports on rural 
conflict in schools that remain dominated by headmasters resistant to change. 
His articles provide a wealth of insight into "real life" situations in society and 
at schools and were an important source of data for this research. Taking a 
different tack, that of the question of an appropriate future education 
philosophy, the sketch by Horvath (1990:207) lends valuable insights to the 
debate on traditional versus modem education. Although Horvath neglects to 
link his observations to visible interest groups, he helps one to achieve a clearer 
understanding of this issue which is at the heart of the pro-versus anti-reform 
viewpoints. In a special feature on education, the Hungarian Observer, in 
September 1991, provides a lively addition to the literature. In a debate on the 
question of religious education (specifically Roman Catholic lessons) one has 
access to a number of different points of view. Gyarmati (9.1991:35), writing 
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in the Observer, gives a report of the particularly controversial introduction of 
religious education and provides a balanced report of the perspectives of 
opposing sides. 
A number of other works, which while not specifically addressing interest 
groups are useful too. Tamas Kozma (1990:379 & 1991:15) gives a historical 
overview of general education from 1945 to 1985 and in particular the political 
transition in higher education. Kozma, director of the Hungarian Institute for 
Education Research, widely regarded as pro-government, argues for the 
acceleration of reforms in tandem with government policy. Writing also in the 
domain of higher education, Istvan Bakos of the Ministry of Education ( 1991 :9) 
discusses the present challenges facing institutes of higher education in great 
detail. Elaborate statistics are used to strengthen Bakos' outline of the 
government reform strategy based on modernisation. These works are useful in 
illustrating the context within which the main players find themselves. Equally 
useful from this point of view are works which deal with the themes of 
centralisation and decentralisation, for example, Gesa Saska (1991 :3), Nagy and 
Szebenyi (1990:3) who write about this policy debate in the period 1980-1990, 
and Bathory (1991:2), Halasz (1991:1), Szebenyi (1992:19), Halasz and Lukacs 
(1990:4) who look at the period 1989 onwards. The former two publications 
lay out the progression of the policy and the common sense behind the call for 
core curricula. The debate of centralisation versus decentralisation, is also 
intrinsically linked to the discussion about whether traditional or modem values 
should be reflected in the core curricula. Halasz (1991), Szebenyi (1990), 
Bathory (1991) and Lukas (1990) provide a broad description of changes but do 
not reveal the particular features of opposing interest groups or the emergence 
of an organised lobby exerting pressure on the new government. 
In Poland, Kozakiewica's work (1990:46) (Deputy of the Solidarity dominated 
Parliament) usefully defined the opposing interest groups in education in terms 
of Minimalists (satisfied with the traditional system and in favour of slight 
modernisation) and Maximalists (who call both the values and objectives of the 
existing system into question and are in favour of far-reaching changes). 
Kozakiewica gives a sharp critique of the former education Ministry and in the 
process, identifies the opposing camps in the debate about a future education 
system. However, he stops short of spelling out the position of the new 
Ministry itself. Sorenson (1991:1) and Chimielecka (7.1991:1) identify the 
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academic nomenklatura (reserved positions for Communist Party members) 
as the most resistant group to reforms who, they argue, fear loss of influence 
and prestige. Chimielecka, lecturer at the Warsaw School of Economics, 
provides first hand knowledge of how former Communists obstructed the 
transition process. Jerschina and Kosiarz (1990:303-304) see the Catholic 
Church as a major player in education as the government seeks the Catholic 
. Church's support in return for access to schools through religious education 
(Davies 1986:238). Nasalska (1990:26), Wisniewski (1991:118) and Stasinska 
(1990:88) point to the lack of teacher motivation, loss of status and poor salaries 
leading to tension within the profession's ranks and indirectly tell us about the 
nature of this group. However, none of the authors present these issues as the 
concerns of organised pressure groups. The growth of the independent school 
movement, undoubtedly a fast rising power group, is documented by Starzynski 
(1990:5) and Mieszalski (1991:1). Starzynski's account, interesting as it is, is 
somewhat one-sided as the author himself is a leading figure in the movement. 
Aside from the work of Siemak-Tylikowska (1992:1) we know little about the 
dynamics of the field of curricula development since 1989. This article on core 
curricula development focuses solely on curricula reforms and does not place 
these reforms within the "big picture" of transition and is therefore of limited 
use to this research. Recent changes to the education system as a whole, 
reflecting the process of political democratisation are discussed in the writings 
of Bugaj (1991:1), Mieszalski (1992:1) and Kozakiewica (1992:91). Again 
these papers only serve to update the researcher in the most general terms and 
fail to contribute to the data on the emerging powers within the policy-making 
arena. 
Czechoslovakia, Central Europe's ideologically most rigid state, placed 
educators under severe restrictions in the pursuit of Marxist education. This 
stark reality is evident in the literature itself, which only begins to manifest and 
discuss opposing views in education after 1989. The Council of Europe's 
documents on Czechoslovakia (Barret 1.1990:7), provide the first glimpse of 
Czechoslovakia's educational history. They give the first indication to be found 
anywhere of the activities of pupils and parents in exerting pressure on the 
government in Slovakia, where parents demanded the democratic election of all 
headmasters in 1990. Harach (1990: 14), in his paper at the International 
Conference on Education in Geneva (1990), drew attention to the development 
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of incipient divisions between the organised teaching profession, academics and 
parents. The debate on an appropriate future education system had only begun 
at this stage and interest groups were still indistinguishable. The literature on 
higher education and research institutes by Burjan (1991:2) emphasizes the 
difficulties these institutes faced in transferring from their communist pasts as 
the academic nomenklatura resisted changes. Work on post-revolution (1989) 
reforms to the public education system by Potucek (1991:1). Von Kopp 
(1992:101) and Cerna (1991:3) all set out the first tentative changes based on 
differentiated education. These researchers, however, stress that full transition 
is dependent on an improvement of the economy and consolidation of the 
democratic process. Conspicuous by its absence in this literature is contextual 
detail of how interest groups have interacted with the state and with each other 
in influencing the tum of events in the educational arena after 1989. Suggestive 
as some of the material is, it fails to indicate both the scope and the nature of 
interest groups' involvement in the events which have played themselves out. It 
is this lacuna in the literature which calls for further investigation. 
3. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The central research problem focuses on secondary education interest groups in 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the period 1989- 1991. 
This study is an examination of the social dynamics of transition in education in 
Central Europe. It is an attempt to define and analyse the circumstances in 
which interest groups seek to develop and participate in mapping out the future 
of education. I will pay particular attention to the difficulties emerging systems 
in Central Europe encounter in working with their communist heritage. The 
dissertation will focus on how these pasts and their inherited traditions, 
obstruct, facilitate or articulate with reform initiatives. It then proceeds to 
analyse the sociological dynamics surrounding the most prominent interest 
groups in the debate on secondary education reforms. These groups include the 
following : teachers, teacher associations, independent schools, religious 
groups, parents, media, public opinion, higher education and research institutes. 
It is the differential way in which these groups engaged in the reform debate 
which is of interest here. 
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I will focus upon two research questions by using power as an interpretive tool. 
These research questions are : 
i) To what extent have these interest groups participated in reforms? 
ii) What are the circumstances which have influenced the development 
of these interest groups? 
This research will attempt through an analysis of these questions to generate a 
better understanding of the context in which interest groups work in their 
attempt to influence the power elite and attain their goals in the policy-making 
arena. [Goals of interest groups are defined by Ziegler and Peak (1972:65) as 
the "stated or unstated values for which groups or individuals strive".] 
The data emanating from the research will be used to develop Gabor Halasz' 
1986 classification of interest groups model. I will then construct an interest 
group classification for each country and then for Central Europe, to suggest 
how the location of interest groups in the dynamics of change might be 
understood. The point on which this research pivots is to be found in my 
analysis of the balance of power in the education policy-making arena, or what I 
term the "arena of power". In this arena, interest groups vie for power to 
influence government education policy and in so doing, attempt to satisfy the 
interests or goals of their supporters. 
The research problem was constructed from a review of the education literature. 
The research approach and questions were developed during the preliminary 
research done in Western Europe and Britain, through interviews and document 
collection (see Appendix 16 and Bibliography). The approach to the work was 
influenced by the work of political analysts, Breslow (1991 :206), Tokes 
(1990:61) and Di Cortona (1991:326) who drew attention to the continued 
influence of former communists in the political processes in Central Europe. 
The significance of the research and the reason for studying the education 
debate in Central Europe, is that, in the absence of a body of knowledge of how 
transition from communism to capitalism works, it provides preliminary data 
which will hopefully enhance our understanding of the transition process in 
Central Europe. The interviews, drawn from people directly involved in this 
period of societal "flux" extending across Central Europe, will hopefully add to 
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the resources of primary data available on the situation in education in Central 
Europe. The seven most prominent emerging education interest groups (in 
post-communist Central Europe), as encountered by myself are identified and a 
classification put forward which seeks to engender a better understanding of the 
distribution of power in the education policy-making arena. The reason for, 
grouping these countries together is because they are seen by analysts as a 
geographical and historical region, traditionally referred to as Central Europe 
(Szebenyi 1992.a.:19). Eveling (7.1990:21) also refers to these three countries 
as the "northern tier" in Eastern Europe. 
4. INTEREST GROUPS AND POWER 
As is clear from the review, while there is some information on interest groups 
in the literature, specific research targeting the broad spectrum of emerging 
post-1989 education interest groups, has yet to be undertaken. The significance 
of this absence is evident in the rather underdeveloped state of the sociology of 
education in Central Europe. It is for this reason that Halasz's (1986:123) work 
is important. A brief review of his classification follows. Halasz developed a 
theoretical model to represent the relationship between the various interest 
groups present in the educational landscape in Eastern Europe. In this model 
four interest groups are identified which have conflicting ideas on the function 
of education in the pre-1989 society. The value of this approach is that it 
provides a guide to comprehending the social forces which interact with 
education and the educational debate in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
Using ideology as a criterion, Halasz distinguished four major "spheres of 
interest" or categories of interest groups in education policy making. The first 
interest category included those who exhibited a high degree of ideological 
commitment in formulating education policy. Category two gave less priority 
to ideology and argued for economic considerations in policy-making. A 
strategy of reconciliation between economic and ideological considerations 
characterised the third category. The last category was least committed to 
ideology in education policy (see Appendix 8). The arena of education 
policy-making in which these interest groups form coalitions or clash is 
structured in a vertical axis representing the economic "E" function and a 
horizontal axis illustrating the ideological "I" function. Both axes have a 
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positive and negative pole. The positive pole of the "E" axis represents the 
external interest groups, for example, economic management, enterprises and 
economic planners. The negative end of the "E" axis is constituted by 'internal 
interest groups' such as the teaching profession, education administrators and 
educationists. At the positive pole of the "I" axis we find those who propagate 
Marxist ideas in education while at the opposite end of this axis are located 
proponents of a pluralist and differentiated view of education. 
Graphically this could be represented as follows 
Axis 'E' 
2 3 
4 1 Axis 'I' 
The interest groups (see Appendix:8) that participate in this arena are : 
1. Ideologically committed educational groups (Dimension 1) 
2. Ideologically less committed groups of economic planners (Dimension 2) 
3. Ideologically committed vocational education groups (Dimension 3) 
4. Ideologically less committed education groups (Dimension 4) 
The main features of conflict identified by Halasz (1986:123) and Howell 
(1988: 125) are between groups (3 + 1) which see a central role for ideology in 
education, and groups (2+4) which view education as a pluralist/differentiated 
structure catering for a wide spectrum of interest groups. A characteristic of the 
Halasz structure is the emphasis on education issues by groups in dimensions 1 
and 4 as opposed to the economic priority visualized by groups 2 and 3. 
Halasz's classification model explains the structure of policy making over a 
period of two decades of communist government. This dissertation only focuses 
on a three-year period and proposes a model based on events from the 1989 
revolutions to my study tour in late 1991. The conclusions and predictions 
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drawn from my model are limited to research of the period 1989 to 1991 and 
are influenced by certain limitations as spelled out later in this chapter. This 
research will, in Chapter 5 - the Summary and Conclusion section, comment on 
the position of the seven "new" post-1989 interest groups, identified in this 
research in regard to the Halasz classification. Data emanating from this study 
will be used to comment on the contemporary use of the Halasz classification 
and propose a new post-1989 classification. 
At this point I must make it clear that the hermeneutic or interpretive tool which 
I will use to analyse interest groups, centres upon the concept of "power". This 
approach necessitates a brief definition of the key terms "interest group" and 
"power". 
In general "interest group" is defined by Sinclair (1992:608) as an organisation 
or group of people who want certain things to happen or to be done because 
they will benefit from them. The Oxford Dictionary (Sykes 1984:523) 
describes "interest" as : "a principle in which a party is concerned; with a party 
having a common interest". Research in the West on interest groups theories in 
political science can be traced back to the first major study by Arthur Bentley, 
entitled, The Process of Government, in 1908 (Ziegler & Peak 1972:5). 
Skilling and Griffith (1971:23) state that the group approach in political science 
has become "an effective tool of research on many political systems" since the 
mid 1950's. In research on interest groups in American society, Ziegler and 
Peak (1972:3) define an "interest group" as "an organised social aggregate 
which seeks political goods that it is incapable of providing for itself'. In the 
publication, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State and Democracy, Alford 
and Friedland (1985:92) elaborate on the role and function of interest groups in 
society: "Interest groups mediate between individuals and the state, screening 
and aggregating demands so that they can be responded to by the state without 
demand overload. Interest groups arise, become strong and disappear as a 
result of the changing values and preferences of individuals". The conflict 
theorist, Gustav Ratzenhafer, sees the social process as "the result of interaction 
between persons with conflicting interests" (Ziegler & Peak 1972:9). These 
conflicts of interests form the basis for my research on emerging Central 
European interest groups in education. In the literature, the term "interest 
groups" is used interchangeably with "lobbies", "pressure groups", "power 
groups" and "organised interest". The level at which this research examines 
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interest groups is that of education. 
Interest groups in Central Europe, by no means new, are important to recognise 
and to understand, both from political and educational points of view. They 
help us understand the complexity of decision-making and policy formation 
processes. They draw attention to the way in which power operates in the 
policy-making arena. Interest groups, therefore, form the central sociological 
phenomenon I examine in this dissertation. It is important, however, to make 
clear that I see them in terms of the following sociological approach: the use of 
power by interest groups to control, influence or change government education 
policy (see Appendix 24). 
Under study here is the relationship between a social category, educational 
interest groups in this instance, and their behaviour, which is the pursuit of 
power (influence) in the education reform process. The term "power" has been 
debated at length over centuries. The human tendency to seek power has been 
recognised by most classic political theorists, including Aristotle, Thomas 
Hobbs and James Madison (Willhoite 1988:23). The English philosopher, 
Bertrand Russell suggested that: "Power may be defined as the production of 
intended effects" (Willhoite 1988:5). Robert Dahl, the prominent political 
scientist, preferred the definition of power as "Influence of this kind, when 
compliance is attained by creating the project of severe sanctions for 
non-compliance" (Willhoite 1988:5). 
In 1979, the political sociologist, Dennis Wrong (1979:2), wrote : "Power is 
the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on 
others". Perhaps the broader definition by Wrong (1979:253) is most 
appropriate for this discussion. "Power is inherent in all social interaction, 
which consists of actors reciprocally producing effects on one another". In 
analysing the relationship between Central European education interest groups 
and their governments, I will use the definition by Wrong and the notion of 
"influence" which Dahl uses to describe this feature of social existence. The 
term power or influence will thus be used as an organising concept to develop 
an understanding of the complex educational process in Central Europe during 
the period of transition. 
In studying the relationship of power between individuals or groups, the basic 
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question to pose is why power is sought (Alford & Friedland 1985:92). There 
is no single correct answer, but power seeking seems to be a characteristic of 
human communities as they compete for a scarcity of resources or differ about 
policies. This disagreement in political terms is called a 'conflict of interests' 
and forms the rational for the struggle for power and its rewards (Ziegler & 
Peak 1972:9). Opposing groups within a society and their relationship with a 
government, centre upon two components of power. James Madison (Willhoite 
1988:16) describes the inevitability of 'self-centered power seeking' on the one 
hand while Willhoite (1988:14) refers to the 'self-defensive power seeking' 
group, as those who do not desire to seek power but do so to prevent political 
opponents from steamrolling them. The main strategies for attaining power are 
co-operation, tolerance, domination and elimination (Willhoite 1988:14). 
Reviewing these strategies we see that 'co-operation' can be defined as alliances 
of people working together for a common objective, for example the first 
post-1989 coalition governments in Czechslovakia and Hungary. The issue of 
'desertion' by one or more of the coalition parties or inter-party groups remains 
a problem of this power strategy as will be pointed out in both Czechoslovakia 
and Poland (Potucek 1991; Korosenyi 1991). 'Tolerance' is a strategy whereby 
political opponents are accepted within, for example, a democracy where 
certain rules and peaceful competition are acknowledged. The third power 
strategy of 'domination' refers to securing control and superior power through 
coercmn. An example is the pre-1989 Soviet foreign policy that kept the 
Central European satellites within the Warsaw Pact orbit by coercive means in 
suppressing the 1956 and 1968 revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Davies 
1986; Hoensch 1989). 'Elimination' as the last power strategy can be described 
as removing one's opponents through means of assassination or as a result of 
losing elections (Heinrich 1986). 
The re-establishment of civil society in Central Europe gave individuals and 
groups the opportunity to pursue their interests and goals within education. In 
this paper, seven interest groups have been identified whose primary interest is 
that of lobbying for their values and ideas to be represented in education. These 
interest groups, with the exception of the Media and Public Opinion category, 
stem partly from occupational categories, but essentially represent organised 
aggregates of people with common interests. These groups rely on a range of 
tactics to induce or persuade political parties and in particular the government 
and education minister to· incorporate their goals into government legislation. 
The efforts of these interest groups primarily focus upon the loci of real 
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decision making power in the respective countries - the power elite - namely the 
ruling Solidarity, Hungarian Democratic Forum, Civic Forum and Public 
Against Violence parties ( Chmielecka 21-11-91, Halasz 25-10-91, Musil 
8-11-91). The governments of Central Europe, however, in tum are caught in a 
power balancing act in their attempts to reform education in ways which reflect 
democratic principles and thereby gaining legitimacy by conceding to some 
demands of interest groups. Their record in this regard has, however, shown 
that they are prepared to concede only limited control of power, and are willing 
to do so only in so far as it does not affect their own political strategies and 
undermine the support they command from their constituencies. The tactics and 
strategies used by interest groups thus far have shown signs of great imagination 
in some cases, but reflect, in other, mounting despondency. 
This study will furthermore point out that the political power of legal authority 
which the ruling parties sought through victories in the first post-1945 
democratic elections has come under threat through voter apathy and confusion 
stemming from a proliferation of political parties. This has seriously 
undermined the power base of the ruling elites and the successful outcome of 
the transition to democratic government in Central Europe. The balance of 
power and use of various power strategies by interest groups within the 
education policy making arena will form the focus in the section on the seven 
emerging interest groups. 
In this study I will look at the relationship of power between the new "power 
elite" that is Solidarity (Poland), Civic Forum and Public Against Violence 
parties (Czechoslovakia), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungary) and 
the "new" lobby of education interest groups. I will proceed to analyse the 
sociological phenomenon of education interest groups as the latter attempt to 
attain their goals in the "arena of power". 
It is within this arena that interest groups have emerged to challenge the new 
power elites' education policy and representation of the "truth", albeit religious, 
traditional or reform communist values. Foucault (Bal11990:202) reminds us 
that within education "knowledge is central to power relations" and a crucial 
role of opposition groups is to question the "universal truths" and to "detach the 
power of truth from the forms of hegemony within social, economic and 
cultural spheres". This study will attempt to identify how interest groups have 
formed in response to the power elites implementation of education reforms 
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based on their vision of "universal truths". 
I approach this study with the assumption that the policy of communism as it 
was practised has failed politically, ideologically and economically in Central ~ 
Europe. My view is founded upon data emanating from extensive personal 
interviews, nationwide anti-communist sentiment in each country which saw up 
to 300 000 protestors take to the streets in Prague, Bratislava, Warsaw and 
Budapest. I also draw on political analysts such as Brown, Gati, Griffith (in 
Bresslow 1991:206) and Garton Ash (1990:2) who put the root cause of the 
communist crisis down to political illegitimacy and economic deterioration 
(Szelenyi in Powel1993:33). Based on the information from my research I take 
the position that the forms of political and economic governance emerging in 
Central Europe offer these countries the opportunity to reconstruct civil society 
(Bernhard 1993:326), to legitimate and re-define political democracy. 
I see a central role for education in this process. Clearly, however, the process 
is not a simple morality play. There are no clear villains and heroes in these 
situations. Communism and its followers do not automatically fall on the side 
of evil and tyranny~ Capitalists may as easily be found there. The real 
problem is how societies develop open democracies where people are 
empowered to participate in the making and unmaking of their worlds (Roskin 
1991: 146). It is this position I adopt in approaching this study. 
5. METHODOLOGY 
How one researches transitional processes is not easy. The method I chose to 
employ in this dissertation was that of interviewing key pro-reform people (see 
Appendix 16 and Bibliography). This approach was essential : 
i) because a large proportion of the documents gathered in late 1991 was 
not available outside of Central Europe; Literature on education reform 
therefore had to be obtained from people at the forefront of the reform 
movement. 
ii) in view of the contemporary nature of political events and the scarcity of 
education literature reflecting political changes; 
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iii) because I felt that it offered an opportunity to guage people's feelings. 
iv) due to the limitation of access to non-English sources. 
The interviewees were originally identified through their prominence m 
publishing articles on education reforms and through references by academics in 
Western Europe. Professor F.K. Kieviet (see p.2, Bibliography) was 
instrumental in arranging these contracts. All the interviews of ± 60 minutes 
were tape-recorded and transcribed to ensure accuracy of the data gathered. 
The interviews were structured around a synopsis of the research problems. 
The interview schedule was circulated more or less, two months ahead of my 
visit to Central Europe, to give the interviewees time to familiarise themselves 
with the questions I had in mind (see Appendix 17). During the interviews, I 
found that the interviewees preferred to discuss the research problem "in their 
own words". Many of the interviews were, as a result, informal. I found 
myself, as a result, frequently asking for clarification of certain statements or 
directing the discussion to the research problem through interjecting appropriate 
questions. I decided to follow this method rather than a formal interview, as the 
interviewees clearly felt at ease, less threatened and a rapport could more easily 
be established. In the politically sensitive period this interview method was 
found to be appropriate. The majority of the interviewees spoke English and 
their comprehension was generally excellent. I used translators on five 
occasions. (Translators indicated in Appendix 16 and Bibliography). All the 
interviews were individual interviews except in Warsaw where a group 
interview of the Solidarity National Education Section took place. 
I was based at the University of Leiden (Netherlands, September - December 
1991) and carried out preliminary research in Western Europe to familiarise 
myself with socio-economic, political and education trends in the "New Europe" 
(Mitter & Weiss 1991:3). My initial research enabled me to gain a better 
understanding of the impact of the European Community (EC), Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Maastrict EC 
unification talks on Central Europe. This phase of my research consisted of 
document collection and interviews in the Netherlands (10 interviews), Britain 
(London: 1; Exeter: 2) and Austria (Vienna: 3). 
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A limitation on the sample of people accessible to the researcher was the 
ongoing process of institutional restructuring and staff dismissals in all three 
countries. 
The research in Central Europe consisted of literature and data collection, 
through interviews in Czechoslovakia (Bratislava : 10 ; Prague : 10), Hungary 
(Budapest : 1) and Poland (Warsaw : 10). It must be clearly stated that the 
majority of interviews reflect the perceptions of reform minded people and 
therefore the sample represents, by and large, a biased community. The 
Bibliography gives full particulars of the interviewees to facilitate a better 
comprehension of the sample. The sample of people selected in Central Europe 
included: 
educators and academics who had published literature relevant to the 
research 
newly appointed and/or pro-reform minded persons from Ministerial 
level, to research institutes, universities, trade unions, newspapers and 
schools 
6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study is limited to a study of the events in the period from the first 
pro-democracy demonstrations (October 1989) and first free elections in early 
1990 to my research in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, during September 
to December 1991. Although this study focuses on secondary education interest 
groups, the complexity and extent of socio-economic and political changes that 
impact on. education during the transition period required that I review the 
relevant pre-1989 education and economic policies of the particular countries 
and examine, briefly, the characteristics of the political transformations in 
each. The limitations of this research are three-fold: 
only literature available in English is reflected in the discussion. A 
limited number of articles were also translated. 
the transitional nature of education, with continuous changes as textbooks 
23 
are re-written, preparation of education legislation and staff replacement 
from Ministerial level to individual schools take place, contributes to a 
study of this nature representing what Mitter and Weiss (1991 :6) 
labelled, "snapshots, recording momentary states" in Central Europe on 
education. 
there were people I was unable to see simply because I could not obtain 
their addresses. Many people who had been dismissed for supporting the 
former system, suspicion, and a lack of co-operation from some of my 
contacts, made it extremely difficult to obtain a variety of perspectives. 
While my status as a South African appeared not to play a role amongst 
those who agreed to meet with me, it was not clear whether this was a 
material factor in the attitude of those who wished not to speak with me. 
Doing research of this nature, is as a consequence, risky. Trends may be 
reversed. The situation in Poland where Solidarity lost in 1993 to the reform 
communist which they had ousted in 1989, illustrates this well. [Reform 
communists or liberal communists propose to "reform, liberalize or seriously 
modify a communist system" (Roskin 1991:138)] 
7. ORGANISATION OF TilE REMAINDER OF TilE 
DISSERTATION 
Data analysis and interpretation of the research problem have been conducted 
through a "intra-systemic" (member states of former Easter Block; Mitter 
1991:23) inquiry, using the comparative framework of George Z.F. Bereday as 
an organisational tool (Vos & Brits 1990:18-23). 
The discussion of each of the countries in the study is structured into the three 
stages proposed by Bereday, with stage four representing the conclusion, as 
follows: 
Stage 1 "Description" : Education Policy (3) in each chapter relates to 
pedagogical data only. 
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Stage 2 "Interpretation" : Political Transformation ( 1.) and Economic 
Transformation (2.) present explanation of pedagogical data 
through the use of disciplines such as politics, sociology and 
econormcs. 
Stage 3 "Juxtaposition" : Education Interest Groups ( 4. 1-7) are placed 
in juxtaposition by analysis of the two research questions and 
classification diagram constructed for post 1989 groups, in all three 
countries. The common criteria of "interest groups" has been 
established and used in comparison to examine the transition in 
education. 
Stage 4 "Comparison" :Conclusion (Chapter 5). Simultaneous 
comparison to analyse interest groups as a phenomenon and 
classification of Central European interest groups in "arena of 
power". 
Chapters 2-4 examine the three countries in question. Each starts with a 
general introduction as an outline to the issues under discussion. The political 
and economic background is briefly outlined before an analysis of the education 
policy is undertaken. Each chapter concludes with an analysis of the research 
questions and a classification of interest groups that contest the policy making 
"arena of power". Finally, in Chapter 5: Conclusion, the data emanating from 
this paper will be analysed in a comparative manner, to comment on the 
phenomena common to the participation of interest groups in Central. European 
education. This data will be used to construct a general classification of interest 






Is geography destiny? In the case of Poland, the answer would probably be 
positive. Wedged between powerful neighbours, Poland has been appropriated, 
partitioned and trampled over repeatedly by Russian, Prussian and Austrian 
empires for over two hundred years, starting in 1772. Polish patriots' attempts 
to establish an independent country failed in 1794, 1830, 1863 and in 1905. It 
was only through Polish military force that Poland re-appeared on the map of 
Europe between 1917 and 1941. This period was, however, shortlived. The 
Germans occupied the country in 1941 and then in January 1947, communists 
seized power and invited the Warsaw Pact forces to enter and "defend" Poland. 
The crisis which beset Poland in the mid-eighties was correctly predicted by 
many analysts but few foresaw in this process the rise of the Polish working 
class and their unknown leaders who were to initiate the domino effect (first 
referred to by President Eisenhower of the USA) which led to the toppling of 
communist governments in Central Europe (Davies 1986:720; Roskin 
1991:136). This chapter is structured according to the Bereday (Vos & Brits 
1990:18) comparative framework. Using this framework, the growth of 
opposition to the communist government in Poland, in particular the emergence 
of a constellation of new political forces, is discussed by means of tracking the 
development of Solidarity and the triumph of its leader in the first post-1989 
elections (section 1). The discussion will suggest that the success of reform 
implementation in education depends largely upon economic recovery. This 
reality mandates a brief description of economic transformation in Poland 
(section 2). 
The relevance of this for education is shown by means of a brief review of 
pre-1989 education policy (section 3). The significance of this review is that it 
foregrounds the first signs of the presence of new and vibrant interest groups in 
Poland and the breaching of what one might call ideological monism in the 
education debate. The political result is that we see three areas in education 
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targeted for reform by government (post 1989). Legislation is introduced in 
management and administration; curricula; and teacher training. This 
legislation gives concretisation to the government's education reform policy and 
is a stimulus for the involvement and legitimisation of interest groups. 
The chapter examines the seven most prominent education interest groups to 
illustrate how they face these challenges (sections 4 .1-7). The section on 
interest groups starts with a summary which reviews the data relevant to the 
research questions : interest groups participation in reforms and the 
circumstances influencing the development of interest groups (Section 4). This 
"arena of power" and the balance of power between the interest groups are then 
presented in the form of a classification diagram in the concluding section (5). 
Before I proceed, it is important to comment on the mood I encountered during 
my visit to Poland. The momentous events of 1989 which saw the 
establishment of an independent Poland after nearly two centuries and the deep 
patriotic fervor were still evident in 1991 during my visit to Warsaw. There 
was an almost tangible atmosphere of hope and optimism for the future. At this 
point I must state that while the physical scars left by the Nazi demolition of 
Warsaw in 1945 had disappeared by 1991, the people, and particularly those I 
had interviewed, were still manifesting the psyches of people who had been 
forced to endure decades of totalitarianism. Signs of their oppression were 
evident everywhere. Many Poles were still working through the process,psy-
chologically and sociall)', of adjusting to the hegemony of the communist 
period. As a result, many, especially the dissidents in the "liberated" and 
somewhat giddy moments of the early nineties, continued to be wary of the 
presence of former communists and nomenklatura. This brief sketch of the 
prevailing "societal mood" in a period of radical transition is essential to be able 
to comprehend the political and educational landscape. 
1. POLmCAL TRANSFORMATION 
The first sign of weakening in the control of the Communist Party came to light 
as long ago as August 1980 as Solidarity (Solidamosc in Polish), the first 










demands during strikes at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk and the mines at 
Silesia (Heyns & Bialecki 1991:52) (see Appendix 21). The basis of this 
crisis, such as it became, was to be found in both economic stress and political 
opposition; in terms of the former there had been worker strikes (1970, 1976), 
and sporadic food shortages, which reflected in essence, a growing failure of 
the Communist Party's economic strategy; and in the latter, there was an 
increasing gulf developing between a fervent - despite state policy - Roman 
Catholic population and the atheist government (Davies 1986: 616, 626). 
After the strike of 1980, events in Poland moved rapidly. During the 
negotiations with the state over the rights of registration for Solidarity in 1980, 
a unique partnership between workers and intellectuals was forged under the 
leadership of Lech Walesa. Solidarity evolved into an umbrella organisation 
for anti-government opposition as worker committees joined together. Martial 
law was imposed in 1980- 1981 as the Communist Party realised that the seven 
million strong Solidarity posed a real threat to its monopoly on power (Roskin 
1991:122). Lech Walesa and other Solidarity activists were arrested, forcing 
Solidarity underground. In December 1981, as corruption in the Gierek 
government became evident and an undoubted liability for the Warsaw Pact, the 
Polish military under General Wojciech Jaruzelski took over power, and in the 
process avoided the threat of Soviet intervention (Davies 1986:616). 
Ironically, several years later, Jaruzelski was to use this putsch as his great 
"liberating act". He claimed that by averting a Soviet invasion, he had 
initiated the peaceful erosion of the Iron Curtain in Poland : "I really doubt 
whether Europe would be the Europe being shaped today had Poland been 
witness then to the kind of conflict that would have ensued if martial law had 
not been introduced" (Prentice 1991:10). 
But his actions were, in reality, sufficient only to postpone facing the country's 
crisis. Strikes and demonstrations continued apace. By early 1988, arising 
from the persistence of crisis, J aruzelski instructed the Interior Minister, 
Kiszczak, to invite Solidarity to round table talks to "save" Poland (Roskin 
1991:135). The government delegation led by Prime Minister Rakowski and 
Kiszczak met Solidarity, led by Walesa, as equals and in desperation pleaded 
with them for their co-operation to save their country. This development had 
momentous outcomes. Solidarity activists were released from jail in February 
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1989 thus paving the way for negotiations which in their tum were to set the 
terms for a general election. Unlike the situation in the 1950's to the 1980's, it 
became clear that in terms of Mikhail Gorbachev's new "glasnost" (openness) 
and "perestroika" (reconstruction of Soviet society) (Evling 7.7.1989:2) 
policies, the Soviet Union would not intervene. Gorbachev had repudiated the 
Brezhnev Doctrine - in his Strasbourg speech (6. 7 .1989) to the Council of 
Europe, saying : "Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the 
sovereignty of states - both friends and allies or anybody else - is inadmissible" 
(Evling 7.7.1989:2). The negotiations thus took on the characteristics of a 
government retreat. 
A major breakthrough of the talks was the unconditional legalization of 
Solidarity and the recognition of its status as an equal participant with 
government in the political process. Popular discontent and economic crisis had 
thus forced the government to accept power-sharing through the establishment 
of an "anti-crisis pact" (Walicki 1991:95). 
The role of the Roman Catholic church and the influence of Pope John Paul II 
needs to be emphasised in these developments,especially in the emergence and 
success of Solidarity (Michel1990:2). The church, especially after the Pope's 
visit in June 1979, had become not only a religious, but also a political symbol 
of the spirit of resistance in Poland and played no small part in welding together 
what became a social movement (Swajkowski 1-10-91). Polish society, infused 
with a new religious and patriotic spirit as a result, and enflamed by the 
apparent rottenness of the communist government, underwent a process of 
"recatholisation" (Schopflin 1991:245) in the 1980's. The church, moreover, as 
it turned out, was also to provide crucial organisational support for Solidarity in 
the upcoming elections. 
In June 1989, partially free elections were held in a complicated system of 
election run-offs. Solidarity, which had developed into a broad based political 
party, faced an election campaign dominated by a government in control of and 
using the popular media. This notwithstanding, it scored an impressive triumph 
and won 99 of the 100-seat Senate and all 161 parliamentary seats it contested 
(Roskin 1991:150). The government still ruled, however, as Solidarity was 
only allowed to compete for 35% of the 460 seat Parliament, the remainder of 
which were reserved for the Communist Party. When Parliament reconvened in 
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July 1989, the Communist Party continued to hold power, but Solidarity had 
undoubtedly gained the psychological advantage as the so-called 
"puppet-parties" (Roskin 1991:150) who had previously ensured communist 
parliamentary dominance, deserted the government to swing the majority to 
Solidarity. General Jaruzelski, as President, was forced, in these 
circumstances, to name Solidarity's Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Prime Minister. 
And thus was Solidarity catapulted from an oppositionary social movement into 
power as a fully fledged political organisation (Breslow 1991:206). 
After Soviet leader Gorbachev had convinced the Polish Communist Party 
leader, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, not to oppose the Solidarity nomination, 
Mazowiecki was inaugurated in office by unanimous parliamentary vote (Roskin 
1991:150). Thus had Solidarity, in a sense, reached the pinnacle of its power. 
This speedy ascent, however, was followed by an equally speedy decline, for 
the movement, as a coalition of forces, could not withstand the disintegrating 
impulses of the revolution. The assumption of power had, in a sense, come too 
quickly for the social movement (Bauman 1991: 130). Its identity as a political 
party with a clear political programme was as yet underdeveloped and even 
undefined. In 1990, Solidarity split into the populist Walesa Supporting Center 
Alliance Party, and the Democratic Alliance led by intellectuals such as 
Mazowiecki. The organisation was, in some ways, hiving off into its natural 
constituencies. In late 1990, Jaruzelski resigned as president and Walesa won 
the presidency against his erstwhile comrade, Mazowiecki (Roskin 1991:150). 
(The distribution of the seats in the Parliament in November 1991 appears in 
Appendix 2.) 
Almost inevitably, it must be said, the rending apart of Solidarity into the 
Centre Alliance and the Democratic Alliance (later Democratic Left Alliance -
SLD) was a consequence of serious policy differences about economic strategy 
and the role to be played by former communists in positions of influence. 
While the former Mazowiecki government had introduced economic "shock 
therapy", into Poland, it appeared, however, to Walesa's Centre Alliance Party 
to be slow in privatising factories and dismissing communists in government 
and industry. The image Mazowiecki 's Democratic Left Alliance revealed was 
that of a moderate left, free-market party consisting of intellectuals with social 
democratic ideals (Korosenyi 1991:104). The Centre Alliance image was 
strongly Catholic but worker based with fervent nationalist and conservative 
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religious ideals. Walesa moreover, deeply charismatic, provided a form of 
leadership which won much popularity for its strong anti-nomenklatura stance. 
Walesa also won a great deal of support from the working class, who continued 
to see the electrician turned trade union leader as a champion of the rights of the 
workers (Rose 1993:156). 
With the Centre Alliance asserting a strong presence within the working class 
the Polish Communist Party, was thus effectively by 1989 cut off from its 
proletarian roots. Jaruzelski, the party's last leader, admitted : "From the very 
beginning, Solidarity was seen as the fruit of a working-class protest." 
However, as time marched on, political slogans appeared in its programme 
which showed that it had moved towards a counter-revolutionary anti-socialist 
form" (Prentice 1991:10) (see Appendix 21). 
2. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Towards the end of 1989 (see Appendix 5) the new Solidarity government was 
faced with a ruined economy with inflation running over forty percent per 
month (Evling 13.7.1990:27; Morawski 1991:286). Without the benefit of a 
precedent of how to transform itself from a planned to a free market economy, 
the government and finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz decided upon the rapid 
"shock therapy" economic policy. In cooperation with the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, the "shock therapy" policy went into effect on 
1 January 1990 (see Appendix 21). In terms of this, the polish zloty currency 
was devalued and made fully convertible to international currencies, prices were 
freed to market-dictated levels, government subsidies were eliminated, 
movement of private capital was allowed and limits were put on wage increases 
and credit (Roskin 1991:183). The policy, furthermore, included a cut in the 
national budget deficit and implementation of Western taxation and banking 
systems. 
Five months after the implementation, the government had succeeded in 
reducing inflation to below five percent a month, the zloty had stabilised against 
the dollar, the budget had been balanced and consumer goods had become once 
more available. However, as the government embarked upon an econoffilc 
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restructuring program the consequences of the economic policy began to be felt: 
Unemployment spiralled rapidly increasing from zero to more than 
two million in two years, forcing many more people below subsistence 
level (Boyes 1991:23; Balasz 1991:10). 
Parliament delayed the privatisation of unprofitable state enterprises. 
These enterprises cut back production and contributed to a deepening 
recession. Only five of the 7000 state enterprises were sold in 1991 
(Zielonka 1991:116). 
In June 1990 Polish salaries had been devalued by forty percent while 
food prices were fifteen times higher than they had been in June 1989 
(Raskin 1991:183). 
By the end of 1991 the economy started to recover slowly. The Parliament 
passed a law on privatization that gave all citizens vouchers to acquire shares in 
former state enterprises. However, the economic outlook continued to be 
unfavourable with a huge budget deficit, a cautious investors' climate and 
Poland having to compete with Czechoslovakia and Hungary for scarce regional 
investments. The completion of economic restructuring and thereby possible 
membership of the European Community (EC) would, it appeared, take some 
time, with the earliest predictions by the Polish Foreign Minister, Skubiszewski, 
indicating some sucess by the year 2000 (Holm 1991:15). 
How these developments on the political landscape impacted upon education, 
will be discussed in the next section. 
3. EDUCATION POLICY 
In this section a brief review of the period 1960 to 1989 is offered in order to 
grasp the education environment in which interest groups articulate their needs 
and the conditions which influence their development and participation in the 
reform process. This section begins by outlining the crisis which had developed 
in education and proceeds to highlight the communist government's attempt to 
address this crisis particularly through (i) its appointment of what it called the 
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Committee of Experts (CE) and (ii) the subsequent involvement of the Roman 
Catholic Church and Solidarity. The round-table talks between Solidarity and 
the government which flowed out of this attempt signalled the start of talks on ~ 
education reform, a process concretised by legislation after the first free • 
elections in July 1989. I 
The education system in Poland - a product of communist ideological and 
political reasoning in 1949 - appeared, by the late 1960's, unable either to ~ 
promote national development or meet the country's cultural and economic i-
needs. By 1970 general conditions in Poland had so deteriorated that the Gierek 
government was forced to re-evaluate its strategy in many areas, but 
particularly with respect to education. It appointed an expert committee, led by 
Jan Szczepanski, to investigate the situation and to recommend how the 
education system could be reformed to meet the needs of the changing society. 
The committee delivered its report entitled, The State of the School System in 
Poland, in May 1973 to both the government, and, unexpectedly, to the public, 
a novelty within the communist state (Mieszalski 1992:3) and indeed, it may be 
added, in any communist country. The 1973 report proposed a comprehensive 
reform of the education system. The recommendations centered upon a new ten 
grade compulsory common school system intended to provide students with 
options for pursuing both technical and academic tertiary education. The lack 
of public enthusiasm for the recommendations and the deepening economic 
cns1s, however, prevented implementation of the report (Januszkiewicz 
1985:3952). This left the education system essentially intact in the period 1973 
- 1987. 
The present situation in Polish education can be traced to January 1987 when 
Prime Minister Messner established a new Committee of Experts whose task 
was to evaluate the entire system and to suggest alternative education options 
for Poland. "Where do we stand?" and "What should be done" were two 
questions he required the CE to address. Messner's approach to the enquiry 
was influenced by concern that public attention was preoccupied with economic 
issues and not on the deteriorating education conditions, and that educators were 
caught up in debating the prevailing conditions at the expense of planning for 
the future (Mitter & Weiss 1991:71). In the end, Messner's insight was 
undermined. Opposition parties, sensing that the enquiry opened up political 
space, argued that the committee should engage the whole society in the 
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discussion. As a consequence, it took a year to establish the new committee, led 
by Czeslaw Kupisiewicz. (The composition of the CE is not given in literature.) 
Three approaches were considered (Gesicki 1991:1) by the new committee. 
These are considered briefly. 
The first option, "The Society Without Schools", and the replacement of the 
school with alternative training and education, an extremely radical proposal in 
anybody's terms, was rejected by the CE for fear that it would pose a threat to 
the development of Polish civilization and culture. A second proposal, "The 
Substantially Innovated School" in which the schools would undergo 
innovations (structure - organizational; programme - methodical) in a series of 
"jumps" (Gesicki 1991:2), was found by the CE to be suspect; its opinion was 
that this reform strategy would constantly be rendered obsolete, due to its 
retro-active nature and as a result of the expected rapid rate of social changes. 
A third approach "The Permanently Innovating School", found favour with the 
CE, and emerged as its proposal. Educational reform, in accordance with this 
approach, consisted of a double-stage strategy in which, in a first-stage, the 
present structure and organisation was to be maintained, but legal reforms 
would be prepared in order for the system to perform the "jump" to the new 
innovated education system. The important second stage is then to maintain a 
permanent state of innovation as a process of evolution in accordance with the 
needs of the changing society. 
Given the prevailing conditions m Poland, the CE in the end, however, 
recommended that the implementation of the reforms in the whole educational 
system should be put aside as they were of an experimental nature and time 
was needed to counter mistakes. A process should instead be pursued which 
would allow mistakes in reforms (e.g. structure; curricula) to become apparent 
following a certain time lapse after implementation. The committee thus opted 
for a "mosaic strategy" (Gesicki, 1991:3) in which selected sections of the 
whole education system would, in a step by step manner, be subject to reforms. 
It was felt, moreover, that this approach would give the Ministry the time to 
adapt their reforms from updated information where evaluations had been 
conducted. The CE concluded by citing a number of difficulties which were 
likely to be encountered. These included the inappropriateness of the education 
system in relation to the needs of the new market economy and the lack of 
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public support and absence of pressure from social groups for radical education 
changes. 
It was to Prime Minister, Mazowiecki, that the Committee of Experts delivered 
its findings in two reports in October 1989. Entitled Education under Impeded 
Conditions and Education as a National Priority, both reports drew attention to 
the reforms needed in education and found in the new Solidarity government a 
receptive audience. So palatable to the government were these reports that the 
government used them as the basis for legislation which it initiated (Mieszalski 
1991:4). 
The new government thus found itself in a peculiar pos1t1on. Having had to 
take responsibility for the affairs of state more quickly than it had anticipated, 
stem challenges lay ahead of it. In the CE's reports, however, fortuitously 
almost, were elements of an approach which it found acceptable and which it 
thus appropriated. This appropriation was the so-called "mosaic strategy" 
which the CE had recommended in its reports. 
On 6 June 1990 the new government passed the System of Public Education 
Act, containing the essential recommendations of the Committee of Experts' 
reports (see Appendix 18). Reflecting the social climate, the government 
sought to embody in the Act the values of what it perceived to be the new 
democracy. Principles emphasized in the Act included: 
liberty, justice, tolerance and openness to universal values (mostly West 
European), including basic human rights; a neutral ideology for 
education (that pupils have the right to receive tuition consistent with 
their own convictions within the parameters of the education system's 
principles); 
parental right to educate their children according to their own 
philosophical and religious beliefs (Szebenyi 1992:21). 
Growing out of a groundswell of reform, this legislation gave impetus to the 
process of renewal which had started after the Polish round table talks. Its 
impact was significant in that it initiated change in the key areas (Barret 
1.1991 :21) of management and administrative policy, curricula, structure and 
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teacher training. 
With respect to management and administration, the changes were far reaching 
A new management and administration policy was installed which led to the 
abolition of the old centralised 3 x 3 model of administration in which each of 
the three levels of administration (national, regional and local) contained a 
political organ, administration organ and Communist Party organ. A new 
two-level structure consisting of municipalities and the Parliament - with the 
courts as the means to appeal against state decisions - was brought into being 
(Szebenyi 1992:28). With the new structure the local education authorities were 
placed under direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. 
The idea behind the elections of local government and education authorities is 
described by Swidlicka (Evling 13.7.1990:30) as a means of "speeding up" the 
democratic reform process. Swidlicka reports that: "He (Prime Minister 
Mazowiecki) had hoped that the local elections on 27 May 1990 would sweep 
away the old nomenklatura and bring in thousands of local activists who would 
make use of the opportunity to implement innovative solutions to local 
problems and build completely new democratic structures from the ground up. 
It is too early to say to what extent the recent (May 1990) local self-government 
elections achieved this aim " (Evling 13.7.1990:30). 
With the disappearance of the regional authority level, schools became 
responsible to the local municipalities and local educational authorities 
represented by school inspectors. It is essential to understand the position of 
schools in this transitional period of the two-level model and therefore a 
discussion on municipalities and schools follows (Barret 1990:31). 
The 1990 Municipal Act in Poland, a companion to the System of Public 
Education Act, supported the formation of school districts around towns, which 
were to be supervised by one to two qualified experts on behalf of the 
municipality. The formation of school districts, based upon the English Local 
Education Authorities, was one of the options proposed in the Polish 
educational debate (Szebenyi 1992:28). The new system of administration 
opened the way for the autonomous development of villages, each taking 
responsibility for its schools. Provision was made by the Parliament iri the 
Municipal Act which would enable the government to intervene. In order to 
avert initial administrative difficulties in the change from the three level model 
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(to a two level model without the formal regional level), Poland retained 
forty-nine regional "voivodeship" (or provinces) administrative units. 
The decentralisation drive also received further momentum from the new 
emphasis placed on the role of the local community and municipalities. The 
displacement through the 1990 Municipal Act of the centralised imperatives 
made possible "bottom-up" initiatives by municipalities. In 1990 the local 
municipalities began by taking over the responsibility of kindergartens (children 
aged 3- 6) and by 1994, all primary and community schools of the region were 
to fall under such local jurisdiction (Szebenyi 1992:28). 
Autonomy at municipal level meant a transfer not only of the schools and their 
assets, but also the financial burden to the local community. Central 
government in Poland was to meet primary school budgets only until 1995 
((Szebenyi 1992:28). 
The implications at school level of this change have been equally significant. 
School autonomy has been advanced with the bulk of decision-making being 
delegated to school councils. The school councils are composed of parents, 
teachers and representatives of the pupils and local community. The position of 
these councils has furthermore been strengthened particularly with regard to 
local education policy, as a direct result of the new education legislation which 
gives these bodies wide latitude in so far as it contains only the basic guidelines 
for local policy formation on staff selection, financial policy and curricula 
background (Barret 1.1991:21). 
This process has helped to "liberate" (Wisniewski 1991:111) the schools from 
the central authority and bring them within the sphere of control of the local 
community. The transfer of financial responsibility to local education authorities 
is a key part of the decentralisation process. This transfer of responsibility will 
further give local authorities the power to appoint principals and to influence the 
pedagogical direction of school programmes. 
The second major area in which the reform made itself felt was that of subject 
curricula. The need arose to address what was perceived as propaganda in 
textbooks, to curtail overloaded curricula, to bring more flexibility to the syllabi 
and to consolidate the fragmented nature of certain subjects. The gist of the new 
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reforms was the common core school curriculum of minimum requirements. 
Outlined in the February 1990 publication of the Council of Europe Newsletter 
(Barret 1.1990:31), these reforms were: 
i) The teacher would spend 70% of his/her time tutoring to the common 
core syllabus, leaving him/her the remaining 30% of his/her time to 
utilize in a flexible manner according to own initiative. This was 
largely in an attempt to address those long-standing grievances and cries 
of dissatisfaction from teachers about the absence of alternatives 
available to the individual teacher (Barret 1990:31). 
ii) The privileged and compulsory status of Russian was dropped in favour 
of a statement giving equal status to all foreign languages. The context of 
this reform was that an acute shortage of foreign language teachers 
plagued the education system with Barret (1.1990:31) putting the demand 
for foreign language teachers in Poland at 20 000 in 1990. 
iii) The abolition of ideological monism. The path of ideological pluralism 
which had been started upon in Poland before 1989, was concretised 
under the Solidarity government with the elimination of the ideologically 
loaded "Social Studies" subject in schools which dated from the 
communist era (Szebenyi 1992:21). 
A new teacher training system and improvement of in-service training constituted 
the third focus of the education reforms. A diagram explaining the structure of 
the Polish education system appears in Appendix 3. At present the standard of 
education is adversely affected by the presence of 40 000 unqualified rural 
teachers in the system, 70 000 teachers who are not deemed adequate for a 
modem school and by the fact that 20% of the teachers corps do not tutor in the 
subjects in which they majored (Mieszalski 1992:6). 
Fifty new teacher training colleges were scheduled to open in October 1990 in 
terms of the 6 June 1990 System of Public Education Act. Offering a three year 
course included in which were many novel dimensions, such as foreign 
languages, for example, it was hoped that they would act as a model for the 
future development of the system and thus facilitate the introduction of 
innovative teaching methods. The ascendancy to power of Solidarity in 
1990 produced an interesting twist to these reforms. Since forming the 
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government, it has been reluctant to promote these structural changes further 
(Szebenyi 1992:25). This has been a direct consequence of the opposition to 
such changes by parents and teachers. This signalled the earliest presence and 
impact of interest groups in the education arena and a phenomenon that the 
government has to contend with since 1989. The structure of the Polish 
education system (see Appendix 3) therefore remained relatively unchanged 
following the events of 1989 (Januszkiewicz 1985:3953). 
4. EDUCATION INTEREST GROUPS 
The re-establishment of civil society in Poland after 1989 provided evidence of 
the normalisation of the activities of organisations, associations and groups 
from across the political, cultural and education sphere. Within education, I 
identified seven interest groups or social categories, each containing various 
disparate and often opposing groups, that were involved in the various 
education reform debates and ground-level participation in changes. These 
interest groups are teachers, teacher associations, independent schools, 
religious groups, parents, the media and public opinion (groups representing 
public opinion) and institutes of higher education. This section proposes to ask 
the research question: what were the circumstances that influenced the 
development of interest groups and their participation in reforms. The seven 
interest groups will then be dealt with in greater detail, with the analysis of 
each interest group ending in a description of its position in the proposed 
"arena of power" classification. 
4.1 Teachers 
Following the first democratic elections in 1989 and the embodiment of 
democratic principles in the education legislation passed in 1990, one would 
expect the reform of the Polish education system to have been a foregone 
conclusion. However, my research in Warsaw towards the end of 1991, found 
pro-reform educators, politicians and academics locked in a "battle" with 
communists, former communists and nomenklatura over the implementation of 
legislative reforms (see Appendix 24). This "battle" ranged from Ministerial, 
municipal and university right down to school level. 
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Although the Solidarity government had made enormous headway through its 
dismissal of many ideologists from the previous government, there remained 
communists entrenched at all levels. The dire situation which teachers faced, 
especially those pro-reform minded, is best exemplified by the comment of the 
president of the NSZZ, Stefan Kubowicz (22-11-91) (see Appendix 16 and 
Bibliography) : "Many teachers are still afraid of old communist headmasters 
and can't teach normally, the power of headmasters is a problem in reforms. 
There are many (with vested) interests, not just political, for example, 
associations of teachers, groups of old directors (headmasters) who want to 
maintain their influence and prestige". (The title "headmaster" is used in 
Central European education literature to refer to the head of a school and is 
therefore used in this study, as opposed to a more neutral and less sexist word 
such as "principal".) The persistence of pre-1989 conditions in certain schools 
creates the potential for conflict between pro-reform teachers, parents, pupils 
and local community on the one hand and those favouring the status quo or 
minimal changes. A research report entitled, New Ideas of Education in 
Poland, published by the University of Warsaw, outlined a number of problems 
which continue to plague reform implementation at schools (Bugaj 1991: 15). 
One of the central problems was found to be a shortage of teachers who are 
creatively involved in implementing Ministerial reforms. Schools in small 
villages and towns are especially prone to this phenomenon. 
Polish teachers have to come to terms for the first time in roughly four decades 
with the prospect and actual day-to-day task of dealing with parents as equals. 
The teachers' relationship with newly empowered parents (especially on school 
councils) therefore warrants discussion as their attitude will affect their 
participation in the process of a democratically functioning community-based 
institution. Teachers, however, are a complex community, as shown by a 
number of studies. One by Professor Wisniewski (1991: 113), who heads the 
education department at the University of Warsaw, found that a number of 
teachers in Warsaw were satisfied with the working of state schools and hence 
were resistant to reforms. Such teachers saw changes as negatively affecting 
their immunity to parental influence. Zahorska's (1991:113) work, coming from 
a sociological analysis, argues that elementary school teachers, whom he had 
interviewed, view parental influence as already being sufficient and in some 
cases too strong. Teachers have become used to complying with the principal 
and Ministry's directives and have never had to co-operate with parents. The 
teachers' present apprehensions therefore are deeply related to the prospect 
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where they will no longer receive toJHiown instructions but will have to 
co-operate with newly empowered parents (Wisniewski 1991:111). Nasalska'.s 
(1990:31) project on teacher conceptions of their professional roles confirms 
this distance between the local community and teachers. Polish teachers 
participating in this project, in reference to the elements most highly appreciated 
in their roles, put contact with the local community at the bottom of their list of 
responsibilities. (See Appendix 1). 
What these studies reveal is that although the isolated position of the school 
within the community is to an extent the result of the former communist 
centralised education system, the present reforms necessitate a change in teacher 
attitudes to fully normalize teacher-community relations. The willingness of 
teachers to accept the new participation of parents within their former exclusive 
domain in schools, will determine the nature of teacher-parent relations. 
The poor economic position of teachers has in many instances dominated 
education debates and pushed to the margin, questions of reforms and teacher 
implementation thereof. The salary issue is seen by 65% of teachers as the 
most urgent issue within the education debate. Teacher demands call for the 
Ministry to address the financial position of the teachers as a priority, instead of 
"idle" attempts to reform the education system (Stasinska 1990:88). The 
increase in the quality of teachers' work is seen by 74% of teachers as a direct 
link to an increase in pay (Stasinska 1990:88). The teacher demands centre 
around a pay increase equivalent to their work and qualifications. These 
demands are supported by 64% of teachers who see their financial position as 
inferior to corresponding white-collar groups. 
Teachers' replies in research data clearly underline the poor self-concept 
prevalent among teachers. Research reveals that 33% of teachers believe that 
they have no influence on reforms of the value-system (Stasinska 1990:92). 
This attitude, and the extent therefore, to which teachers criticise or are 
reluctant to criticise the education system, can be traced to a number of factors. 
The teacher is traditionally seen to be submissive to institutional, parental and 
community recommendations. Open criticism of the education authorities is 
also traditionally seen to have little effect and only lands one in trouble. 
The negative social status and prestige of teachers shape to a significant extent, 
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their approach and involvement in school affairs and orientation to reforms. In 
order to ensure teacher implementation of reforms and reverse the former 
top-down administration style, the new Ministry is faced with a paradoxical 
situation. The Ministry needs to take the lead in making certain national 
reforms whilst simultaneously being seen to enlist the input of local schools and 
communities. As many as a quarter of teachers, by the end of 1990, held the 
pessimistic view that the national debate on education reforms, was too late to 
stop the current wave of "ruining developments" - a reference to poorly 
equipped and understaffed schools (Kubowicz 22-11-91). Following the 
democratic elections, pro-reform teachers were in a disadvantaged position in 
relation to the reform process. This could be ascribed largely to the absence in 
the pre-1989 era of a legal and non-communist lobby and the existence of 
relatively few teachers as community representatives in public issues. Teachers, 
therefore, were separated from public life and lacked a tradition of participating 
in decisions affecting their work. They had ceded all initiative to the Ministry 
whom they regarded as having the only real ability to change the conditions 
surrounding their work. 
In the climate of uncertainty pro-reform teachers and those which cling to the 
former system, remain bogged down unable to make the transition to 
implementation of ground level reforms. 
Within the classification of interest groups that contest the education 
policy-making "arena of power", I would describe pro-reform teachers 
(dimension 4 - see page 67) as being in a position of weakness in view of the 
dominance of the Education Ministry in this process. In the short-term, the 
groups in dimension 1, e.g. reform communists, will continue to impact 
negatively upon pre-reform teachers, especially in light of the recent ascent to 
power by the reform communists. The power of pro-reform teachers in 
policy-making will only be enhanced given economic recovery, increased 
influence by the pro-EC economic lobby and backing by parents who share their 
reform sentiments. The possibility of teacher demonstrations and even strikes 
are not excluded in the near future, as the data reveals the lack of "access 
channels" (e.g. failure of the NSZZ reform proposals to the 1991 Education 
Commission and lack of media coverage) by teachers to gain an input into 
policy-making. 
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4.2 Teachers' Associations 
Teachers Associations are by definition established and organised to further the 
professional interests of a particular group of teachers (see Appendix 21). The 
discussion in this section looks at the two main antagonists in the Polish context, 
the Teachers Solidarity (NSZZ is the umbrella body of this association) and the 
Polish Teachers Association (ZNP). The position of both associations in regard 
to participation in education reforms is examined from the 1989 political 
transformation. Special attention is given in this section to the NSZZ 
pro-reform efforts in the parliamentary Education Commission (1991), election 
of headmasters in state schools, and the involvement of parents at school level 
(see Appendix 24). 
Education, in contrast to sectors such as transport and industry, where 
Solidarity was extremely effective, lacks the unity and the presence of a change 
agent. For example, only a third of the corps of 500 000 teachers in Poland 
belonged to Teachers Solidarity, formed in the late 1980's at a time when its 
activities were severely restricted by the communist government. The rest are 
members of the controversial Polish Teachers Association, one of the most 
powerful and influential interest groups in education. The ZNP trade union is 
controversial because it is politically left-wing, non-communist, with 60% of 
the teachers according to Kozakiewicz (1992:99) non-aligned. A third of the 
ZNP teachers were members of the old Communist Party and constituted the 
bulk of the group to which supervisors (inspectors) and headmasters also 
belonged under the former government. The non-communist label given to it 
by Kozakiewicz (1992:99) contrasts with that of Solidarity NSZZ's 
characterisation which views it as communist dominated (Kubowicz 22-11-91). 
During my group interview with the Solidarity NSZZ presidium, they ascribed 
the continued power of the ZNP to two factors: "The ZNP are rich because 
they have assets of pre-1989 (presidium members present : Kubowisc, Zielinski, 
Zurawski, Kropiwnicki, Kurylo, Baron- see Appendix 16, p. 184). The money 
power of the ZNP attracts members; for example, they can pay for language 
courses, hotels. They are popular because the directors are of the trade union 
and in the local villages they are all powerful. This ZNP trade union is of the 
old communists" (Kurylo 22-11-91). 
The National Education Section (NSZZ) led the pro-reform lobby in education. 
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The NSZZ leadership consists of a presidium with a president, vice-president 
and five presidium members, each democratically elected and representative of 
their regions (see Interviews in Warsaw). A review of the education reform 
campaign of the NSZZ, shows that their proposals centered around enabling the 
society and parents to influence schools and to have a choice of schools. Their 
anxiety, confirmed by Parliament turning down their proposals, is essentially 
that headmasters wield inordinate power. The NSZZ members of the 
parliamentary education commission put forward proposals which sought to 
increase the flexibility of schools so that they could respond to the increasing 
need of private firms and commerce (in the change to a market economy) for 
specific job skills. In spite of a few communist members coming out in support 
of the NSZZ proposals, the parliamentary education commission voted nine to 
eight to turn them down. According to Kurylo (22-11-91), the old communists 
now in Parliament, in the Education Ministry, at various levels in the education 
system and as a number of headmasters, remain a major stumbling block in the 
reform process. 
Much of the conflict, particularly between the ZNP and the NSZZ in the 
teachers associations can be traced to opposing views on teacher appointments, 
the old system of headmasters and participation of parents. Following the 
political transformation in 1989, education underwent a period of 
"housecleaning". The long debated need for free and open competition for 
posts was realised. However, a series of reports have indicated that the new 
criteria for appointments discriminate against former Communist Party 
members, disregarding individual ability in spite of a declared policy of 
so-called fair competition (Kozakiewicz 1992:100). 
The old network of headmasters is identified by Kubowicz (22-11-91) as a 
specific interest group within the education system: "Under the communist 
regime, all directors (headmasters) had to be confirmed by the party. This 
position we (NSZZ) want to change so that society and parents have influence 
in schools. This is the main thrust of Solidarity's demands". The power of this 
group of directors is viewed by many Solidarity teachers as a major obstacle to 
reforms at school level (Boron 22-11-91). The maintenance of their institutional 
dominance, their influence and prestige are seen as the main motivation for the 
anti-reform stance of the old communist school directors' group. In addressing 
this · issue, interestingly the NSZZ was successful in its negotiations with the 
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Ministry of Education. All directors appointed from 1992 were to be elected 
following a ballot of parents, teachers and the local authorities. 
Parent participation and involvement in school councils has however been 
mostly at those lyceums which have pro-reform directors. NSZZ members 
have also become involved in helping parents and pupils to adapt to the 
changing education system. The infusion of the spirit of democracy and parent 
empowerment at school level has also been met by resistance from PJ'O-status 
quo teachers. The influence of teachers' associations as interest groups, 
depends to a large extent upon the fortunes of the political party which they 
draw most of their supporters from. This is especially the case in a country 
such as Poland which has since 1991 been characterised by fragmentation of 
political parties and thereby a reduction of the lobbying power of teacher 
associations (Klosowski 1991:2). 
In spite of the political power of the ruling Solidarity government, their 
education section, the Teachers Solidarity continues to be overshadowed by the 
former Communist Polish Teachers' Association. The data indicates that 
dominant power within education remains in dimension 1 (see page 67), as both 
the ZNP and reform communists in local government form a formidable 
obstacle to the passage of any reform policy initiative by the NSZZ and 
pro-reform educators. Protest activity by the pro-reform organised teaching 
profession, in dimension 4, seems likely, given the successful blockage of 
reform proposals to the parliamentary education commission by reform 
communists. This is predicted as the commission is an important 'channel of 
access' to organised education interest groups. 
4.3 Independent Schools 
The breaching of the state's monopoly in education gave rise to what Andrej 
Witwicki (Starzynski 1990: 13), in an article, called an avalanche. Referring to 
the momentum gained by the independent school movement, as we saw earlier, 
within months new independent schools had come into being. By themselves 
independent schools have indeed emerged as one of the major interest groups on 
the educational terrain. The right to establish independent schools is viewed by 
the NSZZ as one of their first triumphs. "This right is the success of 
Solidamosc," stated the association's vice-president Albin Zielinski (22-11-91). 
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Analysis of this, the fastest growing interest groups amongst educators, will 
start with a discussion of the conditions which contribute to the founding of 
such schools, particularly the prominence of economic restraints on state 
schools and the intransigence of certain state teachers. Finally, the attitude of 
the Ministry to independent schools will be reviewed as well as the positive 
influence of these schools on mainstream public education. 
Late in 1989 the Ministry responded to growing parental demand and publicly 
removed the bureaucratic barriers which impeded the establishment of 
independent schools. This followed a successful high court appeal by Anna 
Jeziona, a teacher from Krakow, who sought legal sanction to start a private 
school. Public reaction to the court's findings was extremely enthusiastic, 
prompting Mieszalski (1992: 14) to comment: "The response was 
overwhelming. Between April and July 1990, two or three non-state schools 
appeared every day in various parts of the country." 
Katarzyna Skorzynska, a former Solidarity activist, and present spokesman for 
the new Ministry of National Education, explained this new spirit in Polish 
education as a liberation from the oppression of state control: "democracy in 
education .. means primarily the possibility to choose" (Mieszalski 1992:4). 
She describes this newly found freedom as the ability of parents and pupils to 
choose their schools and their teachers, and to influence the education provided 
for students. Parents and teachers have been given the right and empowered 
"to found or choose schools in accordance with their own educational and 
political expectations". The independent school movement, which can be traced 
to 1987 had clearly gained the support of parents and numbered two hundred 
and seven by the end of 1990 (Starzynski 1990: 15). 
The chairman of the Civic Education Association, Wojciech Starzynski 
(1990:5) describes the grass roots impulse which by 1990, gave character to the 
association that sponsored 105 of the 207 independent schools : 
"On July 15, 1987 at my house Marek Zielinski ... my wife and 
myself began to discuss how good it would be at least to break the 
monopoly of the Communists in education. Marek said, "Well, do it!" 
And that is how I started . . . One of the first people I talked to about it 
was Andrzej Witwicki. Then, among my friends, another dozen or so 
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people were willing to join in .... Then we talked to many research 
workers and activists. " 
Groups of parents and teachers swept up by a mood of optimism quickly 
became the driving force behind the founding of the Civic Education 
Association, the organisation largely responsible for the establishment of 
schools. In terms of the court ruling, teachers and parents were required to 
shoulder the major share of the responsibility for maintaining their independent 
schools (see Appendix 24). The only responsibility carried by the the Ministry 
of Education was to approve their syllabi. Since February 1990, however, 
schools became eligible for state subsidies up to 50% of their costs (Szebenyi 
1992:24). The outcome of this situation is that although private schools have to 
be funded by pupil tuition fees and although these are high in some cases with 
initial problems being experienced with equipment and facilities, it is generally 
accepted that these schools are better than their state counterparts (Wisniewski 
1991:112). 
Kozakiewicz (1992:95) ascribes the trend towards independent schools to 
parental and teacher dissatisfaction with the breakdown of relationships among 
staff, pupils and parents and the deteriorating education quality of state lyceums 
(schools). Teresa Bochwic (in Starzynski 1990:21) talking about pro-reform 
parents claims they were unhappy about the slow rate of changes at state 
schools, and as a result came to favour the "establishment and support of 
independent schools; rather than fighting with the bureaucracy to make an 
impact upon state schools". Parents were also attracted, according to Joanna 
Kurylo (22-11-91) of Teachers Solidarity, to the idea of independent schools as 
a solution to the continued presence of communists in the public education 
system : "The communists and those who cooperated with the old regime are 
still around and causing problems for those who want to reform education. 
These groups do not want to privatize factories and schools". 
The competitive element brought to the education system by independent 
schools is also seen, by educators interviewed, as a positive development for 
increased excellence in education. The points of optimism expressed in the 
Ministry's Report on Private Schools in Poland, published in Warsaw 
(Starzynski 1990:2) has, however, been met by some criticism. Independent 
schools are accused of luring away the best teachers and not contributing to the 
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educational needs of the lower income sectors of the population. In spite of the 
criticism, it is evident that independent schools have become an important 
catalyst for change in Polish education. Pomianowski, a secondary school 
teacher argues that "The transformation of the state education system would be 
slower and less efficacious if this system did not have to compete with the 
newly emerging system of non-state education" (Miesalski 1992:15). A strong 
case can thus be made that the creation of alternative schools, which the Civic 
Education Association describes as "a real educational mass movement " of 
parents' and teachers', has contributed to regenerating the civic society and 
breaking the long siege of the Party and State (Starzynski 1990:1). 
This much is evident in the new governments' attitude to independent schools. 
The education Ministry looks increasingly to private schools as a "social testing 
ground" especially in furthering foreign language training and implementing 
new management , financial and didactic reforms (Skorzynska in Starzynski 
1990:4). By the end of 1991 the Ministry had initiated active support for the 
independent school movement and formed a new section, headed by Katarzyna 
Skorzynska, to oversee co-operation between itself and such schools. The 
development of a non-rival relationship between the Ministry and independent 
schools is encapsulated in an admission of the Ministry through an official 
statement that: "Today, one can point out concrete examples which prove that 
well-functioning non-state schools have a positive influence upon nearby state 
schools, with state schools introducing innovations" (Mieszalski 1992:15). 
Independent schools have also acquired a new importance after the wilting of 
Solidarity's influence. Following the events of 1989 and especially in light of 
the "comeback" of communist political power in 1991, independent schools 
were seen to be engaging in "self -defensive power seeking". Founders of 
independent schools do not seek this form of power to engage opponents in 
a direct struggle in the education policymaking arena, but as a means to ensure 
the survival of schools which embody the principles of democracy, pluralism 
and differentiated education. It may be argued further, that independent schools 
do not seek to influence education policy making directly. These schools rather 
act as a catalyst for a change at local inter-school level and as a "social 
laboratory" for the Ministry of Education. The present relationship of power 
between independent schools (dimension 4 - see page 67) and the government 
( dimension1) is one of 'co-operation'. However, the yet unknown policy of the 
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incumbent reform communist government, could see the relationship change to 
the status of 'tolerance'. 
4.4 Religious interest groups 
Poland's history and that of the Roman Catholic Church are intrinsically 
intertwined. Allegiance to the Catholic Church is an emotionally charged issue 
in a society that professes to have a membership of ninety percent of the 
population. This seemingly "unanimist" part of the Polish character is best 
exemplified by the statement of Senator Kaczynski, prior to the passing by the 
Senate of the controversial abortion law in September 1990: "All good Poles 
are against abortion. Those who oppose legislation aimed at prohibiting it and 
sanctioning offenders, thereby constitute the bad part of the nation" (Michel 
1990:2). At the outset of this discussion it must be clearly stated that the Polish 
Catholic Church places accent on Nation over Society and thereby favours 
national exclusiveness, is uesistant to pluralist ideology and is vehemently 
opposed to the states' "slide into Western materialism, consumerism and 
secularism" (Longley 1991:12). This background is essential to understand the 
immense influence the Catholic Church has on any new government, as will be 
demonstrated in the historical overview below. The first "flare-up" in 
post-1989 education in Poland, will be dealt with as the opposing interest 
groups dispute the merits of introducing catechism in the school system. The 
key role players in the religious debate are identified by Szajkowski (1-10-91) in 
order to sketch the looming conflict between the Catholic Church and its 
opposition to pro-western factions in the government who wish to secure access 
and economic aid from the European Community. 
The context in which the church (reference to "the church" refers to the Roman 
Catholic Church in this paper) comes to play a role in the education debate 
needs to be spelled out. Although significant democratic changes have occul!ed 
in Poland, the slow process of democratising the political infrastructure and the 
political institutions, has led directly to conflict and a split in the governing 
group which had overthrown the Communists. The split, as we saw in the 
introduction, has led to the formation of Prime Minister Mazowiecki' s civic 
movement of new administrators and intellectuals who lean towards 
pro-centralism and, as a result, in the view of Jerschina (1990:302), have a 
questionable "democratic" stance. 
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Walesa's group is mobilised around the ideology of populism and solidarity 
amongst the working class and in support of the Catholic Church. This split has 
considerably weakened the capacity of the new government to push through its 
reforms. Laws are created but then implementation is left in the hands of the 
old administrators and clerks. In the face of this crisis the weakened new elites 
have turned to the Catholic Church for support. The Church, for its part, 
supports the government for political, ideological and historic reasons as the 
leading symbol during the overthrow of the communists. The support of the 
church has, however, been extremely ambigious and for the new government 
somewhat of a mixed blessing. Since 1989, the Church has attempted to apply 
pressure against the reform movement despite a continuance of changes and in 
fact has argued, as Jerschina and Kosiarz (1990:303) have shown, the view that 
the old administrators are more reliable if they pledge loyalty, than the 
democratic opposition and the radical liberals. 
The upshot is that unreliable as it is, political groups have been forced to work 
with the church. For Minister Mazowiecki's government, this has meant 
making some form of agreement with the Catholic Church. Almost as a reward 
for this, the church portrays the government as a symbol of "social-solidarity" 
and views criticism against the government as being criticism against the whole 
society. Building upon its following from the anti-communist campaign, and 
influence on government, the church, therefore, continues to play a major role 
not only in societal debates but within education. 
The power of the Roman Catholic Church within education becomes particularly 
evident when one recognises that one of the main reasons for the failure of the 
socialist reform school system was the deep-rooted nationwide influence of the 
Church (see Appendix 24). Research by Kozakiewicz (1992:92) confirms that 
about 90% of children and 60-70% of secondary school pupils are strongly 
influenced by the Catholic Church. The immense popularity enjoyed by the 
Catholic Church at the time of the Solidarity victory, gave the church the 
powerbase to influence the Ministry of Education. Szajkowski (1-10-91) tells 
that: "The church appealed to the largely uneducated masses for re-introduction 
of religious education." The outcome was the re-introduction of religious 
education in 95% of schools by December 1990 (Kozakiewicz 1992:93). 
This development, though not unexpected, brought shock reactions from the 
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seven non-Catholic Churches' Ecumenical Council , ,particularly for the way it 
came about . The first reaction came in the wake of a statement published by 
the Joint Commission (of government and Catholic Church representations) that 
school religious education would be taught in accordance with the general 
values and ethic of the Catholic Church. This reaction quickly turned into 
resistance which gained momentum when religious education was introduced 
within weeks of the announcement of the Joint Commission recommendation, by 
way of a Ministerial decree and without debate in Parliament. Ministry of 
Education officials admitted publicly that they had been subjected to pressure 
from Church authorities. Van Schaik (1991:28) confirms this in his report: 
11Betrokken ambtenaren zouden later toegeven dat de beslissing placetsvond 
onderdruk van de kerkelijke autoriteiten 11 • 
Although the law on religious education which was decreed in September 1990, 
guaranteed that non-Catholic pupils' would receive religious instruction in their 
own faith, the controversy centred around the practical implementation. 
Directly after the law was implemented, it became evident that the shortage of 
teachers resulted in many non-Catholic pupils going to different schools for 
religious education. Dutch analysts predicted that the classroom implementation 
of religion would result in high levels of discrimination (Van Schaik 1991:28). 
This anxiety was fuelled by the Polish periodical, 11Polak-K.atolik11 , which 
labelled those pupils who did not attend religious education classes, as II slechte 
Polen" (bad poles; Van Schaik 1991:29). The voluntary aspect of classroom 
religion was also brought into question when it became apparent that there was 
considerable pressure placed on the individual to conform. Prevailing popular 
attitudes of, for example, "So how can you be outside that? (Catholic Church), 
then you are against us, against the whole movement" (Szajkowski 1-10-91) 
were clearly in evidence. 
Despite protests in Krakow and Gdansk, the Joint Commission decided, in June 
1991, to continue religious education for one school year in order for the 
completion of the new education legislation. Szajkowski (1-10-91) argues that 
the introduction of religion in schools will have substantial repercussions on the 
education system and will inevitably result in opposing interest groups coming 
into sharper conflict. In this debate around religious instruction, there are four 
interest groups identified by Szajkowski, aside from the pro-Catholic teachers, 
parents and priests: 
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i) Trained teachers, produced during the communist era, who have a 
secular worldview and who still remain in schools. 
ii) A second group of teachers who are the pro-reform teachers and recent 
graduates of democratized universities and who will undoubtedly come 
intci conflict with the traditional, conservative and clerical priests who 
teach school religion. 
iii) Reform minded pro-Western European headmasters who have and 
continued to be confronted by priests who have been mostly isolated 
from West European trends and promulgate traditional values and have 
a higher social standing than headmasters. Talking of this situation 
Szajkowski remarked that : " ... intellectually they (headmasters) have 
made very little impact ... the quality of priests is particularly bad ... these 
are the guys who are going to the schools to teach a traditional type 
religion". 
iv) The fourth interest group is found within denominations such as the 
Polish National Church which collaborated closely with the former 
communist state. Parents of the non-Catholic denominations will 
strive to maintain their religious identity within schools. 
Although a decline in church attendance has been reported by Szajkowski 
(1-10-91), partly due to 'the demise of the common "communist enemy" and 
because of a preoccupation with bread and butter issues, the Catholic Church 
remains with a larger than life presence in Polish society, in political circles and 
in education. The re-emergence of the Catholic Church in Poland and Central 
Europe after 1989 as a force to be recognised within a changing society, has led 
Patrick Michel (1990:6) to observe that "religion is constantly being called 
upon, to channel energies in search of a new identity .... religion appears as a 
formidable vector of re-ideologization." 
The Roman Catholic Church is a good example of Weber's 'traditional' type of 
power and is an integral part of Polish history (Willhoite 1988: 14). The 
'authority' of the Roman Catholic Church can be ascribed to its broad power 
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base, which, unlike the multitude of post-1989 parties, is entrenched in the 
society. This analysis has clearly shown the immense power of the Catholic 
Church, as witnessed in the debate on religious education. The 'persuasive' 
type of power that the Catholic Church employs (calling on traditional and 
national values) and given its powerbase, will see the Church impact on 
education policy-making in the long-term. This impact will not only be felt by 
interest groups within dimensions 2, 3 and 4, but groups within dimension 1 
will be affected, as the Church's power remains 'stable' while successive 
political groupings attempt to consolidate their fractured power (see page 67). 
4.5 Parents 
The period 1989 to 1990 can rightly be described as a landmark in the process 
of the normalisation of parent-school relations. In the post-war era, parents had 
effectively been kept from having a meaningful say in their childrens' 
education. With the ascendancy of Solidarity this barricade was overcome: "for 
parents and teachers, it means the right to found or choose schools in 
accordance with their own educational and political expectations and to 
participate in school governance" (Skorzynska in Mieszalski 1992:4). The 
"awakening of civic culture" to its role in the reform of the education system, 
which sociologist Melosik (Mieszalski 1992: 11) reported as having been a chief 
casualty of forty years of communist rule", had indeed begun. 
The discussion opens with a recounting of the legislative empowerment of 
parents and their access to school councils. The communist legacy that parents 
had to contend with is given as background, leading into an analysis of parent 
participation in reforms by highlighting the attitude to reform initiatives. The 
economic pressures on parents are interwoven in the text. 
The 1990 System of Public Education Act paved the way for the establishment 
of school councils which in tum, prepared the way for the joint control of 
schools by parents, teachers and the local community (Barret 2.1991:21). The 
school councils act as mediators between all interest groups, including 
institutions which lend financial support to schools. These councils also havethe 
ability to influence the general didactic activities of the school in accordance 
53 
-- -
with the needs of the various interest groups (see Appendix 24). 
Parental input in education before 1989 was described by Wisniewski 
(1991:111) as a farce. This was firstly due to the total inability of parents 
to influence the education of their children in the communist era. Secondly, 
"parents were looked upon as intruders who should not stick their noses into 
school affairs or, much less, supervise the teachers" (Anna Paciorelc in 
Starzynski 1990:11). 
Parents, therefore, are relative newcomers to schools and are only at the initial 
stage of large scale participation. The effects of four decades of 
non-participation by parents in education was evident in a paper delivered at the 
first Polish-American Education Conference in November 1990. Discussing 
parental attitudes towards reforms, Zahorska (1990:110) concludes that parents 
see all change as originating exclusively from the Ministry and local authorities. 
Zahorska's research suggested that only 50% of parents who participated in the 
research saw a role for themselves in general school affairs and only 30% 
wished to have a say in electing a principal. Furthermore, only 10% of parents, 
polled in the research, answered in the affirmative as to whether they would 
become actively involved in the reform movement (Wisniewski 1991:114). 
Ewa Chmielecka (vice president of Solidarity National Science Section and 
lecturer at the Warsaw School of Economics 21-11-91) and a parent at the 
Lyceum 1m Lelewala in Warsaw, commented that "Parent involvement was not 
very good. Parent attendance at teacher-parent evenings might be well 
attended, but to really participate is a problem". 
In contrast, however, to the low parental involvement in the reform movement 
suggested by Zahorska (1991:110) and Wisniewski (1991:114), my attendance 
of a parent-teachers evening at the Lyceum 1m Lelewala (state school) in 
Warsaw, brought a different perspective of the initiatives of parents at school 
level (Chmielecka 21-11-1991). On parental initiative, a class was formed, 
consisting of pupils whose parents saw the need for extra classes to enrich the 
given curricula and engage in a number of projects. 
The parents led by Ewa Chmielecka; (21-11-91), received special permission 
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from the Minister of Education to start the extra classes and an enrichment 
programme. The project consisted of a number of extra subjects, e.g. History 
of Fine Arts, History of Religion, and New Polish Cinema which were taught in 
school-time. Parents paid the teachers for tutoring these additional subjects. 
The parents were fortunate to acquire a Canadian teacher to give six hours of 
English a week as they were eager for their children to learn English. 
The parents of this project were also of mixed income which put a limit on their 
activities in the present economic conditions: "Finances of parents is a 
problem. Lack of teachers of English is a problem, pay is low. Textbooks 
(Polish) are very expensive and private tutors of English make three times more 
than what schools can pay per hour" (Chmielecka 21-11-91). The 
headmistress, herself, was actively involved in the project as one of the class 
tutors. The "enriched class" was busy in November 1991, planning an 
exchange programme with a school in Britain. The project entitled "Concept of 
Democracy" and supported by the Council of Europe was for a two week 
exchange of pupils to familiarise both groups with the others' society. The 
financial difficulties faced by this particular school management were 
highlighted during my visit in November with the state announcement that the 
December education budget was on the point of exhaustion. 
In order to realise the programme, the parents of the "enriched" class project 
had approached the mayor to channel some of the municipal tax from the 
community which the school served to launch the project. In personal 
communication at the school, two further obstacles (except finance) to changing 
education, were emphasised . These were: 
i) the continuance of a very centralised and specific curricula which left 
very little room for teacher creativity or supplementary subject 
matter; 
ii) the overly authoritarian approach practised by some teachers, which at 
times affronted the pupils' dignity and placed pressure on the pupil in 
class. Chmielecka (22-11-91) expressed the opinion that the "Basic 
problem in the system are teachers who do not know how to relate to 
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pupils correctly". 
Reflecting upon the visit to the Lyceum Im Lelewala, the author was left with 
the lasting impression of the critical role of parent initiatives in the transition 
period in education. Clearly the parents were not of the privileged class, 
nevertheless they pooled their resources to ensure that their children 
experienced the benefits of the new openness and changes in education. 
Although the position of parents (for ot against pluralist education) cannot be 
indicated on my classifications "Ideology" axis, due to insufficient research 
data, this interest group is set to have the greatest impact upon the "arena of 
power" (see p67). After four decades of 'elimination' from access to 
policy-making by the government's 'self-centered powerseeking' for ideological 
purposes, parents have now been empowered through participation in school 
councils. Personal communication and parent initiatives give a strong indication 
that,_ regardless of domination by the ruling power elite (dimension 1) in 
national policy-making by means of 'inducements' (for example: financial 
support) and 'legal' power and perhaps even old apathies, parents are beginning 
to wield increasing power at local level. Parents draw their power from the 
local community and local issues, and not from the debate related to a choice of 
traditional, socialist or West European education, and base their concerns on the 
need for the best education to equip children for a job in the rapidly changing 
society. Parent participation in school boards is set to increase as they pressure 
the "ruling-elite" to address their concerns on education policy-making. 
4.6 The Media and Public Opinion 
In Central Europe the communist states held an information stranglehold for 
over four decades. In this period the official Polish party mouthpiece, the 
"Trybuna Ludu", in reality only served to keep the nation informed of the 
achievements of the government. Information about events in the rest of the 
world came from "Radio Free Europe" and the "BBC" (Evling 13.7.1990:1), 
who with underground resistance newspapers and the free media which sprung 
up in many cases literally overnight, contributed to the overthrow of the 
communist governments in 1989. 
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The achievement of a free press in 1989, however, also brought with it the 
difficulties of democracy when it soon became clear that the press and broadcast 
media would be involved in the struggle for political power (see Appendix 24). 
Most of the media were privately owned and as Ellen Eggenhuizen (16-9-91)) 
of the Utrecht School of Journalism remarked upon her return from Central 
Europe: "Most new political parties have their own newspapers, these can also 
be seen as pressure groups and official mouthpieces of parties". A result of this 
new media freedom was that political and economic issues dominated the 
headlines at the expense of education. 
Personal communication by interviewees related the dominance of political 
issues prior to and following the political transformation. The economic crisis 
flowing from the "shock therapy" shift to a market economy, also effectively 
kept education from national prominence. The small number of education 
articles in the press in 1990-1991 bears witness to the low priority of education 
within the consciousness of the new democratic society. This trend has been 
documented by Wisniewski ( 1991: 11) and indicates that personal goals of 
teachers related to education had shifted from a priority ranking in 1977 to 
fourth position by 1986 (see Appendix 4). 
The fragmentation of the governing coalition parties and numerous new parties 
which numbered twenty nine in the Polish Parliament in November 1991 
(Klosowski 10.11.1991:3 -see Appendix 2) not only contributed to confusing 
the voters but led to the weakening of cohesive and effective public opinion 
within the education debate. Slawomir Majman (Klosawski 10.11.1991:8) in 
the "Warsaw Voice" daily editorial, commenting on the economy and public 
opinion, said: "The Poles, who for years were in the forefront of the struggle 
for democracy, are proving today that they can also be in the forefront of lost 
illusions. Again, the political struggle is over power and not about how to solve 
the major socio-economic problems". 
In fact, the lack of public media interest in the education system in the pre-1989 
period, when public concern was limited to the issue of teachers' status, this 
issue had been the topic of debate in teacher circles since the 1960's. But even 
this debate was poorly aired. The campaigns of the Polish Teachers 
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Association, for example, the only legal representative of teachers interests 
prior to 1989, received very little media coverage whilst its own press did not 
cover its lobbying adequately either. It is only since the political transformation 
that teachers have had an opportunity to raise openly the question of their status. 
This achievement has itself been a compromised one. Journalists who have 
attempted to put the case of teachers have come under fire from some school 
administrators (Wisniewski 1991 :84). 
The result is that both the media and public opinion do not appear on the 
"Ideology" axis of my classification. However, I am of the opinion that the 
involvement of the media and public opinion in the "arena of power" will,, 
irrespective of its positioning, have a powerful impact upon all four dimensions. 
This is said, given the fact that the media form one of the main channels of 
access for interest groups to ·propagate their views and to pressure the "ruling 
elite" . The only threat to my prediction would be the ascent to power of a party 
in dimension 1, which will endanger the consolidation of democracy and 
thereby revert back to the pre-1989 "media clampdown". 
4. 7 Higher Education and Research Institutes 
The impression that I gained whilst interviewing and talking to some of the 
Solidarity education and scientific community was that institutions remained in a 
state of flux as successive political coalitions from the original (1989) Solidarity 
struggled to implement an economic policy that would appease the majority of 
people. Mikolai Kozakiewicz (1990:48; vice-chairman of the Parliament's 
Commission for Education and Youth) concluded in his article - Education 
research and Polish Perestroika: "Only a full knowledge of impending disaster, 
of a catastrophic state of affairs in a specific area, will galvanise people into 
action". This research will demonstrate that in spite of public scrutiny and 
government strategy to pressure institutions to reform, a number of obstacles 
need to be overcome. This discussion will show how the legacy of state 
control of the pre-1989 intellectual "nest of the opposition in Poland" 
(Chmielecka 7.1991:1) brought about the present debate on how to recuperate 
universities and research institutes, caught in a crisis of academic quality. 
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Evidence will show that the education Ministry and academic pro-reform 
groups have to contend with a "catch twenty-two situation." On the one hand, 
legislation has granted. institutions autonomy which has aided the entrenchment 
of the nomenklatura. On the other hand, to reverse this situation, the 
government finds itself in the ironic position that the same central state 
intervention policy that it opposed in the communist era might be the only tool 
to dislodge the nomenklatura from their positions of influence. This dilemma 
aside, other challenges confront those working in higher education. 
The democratic revolution was closely followed by a search for a new 
administration, reflecting the political changes, in the various state departments. 
The period 1990-1991 was characterised by the rapid change of staff not only at 
government level, but within the domain of higher education and research 
institutes. A number of old communist institutes were either closed down or 
renamed and restaffed. In this period interest groups grew sharply as 
Communists and their former ' collaborators, at all levels of management, 
resisted the democratic reforms and the newly appointed pro-reformists (see 
Appendix 24). This compelled the state to initiate policies to ensure compliance 
with its policy directives. 
Education research institutes which have a direct influence on the development 
of education at school level and should take the lead in providing schools with 
alternative models, can be divided into opposing interest groups, termed 
Maximalists versus Minimalists by Kozakiewicz (1990:46): 
i) The Minimalists view the existing society and education as acceptable 
and do not question the basic values or objectives of either. They 
favour some measure of modernisation and democratisation to achieve a 
cautious revolutionary path towards the new society. 
ii) The Maximalists propagate a number of forward leaps in a radical 
revolutionary change of structures. Proponents of this view see the 
education system as intrinsically corrupt and support the notion of critical 
research which calls into question both the objectives and basic values of 
education. 
The remaining vestiges of nomenklatura and conservative academic staff which 
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form strong local lobbies have compelled the state to initiate policies to ensure 
compliance with reform directives(Chmielecka 21-11-91) .Institutions which have 
been granted autonomy have contributed to the process of entrenching the old 
anti-reform staff and structures. This forced the government to legislate 
additional regulations in order to gain limited control and exert pressure on 
structures reluctant to transform. Two of the main state strategies have been: 
i) the granting of financial reserves (universities have a 16% budget shortfall 
- 1991) to those universities making the best progress with reforms 
(Chmielecka 7.1991:2), 
ii) the financing of the education research sector on a competitive basis. 
The new democratically elected state Committee for Scientific Research, 
annually evaluates all research units. Karczewski (1991:2) and 
Frackowiak (1991:1) report on the sharp criticism and resistance of 
"well placed and established" groups in the science sector which are 
unwilling to adjust to a survival of the fittest policy. State funds would 
thus be awarded to researchers on the basis of excellence achieved and 
not on the proximity, politically, of institutions to government. 
Institutions of higher education, such as teacher . colleges and universities which 
prepare future teachers, constitute a vital link in transformation of the education 
system. The September 1990 Academic Education Act, ensured the autonomy of 
universities and prepared the way for reforms. The problems facing universities 
in their progress to reforms are: 
i) fears of the continuance of the former system as, "people do not have the 
psychological mechanism to perform the task of cutting jobs" 
(Sorensen 1991:9); 
ii) anxieties with respect to staffing, especially with conservative lecturers 
being unable to adapt to the greater choice of courses offered to students. 
The newly renamed Warsaw School of Economics (WSE), for example, 
has opted for a process of staff selection through the student body. The 
school will offer various specialities by the third term in 1991. The WSE 
will then give students the opportunity "to choose among different 
lecturers of the same course and in the process serve as an indicator of 
lecturers competence and teaching quality" ( Chmielecka 21-11-91). 
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Universities in the period of transition are characterised by conflict between 
interest groups on the issues of rate of reforms, academic power and 
dependence on the state. Additional controversies are the positions of the 
scientific nomenklatura, professors appointed as a result of negative selection 
(according to political criteria under the communist government) and the 
contradictory interests of scientific and· research groups in a time of changing 
state financing of research. Chielecka (21-11-91), Jerschina and Kosiarz 
(1990:304) and Frackowiak (1991:2) depict university administrators, 
professors, students and the "academic middle-class" as the other most 
prominent interest groups in higher education. The silent conflict is between the 
older traditional professors and the younger generation of doctors who were 
active in the Solidarity underground and political movement and who favour 
acceleration of reforms and closer ties to European academics. 
Although the Minister of Education (1990) was popular among the "academic 
middle class" (young doctors), he is strongly opposed by the professors and 
Parliamentary Senate. The result was that the professors and tradition prevailed 
and with this declined the probability of significant changes occurring in the 
university structure (Jerschina & Kosiarz 1990:302). In spite of the professors' 
opposition to government central control of the universities, the professors are 
clearly not recognising the same principle with their dominance over the 
students and doctors. However, the professors in calling on the support of the 
government and Church, have exhibited growing dependence on these 
structures. In this process their new found autonomy might become a gift to the 
new power elite. The emigration of young pro-reform scientists as a result of 
the former state policy of weakening the intelligentsia through low salaries, has 
contributed to diminishing the chances for rapid reforms in science and 
education. In the period 1985 - 1990 alone, 220 000 university graduates left 
the state controlled economy for the private sector or to emigrate (Wisniewski 
1991:74). 
In 1991 I came away from the Warsaw seminar, Higher Education: Law and 
Practise, with the impression that in spite of the economic brake on reforms 
and vestiges of nomenklatura at higher education and research institutes, that 
pro-reform academics had crossed the "rubicon of academic freedom". 
Although university and research institutes' servility to state ideology had been 
dealt a fatal blow by new legislation and Ministerial strategies, Meek et al (in 
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Sorenson 1991:11) reminds us that the transition remains incomplete: "While 
there can be little doubt that nearly everywhere higher education is being asked 
to fulfil new roles and to serve more diverse community needs, demands and 
expectations, little is known about the inter-relationship between policy outcome 
and the structure and character of specific higher education system" in Central 
Europe. 
The research indicates a three-way power struggle within higher education and 
research institutes. The main role players in this conflict of interests are the 
traditionalist professors, academic nomenklatura and "academic middle-class". 
Both the professors and nomenklatura are in dimension 1 (see p67) and favour 
respectively traditionalist and status quo education. In direct opposition, on the 
negative pole of the "Ideology" axis, in dimension 4, are the pro-refonn 
"academic middle-class" that lobby for pluralistic values and academic 
decentralisation from a dominant state influence. The influence of the professors 
and nomenklatura (dimension 1) on the arena of policy-making will be 
strengthened by any centralist government, for example, the Democratic Left 
Alliance (former communist) which gained the largest vote in the 1993 
parliamentary elections. The only scenario which will reverse the present 
domination of groups in dimension 1, will be the bolstering of groups in 
dimension 2, as the economic recovery, European integration and academic 
co-operation begin to become a reality. This development could swing the 
balance within the "arena of power" from the anti-refonn Minimalists 
(Kozakiewicz 1990:46) in dimension 1, to the pro-refonn Maximalists in 
dimension 4. 
Participation of interest groups in reforms; circumstances influencing 
development of interest groups 
In this section, I briefly consider each of the interest group categories. I begin 
with teachers. It is evident from the discussion that in spite of the political 
playing field being levelled, teachers found themselves in a disadvantaged 
position in their relationships with the community and parents and were thus 
relatively powerless to influence education refonns. The research demonstrates 
that teachers had come face to face with their traditional inability to influence 
Ministerial policy, as had been the case under the fanner government, and were 
thus slow in changing their attitudes and participating in the transition process. 
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In talking to educators in Poland I gained first-hand experience of this 
phenomenon which confirmed references in the literature that a number of schools 
and individual teachers, especially in small towns and villages, continued to 
support the status quo and were inclined to retard the pace of Ministerial reforms. 
Participation in the reform movement was left to individual teachers. and schools 
with pro-reform headmasters, who, it must be said, struggled against the 
dead-weight of their reluctant colleagues. Their effectiveness was thus severely 
constrained. 
Wih respect to the organised teaching profession, Solidarity played a smaller role 
as change agent for education than had been the case in the other sectors of 
society. The dominance of the former communist and for a long time only legal 
organisation, the Polish Teachers Association (ZNP), continued after 1989 and 
thwarted reform initiatives by the Solidarity aligned National Education Section 
(NSZZ), not only on the parliamentary education commissions, but in the 
implementation of reforms down to school level. 
Independent schools constitute the third category. The dissatisfaction of certain 
teachers and parents with the slow pace of reforms at state schools and the 
anti-reform sentiment of some teachers led directly led to the establishment of 
independent schools. These schools are viewed by both founders and the education 
Ministry as a "social testing ground" (Starzynski 1990:4) for future reforms of 
the state system and· in a number of documented cases have led to state schools in 
the vicinity of independent schools, adopting and implementing innovative 
practices. 
The Roman Catholic Church, itself the fourth category, had become a rallying 
point for those supporting reform of the communist system, and found itself 
amidst the first controversy, as the new Ministry moved to implement religious 
education. This development was viewed by some people as an attempt to extend 
Roman Catholic power in education and was opposed as an undemocratic example 
of unilateral state action. The potential. for future conflict seems probable, given 
the determination of the traditional conservative priests, and the opposition of 
those who tutor religion and those headmasters who favour instead West 
European type education reforms which are more secular in emphasis. 
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Parents constitute the fifth category. The most profound effect of the former 
education system is seen in the abstention of parents from the education process. 
Parents see change as directed from outside and exhibit a reluctance to becoming 
involved. Parental participation in reforms is therefore largely represented by 
individual initiative (e.g. Lyceum 1m Lelewala - Warsaw Secondary School). 
This trend is substantiated in research which indicates that only 10% of parents 
polled in October 1990, actively supported the reform movement (Wisniewski 
1991:114). 
Public opinion makes up the last category. The minimal effect of public opinion 
and media investigation in education before 1989 had kept the community in that 
period from publicly debating education issues. It is only since the political 
transformation that public opinion began to impact upon the direction of education 
policy development. 
In spite of the leading role played by universities such as Warsaw, Krakow and 
the Warsaw School of Economics, the data indicates that certain institutes of 
higher education have used their autonomy (granted in 1990) to ward off policy 
and staff reforms, thereby attempting to cling to their all powerful pre-1989 
position. The extension of reforms to all institutions will depend upon the state's 
success to bring pressure to bear through a strategy of awarding research grants 
and allocating subsidies, dependent on the pace of reforms. 
Teachers are a key element to the success of any state's education policy reforms. 
In Poland, however, teachers face a daunting task to re-establish themselves as 
an interest group, given their isolation from the community under communist 
rule. Teachers need to re-address the prevailing negative social attitude to their 
profession and public suspicion of forty years of ideologically selective admission 
of candidates to education training institutions. An even greater challenge 
that awaits the post -1989 teacher core is the urgency of reversing the culture of 
submission and non-criticism with respect to central top-down policy directives. 
The extent of teacher participation in school councils and community issues could 
be the decisive issue in the strategy to diminish central control and power. This 
situation moreover, hinges on the rebuilding of morale amongst teachers. 
Interviewees were unanimous in talking to me that the single biggest constraint to 
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transformation from the communist past was the economic crisis that had gripped 
the country by the end of 1991. Severe constraints on the education budget 
resulted in mere "modest school reforms" (Mieszalski 1992:18) as lack of funds 
left teachers with poor salaries, deteriorating work conditions as school 
maintenance came under pressure and meaningful reforms were ·left to await 
economic recovery. 
The establishment of teacher associations as an influential interest group is closely 
linked to political affiliation and their stance on reforms, particularly those of the 
two main organisations' (see Appendix 21). In the contest for influence, the 
pro-reform NSZZ had the initial political edge, but lack of members and financial 
assets enabled the former communist Polish Teachers Association to retain its 
dominance and so stall NSZZ initiatives. Breaking with the former system's 
practices at school level has placed individual pro-reform NSZZ teachers in a 
vulnerable position, as headmasters continue their grip on power. Powerbrokers 
appointed under the former government also continue to be influential at 
municipal level, a reality which prompted Szebenyi (1992:30) to comment that 
teachers remain at the "mercy of incompetent municipalities". 
The independent school movement, which can be traced back to 1987, gained 
eminent support from parents and was catapulted to the forefront to become one 
of the leading interest groups, as alternatives to state schools were demanded by 
impatient parents. Independent school founders, which included prominent 
reformers, wasted no time in transforming and creating a new sector in the 
education system. Independent schools which numbered two hundred and seven 
by 1990 (Starzynski 1990: 15) are set to increase as conditions persist which led to 
their creation. These include dissatisfaction with the rate of state school reforms, 
breakdown of the teacher-parent-pupil relations and demand for school-leavers 
able to slot into the new market-orientated economy. 
The stature of the Roman Catholic Church as an education interest group, active 
as a rallying point since the communist era, cannot be doubted. The Catholic 
Church was the first interest party to make headway into education after the 
political transformation. Seemingly regardless of opposition, the Catholic Church 
succeeded in securing religious education (albeit voluntary) in schools during 1991 
- making a renewed showdown on the matter seem probable in the future. At 
school level a power struggle ensued as pro-reform headmasters and secular 
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teachers trained under the former system were confronted by conservative priests 
on their staff. The position of the Catholic Church has been vindicated by public 
support for the church, particularly as expressed in the popularity amongst young 
men for joining the priesthood (Szajkowski : 1-10-91) and by the passionate 
support for the Polish John Paul ll. 
The lack of parental input in the pre-1989 education context, described by 
Wisniewski (1991:111) as a farce, had conditioned parents to such an extent, that 
they were, and remain hesitant to become involved as an organised body in state 
schools. Schools are therefore not only faced with eliciting parents' participation 
in newly created school councils, but changing the negative prestige of schools 
and the low status of teachers. 
The lack of proper media coverage of education has continued after 1989, ~ the 
economic crisis followed the "shock therapy"shift to a market economy;and 
effectively kept education from national prominence. Fragmentation of political 
parties and voter confusion and subsequent voter apathy in later elections, 
weakened the formation of a public opinion forum to pressure the government to 
maintain the pace of education transition. 
An overview of the remaining scientific nomenklatura and the success of 
conservative professors to consolidate their positions (given the autonomy granted 
to higher education institutions in 1990) has led to the exodus of young pro-reform 
academics and the decline in probability of significant changes in the majority of 
universities' structures similar to the democratic transition in secondary education. 
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5. CONCLUSION : ARENA OF POWER 
Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making arena or "Arena 
of Power" 
"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups) 
1. Pro-EC membership sector 
of business 
"I" AXIS (negative pole) 2 3 
4 1 
1. Pro-reform educators 
ii. Independent schools 
m. NSZZ Solidarity 
iv. Pro-reform "academic middle 
class at institutes of higher 
education e.g. Warsaw 
School of Economics 
v. Maximalists at research 
institutes 
1. Managers of former state 
enterprises resistant to 
free market 
"I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole) 
1. Solidarity government 
ii. Reform communists in 
local government 
m. Roman Catholic Church 
1v. Polish Teachers 
Association 
v. Academic nomenklatura 
VI. Former communist teachers 
opposing reforms 
vn. Minimalists at research 
institutes 
"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups) 
Groups in dimension 1 and 3 see education's function as a monistic affair catering 
for a single value system be it traditional education (Education Ministry), Roman 
Catholic values or socialist (reform communists) education policy. These interest 
groups include both internal education based members and external interest 
groups, for example, the business sector. In dimensions 2 and 4 both internal and 
external groups are found that see education's function as the provision of 
differentiated and pluralist education. Broadly speaking both dimensions 
represent people that favour pro-western European modern values and education 
philosophy. Although the research shows that parents are only on the threshold 
of using their influence in their participation in school boards, the power 
exercised by this interest group, albeit in dimension 4 or 1, can have a great 
future impact on the shift of power between the negative and positive poles of the 
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"I" axis. The lack of conclusive data on Parents and Public Opinion/Media made 
the positioning of this interest group on the "I" axis, impossible. 
The influence and power of groups in dimension 2 will probably show a 
substantial increase with economic recovery and the involvement of the business 
sector seeking qualified manpower and joint ventures with education. However, 
the successful transition of the "shock therapy" period in the economy will be a 
deciding factor on the future influence of pressure groups in dimension 2. By the 
end of 1991 the interest groups in dimension 1, remained the custodians of power 
in the policy-making arena. 
Following the political "change of guard", the Roman Catholic Church is the only 
pre-1989 interest group that has exhibited a constant growth in its influence, both 
within education and wider society. By contrast, the initial dominance of 
Solidarity and its various offshoots originating from Solidarity has shown a steady 
decline. Complicating this equation has been the revival of the old guard. The 
decline of Solidarity has been mirrored by the growth of the former Communist 
Party, culminating in the Democratic Left Alliance parliamentary victory in 
September 1993. The efforts of the majority of parties from across the political 
spectrum, including the SLD to form an alliance with the Catholic Church, 
confirm the indication that support from the Catholic Church is seen as a 
prerequisite for gaining political power. In conclusion, it appears that the lack of 
·· political "clout" of pro-reform groups in dimension 4, has left the Roman Catholic 
Church as the deciding force in the Polish education's "arena of power". 
Given the "fallout" of interest groups in the four quadrants I use, the situation in 
education is likely to develop in complexity. What is of consequence for us in a 
work of this nature is to assess the alliances which have been made and/or are 
being considered in this situation. Clearly none of the interest groups operate as 
isolated organisations. Both as groups and as individuals, they find themselves in 
a multitude of contexts - daily - where they would be negotiating and discussing 
and reflecting on their specific interests. In situations such as these, it is evident 
that positions people occupy are liable to change as individuals and groups' 
attitudes become either more or less flexible. Axes of influence and alliance, as 
suggested in the diagram, are likely to emerge from the groups in dimension 1. 
Such groups would seek political power to influence education national 
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policy-making (e.g. remnants of the Solidarity government with reform 
communists and the Catholic Church). Within dimension 4 a pro-reform block 
can become a reality as the independent schools, NSZZ Solidarity and "academic 
middle class" are pressured to greater unity to defend the reform movement 






The political transformation which Hungary recently experienced has roots 
which can be traced back to the 1956 revolution, an event that proved to be a 
political ~atershed and contributed to Hungary's peculiar brand of socialism. 
The events of 1956 enabled Hungary, as the "jolliest barrack in the (socialist) 
camp" as Bathory (1991:1) put it, to establish cultural and scientific relations 
with the West, virtually as it pleased. Structured according to the Bereday 
framework, this chapter starts with a political introduction (section 1) which 
will show how the liberal communist government acted as a catalyst for the 
breaching of the infamous Berlin Wall through its open border policy, thereby 
detaching East Germany and Poland from the East Block. It will also try to 
show, on the other hand, that although thousands of pro-democracy marchers 
took to the streets in Budapest in 1989, the revolution was mainly a "top down" 
affair as the Communist Party continued to manage much of the transition, 
including the process leading up to the multi-party elections of April 1990. 
This situation and the adverse effect of the "fiscal crisis" (Hausner in Campbell 
1993:89) that Hungary (similar to its two northern neighbours) has had to 
contend with, fundamentally, it is argued, defined the character of the 
parameters within which Hungary . worked in its attempts . to reform its educa.:.. 
tional system (section 2). 
Unlike most of its Comecon partners, Hungary provided its citizenry with much 
greater individual freedoms. The greater political and social manoeuvrability 
enjoyed in communist Hungary, facilitated the relatively high degree of 
decentralisation of education which came as a result of the 1985 Education 
Act. This decentralisation and the school autonomy which came with it, 
enabled interest groups to emerge, thus raising the level of debate in education 
considerably. As we shall see, however, the debate around centralisation as 
opposed to decentralisation came to be an issue of torment in education. This 
issue was to surface repeatedly between 1989 and 1991. Another issue at stake 
in this debate was the question of an appropriate education philosophy for a 
future system. While the 1985 Act, central in the country's education history, 
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had positive features, it was also negative in certain features which were a 
continuity from the communist period (section 3). This section examines the 
reforms that were introduced through the Act, inter alia the management and 
administration policy, curricula and teacher training and uses this as a basis and 
the background to comprehending the role of interest groups in the period 1989 
to 1991 (section 3). 
The section on emerging interest groups starts with a summary of the 
circumstances that influence the development of such groups and the degree of 
interest group participation in reforms. How interest parties have been moulded 
by their participation in the education reform process and their attempts to gain 
an input in policy-making and access the "arena of power", is sketched in this 
section (sections 4.1-7). The discussion of each of the seven interest groups 
ends with remarks on the relationship of the particular group to the remaining 
groups within the policy-making arena. 
This "arena of power" and the balance of power between the interest groups are 
then presented in the form of a classification diagram in the concluding section 
(section 5). 
1. POLmCAL TRANSFORMATION 
The Hungarian revolution of 1956, a landmark event in Central European 
history, marked the first sign of rupture within the monolith of its Communist 
Party. Workers had become disillusioned with Stalinist industrialisation and 
party intellectuals began to· speak out in favour of liberal communist alternatives 
to the Soviet model (Roskin 1991:100). Taking their courage literally in their 
hands, people began to mobilise. Dissatisfied with the Stalinist Rakosi 
government, thousands of protesters under the banner of the Petofi intellectual 
movement, gathered on 23 October 1956 in the streets of Budapest, calling for 
free elections, an end to Soviet occupation and the return of the liberal 
communist, Imre Nagy. Their courage was met, however, by brute force. The 
security police, in their wisdom, shot a number of demonstrators, thus 
precipitating a country-wide revolt which led to reform communists taking over 
local government. Imre Nagy was allowed to return, and on 30 October, he 
formed a multi-party coalition government, promising to comply with the 
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demonstrators' demands. The Nagy government made its intentions clear. 
It wished to follow the Yugoslav model of socialism, independent of Soviet 
influence. 
This was not to be. The dream of an independent Hungary was quickly 
shattered as Soviet tanks rolled into the country on 4 November 1956, leaving 
behind them 32 000 Hungarians dead and summarily removing the liberal Nagy 
government. To make their point, the Soviets executed Nagy and his chief 
associates, thus obliterating the effervescence of 1956 (Hoensch 1989:292). A 
non-Stalinist communist, Jonas Kadar, was installed by the USSR to govern the 
country. 
In some senses, however, the Soviet government had overplayed its own hand. 
The international outcry following the 1956 revolution conditioned 
circumstances and shaped for Kadar the kind of leadership he would exercise. 
These enabled the Kadar government to develop a degree of independence 
hitherto unknown within the Soviet orbit. In particular, a secondary economy, 
centered upon conditions similar to a market economy and functioning on a 
small business basis, came into being, thus stabilising, somewhat, the 
vulnerable economy (Schopflin 1991 :246). For more than thirty years, as a 
result, communism operated in a political milieu which was decidedly 
ambiguous about its gravitation- was it a part of the East or the West, or could 
it survive, Januslike, as a composite of both. Formally, Hungary appeared to 
be a client state of the Soviet Union, but, embedded in its political psyche was 
an ambivalence which rendered the political hegemony of the USSR very 
problematic. Elements of this ambiguity are clearly in existence as we move 
into the uprisings of the late eighties. 
In mid-1989, the liberal Hungarian communist government played a key role in 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, essentially because of its non-compliance with the 
Warsaw Pact agreement to keep visitors within its borders (see Appendix 21). 
It allowed thousands of East German "tourists" to flee across its borders to 
Austria and then West-Germany. This forced the East German government to 
change its hardline policy and open the Berlin Wall. This situation had arisen 
as a result of a succession of events. Briefly, the tough Karoly Grosz, who had 
replaced Kadar, had come under immense pressure during 1989 in a constant 
swirl of public anger expressed through marches and rallies. People were also 
angry at Grosz for allowing police to violently break-up freedom rallies. The 
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theme during most of these rallies was the demand for freedom of expression 
and the right of other parties to exist. In the wake of this, levels of popular 
protest were rising to an unprecedented pitch. Nightly, and for weeks, over 
75 000 people could be found in the streets. The upshot of these developments 
was that parliament was forced to bow to popular demands and legalise all 
political parties (Di Cortona 1991 :318). 
Large pro-democracy rallies took place in March 1989, and in June of that year 
the government was forced to support the symbolic state reburial of the 1956 
revolution leader, Imre Nagy. This was a crucial psychological and indeed even 
political breakthrough. A further, more significant development was that the 
government, led in September 1989 by the liberal communist, Reszo Nyers, 
met with opposition parties and the first free election was set for April 1990. 
The 1990 elections saw the establishment of a relatively stable modern political 
party system, characterised by the participation of a number of parties. These 
elections were won by the moderate anti-communist opposition presented by the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), which polled 42.75% of the vote (165 
seats of the 386 seat Parliament) (Korosenyi 1991:56). The MDF, under Jozsef 
Antall, chose to form a coalition government with the Smallholders (43 seats) 
and Christian Democratic (21 seats) parties (Di Cortona 1991 :320) (see 
Appendix 13). The Hungarian Democratic Forum, a moderate Catholic party 
(similar to a Christian Democratic party), occupied a position to the right of 
centre. 
The MDF were opposed by the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a secular 
liberal party which, with 92 seats, attracted the second largest number of votes 
in the first free elections (Szelenyi & Szelenyi 1991:122). The SZDSZ, under 
the leadership of Janos Ris, together with the Young Democrats, a youth party 
with 21 seats, were inclined to a position left of centre. The Socialist Party 
(ex-communist with 33 seats in Parliament) was not expected to show growth, 
thus leaving the political spectrum without a centre left, a characteristic of a 
well-functioning democracy (Roskin 1991: 174). 
The fortunes of the MDF government, as the situation during the election 
revealed, depended upon the ability of its president, Antall, to form a united 
front with its coalition partners whilst turning the political focus from the 
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Catholic nationalist (MDF) versus secular liberal (SZDSZ) debate to the welfare 
of the society (e.g. unemployment) during the process of marketisation (Roskin 
1991:174; Pataki in Evling 7.1990:21). However, the range of political parties 
represented in Parliament and the issues which remained at the centre of 
political debate, appeared likely to pose a threat to the stability and functioning 
of the democracy. 
2. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
The new Budapest government, having to decide an economic path for Hungary 
and distressed by the initial "economic chaos" following the application of 
"shock therapy" to the Polish economy, decided to opt for a gradual transition 
to a "free market" (Gati 1991:141). The country had, in fact, started the 
process of marketisation during the 1980's, even though private enterprise had 
been limited to small family businesses as part of the so-called "secondary 
economy" (Szelenyi & Szelenyi 1991: 125). The context in which decisions 
were having to be made is important to describe. The economy was still 
attempting to recover from the collapse of the Comecon network. This led to a 
fall in factory sales as the business sector found itself struggling to adjust in the 
new and highly competitive international market. This crisis was paralysing 
Poland and presented Hungary with a severe challenge. The government 
therefore took the cautious way, in the process of opening up markets, 
privatising factories and removing price controls. By the end of 1991, only 
8.3% of former state enterprises had been transferred to the private sector 
(Kocsis 1992:114). Towards mid-1992, an estimated one hundred of the major 
state-owned enterprises were to have been privatised in terms of the 
government's intended policy aim of attaining 50% private ownership of the 
business sector (Roskin 1991:185). The "gradualist" economic approach of 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary has led Szelenyi (1989:8) to characterise their 
economies as socialist mixed economies, wherein the state continues to be 
dominant, but the private sector plays an increasing stronger role (see Appendix 
21). However, by the end of 1992, the method by which this process was to 
take place remained an issue for debate, particularly in Parliament ythere the 
process of privatising the remaining state enterprises brought parliamentarians 
into fierce argument (Kocsis 1992:115). 
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In early 1992, the Hungarian government embarked upon a strategy to become 
an European Community (EC) member. It applied for EC associate membership 
and sought to join the Pentagonal Initiative (Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Austria and Yugoslavia) to gain experience in regional co-operation (Gati 
1991:145; Royen 1991:85). The promise of economic growth through EC 
(European Community) membership has a strong attraction for Hungary. 
Stringent EC membership requirements, such as operating a functioning market 
economy, having in place a democratic political system and maintaining 
particular environmental standards, remain challenges for the government to 
meet. 
In spite of opinion polls which indicate pessimism amongst Hungarians on 
economic issues, analysts such as Adalbert Rittmuller, German government 
economist in Budapest (Harden 1991:1), see the Hungarian economy as leading 
the Central European countries to economic recovery, as Hungary is largely 
unafflicted by high unemployment, strikes, collapse of social services and has a 
mere 26% (Mizsei 1990:78) inflation rate (Boyes 1991:23 gives the rate of 
inflation as 28.2% - see Appendix 5). The overall economic picture, though 
this relative comfort notwithstanding, is still poor and in some sectors critical. 
The EC and United Nations Economic Commissions report indicated that 
Hungary was expected to reach the bottom of its downward economic swing by 
mid-1992 before it could begin its recovery (Ipsen 1991:11). 
3. EDUCATION POLICY 
In order to comprehend the undercurrents in the present debate on education 
reforms, one needs to trace the political tug-of-war that began with the 1956 
revolution and persisted through a succession of reforms which came in 1961, 
1978 and finally in 1985 with the previously referred to Education Act, and 
which is discussed fully below. In this tug-of-war· there was on the one hand, 
the Hungarian communist government who sought legitimacy in education, 
albeit in a top-down style by granting its populace limited school-level 
autonomy. Through the 1985 Act, however, it continued to control the field. On 
the other hand with the opening up of limited space, the return of civil society 
was evident - prompting Mitter and Weiss (1991:27) to call this period the 
period of "cool socialism". As Eva Kuti (in Katus & Toth 1990:125) showed in 
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substantiating Mitters' assessment that there were in existence some 6 600 
voluntary associations and foundations by 1986. This activist trend had, 
significantly, moreover, spilled over into education during the debate of the 
1985 Act, highlighting in one sense, but also confirming earlier signs of the 
presence of clearly identifiable interest groups in the field. The economic 
crisis, however, was to overshadow these developments as financial constraints 
and Ministerial resistance to implementation of the 1985 Act led to a crisis 
by 1989. 
In trying to understand educational and social policy in Hungary prior to 1989, 
one needs to be aware of the profound effect of the 1956 revolution on the 
country. The revolution marked a break in the ideological hegemony of the 
Communist Party, and not unexpectedly, precipitated a shift in relations 
between Hungary and the other "socialist" countries in the region. The Kadar 
government, haunted by the 1956 popular uprising, sought to prevent, through a 
number of concessions to popular pressure (e.g. limited private enterprise), a 
re-occurence of that event. It, furthermore, despite working with the 
ideological constraints of its Comecon membership, led Hungary towards 
developing good relations with the West in socio-economic and scientific fields. 
The country which emerged out of this was undoubtedly unique and came to 
acquire the image of a hybridised oddity - a "Hungarian Goulash" some called 
it, or "refrige socialism" (Mitter & Weiss 1991:27). Tokes (1990:48) describes 
this period of Hungarian Socialism (1957 - 1988) as an attempt by the Kadar 
government to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the nation. One effect of this 
period was that a number of structures were to come into being and important 
legislation was to be passed, for example, the 1985 Education Act, which were 
to continue to have an impact under the post-1989 government. 
One of the central inheritances of the 1956 revolution was the Kadar 
government's modernisation policy. The government sought through the 
Education Reform Law of 1961 to modernise Hungary and ensure political 
stability (Tokes 1990:48) (see Appendix 19). A three track secondary education 
system (academic; vocational-commercial; vocational - agricultural) was 
established. This comprehensive or general school system formed the basis for 
state education and made possible, entry to either academic or technical higher 
education. The period 1956-1979 was characterized by a concerted state effort 
- albeit from the top - to promote and advance pupils from blue-collar 
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backgrounds through to secondary and higher education (see Appendix 9). No 
doubt, some of the intention behind this was to avert the growing political 
crisis. But a tiger had been unleashed, however. In promoting freedoms, the 
government was itself feeding the crisis. 
A hint of a potential crisis was suggested in a public opinion poll conducted in 
1976 on what voter support would be in a hypothetical free election. This 
showed alarmingly that the Socialist Workers Party, the party in power, would 
gain a mere 5% of the national vote (Hoensch 1991: 265). Clearly, further 
concessions were called for. By.the mid-1980's the government, under pressure 
from its reformist wing, educators and young white-collar intellectuals, passed 
the 1985 Education Act. The 1985 Act was prompted by the clear 
disintegration of the centralised school system and fears that "people would be 
taking to the streets" to press their demands for school automony (Halasz 
1990:387). The 1985 Act, undoubtedly an important moment in the reform 
process, one that was to resonate in the post-1989 debate, justifies brief 
elaboration. 
In summary, the legislation gave recognition to school level autonomy and 
resulted in attempts at the deregulation and depoliticisation of school 
administration. Schools were given the freedom, within the parameters of 
national strategy provisions and central government's educational policy and 
plans, to identify their own educational tasks. School issues which did not fall 
under statutory authority were left to the schools to decide upon. Furthermore, 
schools could work out supplementary curricula and develop their own local 
educational system. The school staff was described as the key decision-making 
and consultative body in matters relating to educational questions. It could 
veto, through a secret vote, the appointment of a new school director 
(principal). School councils consisting of parents and community organisation 
members were, however, set up as a balance to the influence of teachers 
(Halasz 1991:3). 
The 1985 Act in reality initated the process of separation of legal administration 
and pedagogical control. The centralised pedagogical control which the earlier 
system had perpetuated was in fact abolished by this law. Pedagogical matters 
were now the sole domain of schools and even the local and regional 
educational departments had lost th~ir right to interfere. The most visible, and 
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indeed, the most positive result was that within a three year period, school 
innovations had increased sharply with one quarter of schools having utilised an 
educational innovation fund set up by the government (Halasz 1991 :3). 
The general public response to the 1985 Act was that of enthusiasm, particularly 
after the failure of the government's attempts to reform its school curricula and 
programmes in 1978 (Halasz 1991:3; Howell 24-9-91). Under fire from the 
critical theoretical writings of Hungarian educators, (prompted by exposure to 
Western influence), and in reaction to the rapidly changing political scene in the 
mid-eighties, the reformist Ministerial policy-makers saw the 1985 Act as their 
opportunity to secure stability within the education system (Norman 1-10-91). 
However, the motives of the state were not entirely persuasive - it was widely 
suspected of attempting to gain the support of educators and the public through 
this manoeuvre (Nagy & Szebenyi 1990:9). The major problem was that 
uniformity of provision, determined by the centre, continued to be very much 
the preferred approach of government. This stance did nothing to convince 
educators and the public that fundamental change had occurred. In the 
meanwhile, what is more, the economic crisis (as described above) had reached 
such proportions by 1988 that it became clear that not only was the financing of 
school reforms in jeopardy, but it became apparent that the state was 
experiencing difficulty with the daily maintenance of schools (Gyarmati 
9.1991:2). And further, to compound this, in 1989 the decade long crisis 
around the Ministry of Education's leadership came to a head with the 
resignation of Bela Kopeczi and his deputy, Ferenc Gazso, who had been 
appointed to implement the 1985 Act. Gazso, frustrated by a stubborn civil 
service, acknowledged in an interview that Ministry staff were reluctant to 
implement reforms which would effectively decrease their power. He went on 
to remark that "reform of schools fell apart" as the Ministry "failed to react to 
the requests and suggestions of educators" and continued to impose central 
directives contrary to the spirit of the 1985 Act (Darvas 1991 :243). 
At the end of 1989 the education terrain found itself overrun by new 
role-players as political reforms brought levelling of the playing fields. This 
section will relate how, . in this new environment, the various political parties, 
each supported by· members of different education interest groups, went about 
establishing their positions on this new levelled ground and mapping out their 
vision of educations role for a future society. The result was that the monist 
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concept of education advocated during four decades of communist rule was 
about to change radically as education was pulled into the orbit of the party 
political struggle for power. 
The latter part of the discussion focuses on how the new Hungarian Democratic 
Forum-led government found itself amidst a public debate on central versus 
local control of education, thus interestingly, participating in the resurrection of 
the very dispute which emerged out of the 1985 Act. While this government 
constitutionally entrenched the principles of democracy in education, it was 
unsure how to proceed with devolving power away from the centre. As an 
attempt to resolve this problem, it commissioned two expert committees to . 
hammer out the question of whether, and how, to centralise or decentralise 
education. While waiting for these two committees to report their findings, the 
government went ahead with reforms in three key areas. These three areas 
were : management and administration policy; curricula and teacher training. 
It is in this period, of what one can call political flux, that various interest 
groups became very much more visible in attempts to influence and lobby the 
government, in an effort to further their particular goals. This section will also 
follow the education Ministry's response to the pressure of these special interest 
parties. Before looking at these groups, it is important to lay out how the 
political terrain was configured with respect to education. 
The discussion begins with the positions of the major political groupings on the 
eve of the first free elections, as political posturing on the new education law 
began in earnest. As schools were reduced to a political football, parties were 
increasingly seen to reflect the pre-1945 dictum of Cardinal Mindszenty that 
"Whoever holds the school in his hands, holds the youth" (Mihaly & Horvath 
1991:5). In October 1989, the Parliament paved the way for a multi-party 
system. The political parties which had been caught up in the process of 
democratisation began to formulate their education-manifestos to canvas 
electoral support. 
The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), drawn from supporters of a 
traditional-nationalist value system, was the first major opposition party formed 
before 1989 to put forward a well-defined education program. Its strategy, 
however, was void of concrete reform proposals and reflected mainly value 
positions. These values included freedom, democracy, autonomy and the 
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understanding of education as a "strategic branch" in its budgetary allocations 
(Darvas 1991:246). As the biggest member in the new coalition government 
described above, the MDF education program has the most support. 
The former main democratic underground opposition formed themselves into 
the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). Their position is that the entire 
social system would have to be radically reformed. Their 1989 education policy 
positions, for example, confirm their stance against state monopoly in 
education, opting instead for consolidation of local control. A faction amongst 
them, according to Horvath (30-10-91), even advocate total and unconditional 
freedom within education and the total absence of state control. Parents and 
students are regarded, within this view, as responsible citizens, capable of and 
therefore deserving of the right to decide upon the nature, level and educational 
institutions of their choice. The most outspoken anti-communist and radical 
party among the political organisations, the SZDSZ's education program is the 
clearest indication of the extent of the change in pedagogical thinking in 
Hungary today. International values and understandings as opposed to specific, 
Hungarian ones, appear in several references in their documents. They support 
full school autonomy in regard to structure, content and finances and concede 
only to national final examinations for the purposes of standardisation of 
academic performance .. 
The other important organisation in this fray is the Hungarian Socialist Party 
(HSP). This party evolved from the former Communist Party and had a brief 
section on education in its 1989 policy manifesto. The HSP had as goals, the 
curtailing of central control with more autonomy for schools and the freedom of 
learning as a guarantee. 
Political conflict between these parties, particularly in education, reached a 
climax after the April 1990 elections. Especially contentious was the issue of 
religion. The MDF-led government immediately became embroiled in a public 
crisis with its proposals to re-introduce 'religious education'. The furore which 
followed, forced the state to adopt a consensus approach rather than attempting 
a one-sided radical return to traditional values. The government faced with 
parliamentary agreement on desired school and teacher autonomy, but division 
on the function of the state (e.g. state control versus local "client" control), 
appointed a new committee of experts to deal with the matter. 
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This committee was appointed in June 1990, consisting of experts linked to the 
1985 Act committee, led by the deputy educational minister from the former 
Kadar government. This committee's draft, made public in February 1991, 
triggered a "particularly intensive and fierce discussion" in political and 
educational establishments (Horvath & Mihaly 1991:5). The draft proposed a 
liberal solution to the educational problems and was favourably received by the 
public, but opposed by the government. Government criticism focused on the 
need for increased state control in regard to curriculum issues and 
administration whilst religious and national values should be re-affirmed by the 
new legislation. What this highlighted was the paradoxical situation in which 
the 1985 Education Act (which had begun the process of decentralisation) now 
stood, and, which was in fact, in direct contrast to the new government's move 
towards tighter state control. This paradox had become evident in the 
government's drive to reincorporate, ironically from the top again, conservative 
and traditionalist values in education. 
The positive public response to the draft had far-reaching implications for the 
reform process (Halasz 25-10-91). For one, there were many positive 
responses and secondly, it spoke of feelings held deeply about the crisis in 
education. By its sheer volume thus, public voice was inserted and continued as 
a key factor within the process of education policy-making. The intensity with 
which it made itself felt and the scope it covered, forced educators and 
politicians to treat public opinion more sensitively. The "large public 
acceptance" of this first draft of the committee's report, compelled the 
government to accept a number of points (e.g local school autonomy and 
community participation in decision-making process) from the first draft and use 
these as a starting point for the second group of experts. asked to continue the 
draft (Halasz 25-10-91). 
And yet, this vocal popular support not withstanding, government remained 
opposed to the committee's recommendations, and, in the end, the weight of its 
opposition was decisive. This led to the appointment of a second expert 
committee selected from the Hungarian Institute of Educational Research 
(HIER). In October 1991, after sitting for a few months, the group submitted 
its proposals which, not unexpectedly, went in the opposite direction of the first 
expert committee's proposal. They emphasized the necessity for central control 
and made much of the limitations of school autonomy. The deviation of the 
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second draft from the first saw the parliamentary parties locked in debate as the 
second draft (supported by the government) retained as a point of departure the 
supposition that (as in the 1985 Act) the main function of the state was to 
regulate the relationships between the community, individual, school and state. 
This view departed from the oppositions' beliefs that the operation of schools 
and institutional policies should not be the product of a predefined state 
pedagogy. 
As the majority party, the MDF had sufficient support to push through their 
proposals, and so on 5 November 1991, the draft act was passed by Parliament, 
ostensibly aimed at correcting the perceived imbalances of the first draft act. A 
general criticism of the first draft had been that it had excluded state schools in 
contrast to church and independent schools, from collecting additional funds 
from pupils. State school managements would in future be able to rely on 
additional state grants to deal with school budget deficits. 
Despite the progress which took place during these two years, from pre-1989 
"humanist inspired socialist education" to the post-1989 "humanist inspired 
democratic education" (Szebenyi 1992:21), comprehensive education legislation 
embodying the ideas voiced in the debate which came in the wake of the second 
committee's proposals in 1991, was only expected in 1992 (Bathory 1991:4). 
In the meanwhile, following the parliamentary and local elections, a number of 
developments, as a result of the changing political scene, were being set in 
motion and manifested themselves in three spheres : management and 
administration policy, curricula and teacher training. This discussion will 
review these changes in these spheres in order to show how the opposing groups 
within the society crystallised into seven interest groups which are examined in 
the second half of this chapter. 
In terms of the November 1991 Act, with respect to administration, the old 3 x 
3 model of governance was abolished. This left Hungary with a two-level 
structure in which municipalities were made subordinate only to Parliament, but 
left in control of local schools. The government implemented through the 1991 
law a system whereby the country's eight regions each had a commissioner to 
supervise the legal activities of the various municipalities or communities. Each 
municipality had the same supervisory role over the schools within its 
jurisdiction. Schools were limited to being able to implement curricula and 
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conduct evaluations of the curricula. This has meant · that some schools· 
had to "defend" themselves to get back the autonomy they gained from the 1985 
Act in those municipalities which chose to intervene in the schools' pedagogical 
activities. Schools, without the option to call on regional authorities, now found 
themselves in the middle of the balance of power between the Ministry of 
Education and the local municipality. 
This system of management served to open up the debate on centralisation 
versus decentralisation. Severe criticisms have been voiced by people opposed 
to decentralisation who are against the concentration of power and supervision 
in municipalities (Horvath 30-10-91). The incompetent involvement of some 
municipalities in the pedagogical process in schools and the questionable 
authority of some school boards have served to strengthen the call by those 
favouring recentralisation and a return to the former system of controlled 
supervision (Szebenyi 1992:28). This issue was made even more complicated 
by the Ministry of Education's assertion that it had professional responsibilities 
to schools. The legality and practical implications of this interest- particularly 
the state's establishment of eight Regional Education Centres - only served to 
confuse the situation. The present debate on decentralisation (school autonomy) 
or centralisation is a direct result of the "ambiguous government policy in 
regard to the 1985 Education Act" (Halasz 25-10-92). The state is undecided 
and ambiguous to the autonomy granted to schools by the 1985 Act or whether 
to create a new central control mechanism. This debate has gained momentum 
with the staunch defence of school autonomy by teacher associations which 
grew in professional self-confidence under the autonomy granted by the 1985 
Act. The opposing interest groups in this debate are, firstly, the educators and 
experts, who support the division or decentralisation of power and seek to 
ensure school autonomy. Secondly, the Christian-National movement and ruling 
MDF-led coalition, who want to ensure central control over the schools. The 
result of government centralisation policy might best be summed by Horvath 
(30-10-91) : "Democratic changes in the political system may result in 
authoritarian action in education. The legitimation for centralisation is seen not 
only for an increase in professional control over schools, but for more political 
power". 
Before 1989, the municipalities occupied a politically subordinate position in 
the centralised education system. Abolition of the 3 x 3 model after 
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1989, transferred the Ministry's reform program to the municipalities. What 
this implied was that the autonomy afforded to schools by the 1985 Act was 
extended under the new government, but schools now found themselves in a 
precarious balancing act between the Ministry and local municipalities. Geza 
Saska (Chairman of the Education Commission of the Metropolitan General 
Assembly) remarked, for example, that the great act of power balancing had 
only begun: 
"The struggle between three elements of the system has not yet been 
brought to an issue. At present, nobody knows the kinds 
of balancing techniques that will develop among them as well as 
their respective spheres of authority. However, it has already become 
obvious that schools also are as afraid of the municipalities as of 
anything new. Another reason is that the initial steps (involvement 
with schools) of the municipalities have not always been fortunate." 
' 
(Szunyogh 1991:8) 
The most frequent fears expressed by teachers and parents on school autonomy 
were put to Ferenc Gazso, Chairman of the Draft Committee, preparing the 
Concept of the New Education Act, by Szunyogh (1991:6), editor of the 
Hungarian Educational Weekly. Gazso, in response, confirmed that schools 
would continue to be able to exercise a professional autonomy, but not in an 
absolute manner. They would have to depend on the "recognition and 
institutionalised representation" of parents and local community. Community 
participation in the new school boards was seen as a prerequisite in balancing 
the rights of the school, its clients and other interest groups. Halasz (25-10-91) 
sees the threat to school autonomy as well founded in light of the parliamentary 
balance of power weighed in favour of the pro-centralisation coalition 
government. This trend is in contrast to a 1990 public poll which confirmed 
that 48.4% of people surveyed preferred a local approach to education problems 
(see Appendix 7; Question 17). The new law of self-administration which 
placed responsibility for the schools in the domain of the local self-governing 
bodies has been eagerly awaited by the majority of schools and education 
experts (Horvath & Milhaly, 0 1991:3) as it is a vital step in the process of 
decentralisation and should spell the end for bureaucratic controls and the old, 
Prussian school system. However, local municipalities are still viewed with 
some suspicion as some teachers regard local education bodies as "tentacles" of 
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state control. As a result of this law the schools virtually became "a captive of 
the disputes between the parties" (Horvath & Mihaly, 0 1991:3). This situation 
developed as it seemed the ruling coalition was losing its central power over the 
schools, after suffering heavy defeats in local elections and some cities (liberal 
victories). Teachers have thus become wary of local education structures which 
could be seen as another form of central control. 
The ambiguity and displacement of authority aside, the administration, 
management and reform of the public education system remained handicapped 
by the lack of funds, impatience of the population and the continued opposition 
of interest groups from the former system. The obstacles that the Ministry has 
had to contend with were revealed by Education Minister, Andrasfalvy during 
his speech at the start of the 1991 school year (Szunyogh 1991:3). Andrasfalvy, 
spoke of the continued functioning of "bad institutions" (unspecified schools) 
and the difficulty of changing peoples' conditioned response after forty years 
under the former system's influence. The limited budget and relatively recent 
formation of the new Ministry of Education, were cited by the Minister as 
reasons for his inability to announce a new Education Act at the start of 1991. 
The Minister, however, did point to the newly-gained freedom of teachers to 
exercise their professional autonomy (in reference to new freedom in teaching 
curricula) as the single biggest achievement of the political transformation. As 
former oppositionalists, the new Ministry officials are now coming to terms 
with the Minister's approach of administering the Ministry not as a central 
organ of prescription, but as a serving body to parents and pupils. 
With respect to curricula, a few developments are worth noting. The 
imminence of political change by the end of 1989, coincided with the national 
discussion on the principle of a Core Curricula (CC) for education. In May 
1990, about two thousand people answered the call for "all those [who] could 
take part" (Szebenyi 1992:289 (b)) to attend a national conference. A concerted 
effort was made to avoid the former government's approach of "segregated 
opinion gathering" in deciding upon curricula reforms. This principle was met 
by initial opposition from some teachers and Ministry officials (Gyarmati 
1991:5), but ultimately proved to be fairly popular (Szebeny 1992:22; Halasz 
1991:9). Teachers were the most enthusiastic supporters of the CC as it gave 
. them ample freedom to "fill out" the CC according to their pupils' needs 
and leaving themroom for innovative teaching. The final CC draft completed by 
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the Ministry of Education in November 1991 specified : only the minimum 
number of school days per year, the knowledge to be attained at primary, 
pre-primary and secondary levels and delimited the cultural domains in'stead of 
mandatory subjects. It also committed itself to raising secondary school 
standards with the view to giving pupils access to international tertiary 
education and instilling democratic and general European values at school level 
(Gyarmati 1991:5). However, by the spring of 1992, Szebenyi (1992:291,2 
(b)) reported that the CC draft was "put on ice" as the whole debate flared up 
again. Szebenyi identified the main interest groups as intellectuals and a sector 
of the mass media (opposed to any curricula in education); teachers from elite 
schools and some members in the Education Ministry (pro-output control only) 
and "old and new conservative interest groups" in the Education Ministry that 
attack the CC from an "orthodox conservative angle". 
Popular affection for the pre-1945 school structure within the general public 
prompted the government to revive the 4-grade elementary (primary) school and 
8 grade academic secondary (grammar school or gymnasium) school system 
through amendments to the 1985 Education Act in the form of the 1990 
Education Act. However, draft laws proposed in June 1991 and November 
1991 were opposed by the parliamentary opposition parties and were under 
discussion by the end of 1991. Debate particularly centred upon the question of 
early selection and future career constraints that the new proposals sought to 
enact. The 1990 structure of the education system that dates from the 1961 act 
appears in Appendix 6. 
The teacher training system is facing an immense challenge in meeting the 
demand for qualified teachers who have been adequately prepared for an 
innovative and reformed education system. K. Mihaly (1991: 119) argue __ that 
universities and colleges were generally unaffected by education changes and 
lacked appropriate reform strategies. Two decades of conservative management 
in teacher training colleges, however, had effectively ensured that they would 
become bastions of the old system. The new foreign language policy alone 
necessitated the retraining of about ten-thousand Russian teachers (Radnai 
1991 :2) and the re-structuring of higher education and training colleges to 
accommodate the overwhelming need for foreign language teachers. How this 
was to happen was not clear. 
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K. Mihaly (1991:119) expressed doubt about the ability of teacher training 
institutions, mainly those found in small cities, to bring about the desired 
changes. The result of the lack of response to the new environment, 
particularly from some teacher training institutions, led to an increase in the 
demand by pupils, students and western-orientated professionals, for English 
and German language career skills, which in tum had led to a surge in private 
language schools. In November 1991, these schools already numbered 
eighty-six (Kasriel 1991 :7). 
This particular issue - that of foreign language training - has precipitated a deep 
but also. complex schism in the fabric of Hungarian society. The ruling political 
elite in Hungary generally favour a return to national traditions. The ruling 
coalition has as its point of reference the pre-1939 period which was 
characterised by strong conservative traditionalism with Christian democratic 
values (Evling 7.1990:20). This group sees integration with Europe only as a 
distant secondary objective (Horvath 30-10-91). The liberal opposition parties, 
on the other hand, do not question the significance of national traditions, but are 
concerned at the conservative inclination to re-centralise state education. 
Openness to West-European values, education trends and modernisation 
encapsulates the approach of the liberal parliamentary opposition. Horvath's 
(1990:208) assessment of this situation, one which is echoed by some 
progressive educators, is that the present government, as the result of weak 
tradition, is paradoxically unable to lead the society and the individual towards 
making a bold step towards reform, but is still too powerful to allow. others to 
initiate such reforms. Interestingly, however, and undoubtedly significant for 
the balance of forces in this debate, the struggle between modem and traditional 
education policy values is not only present in opposing political parties, but 
within the ruling coalition itself. 
4. EDUCATION INTEREST GROUPS 
There are several interest groups on the educational landscape of Hungary 
which can be distinguished by their specific orientations to : level of 
participation in the education reform process; local autonomy versus central 
decision-making and traditional versus modem education values. 
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This section examines the development of seven interest groups identified by the 
writer as key role players in the education transitional phrase. Although the 
events of 1989, activated these "new" interest groups, "Ideologically less 
committed education groups" have been around since the mid-1970's (Halasz 
1986:131 -see Appendix 8; Howell1988:125). The groups to which this study 
gives particular attention to, are teachers, teacher associations, independent 
schools, parents and pupils, religious groups, media and public opinion, and 
higher education and research institutes. This section will conclude with an 
analysis of the research questions. 
4.1 Teachers 
In spite of Hungarian education's advance following the 1985 Act, the large 
scale absence of teachers in the civil opposition movement to the communist 
government, resulted in political leaders and not educators deciding upon the 
direction of education development. 
Frustration and a degree of apathy amongst teachers originates from many 
circumstances. Their main problems relate to: their low professional status, 
economic improvishment and complexly, their internal vulnerability on the one 
hand to emerging interest groups of modem, mostly young, pro-reform 
teachers, and on the other to headmasters who favour traditional values and 
continuance with the pre-1945 education period. 
The rapid transformation of the teaching profession in the eighties highlighted 
the need for a new education policy which clearly defined the role of teachers. 
The professionalisation of teaching, linked with school autonomy, resulted in 
an increasing number of teachers who saw themselves as professionals, and who 
espoused the ideas and innovations of their profession. 
Although this trend to professionalisation is only m its early stages of 
development, it has given momentum to the question of teacher autonomy 
within the national educational reform debate. The "socialist" education 
system, however, was directly opposed to any form of alternatives and 
autonomy on organisational and individual level and as a result largely produced 
teachers who were "dependants". It would thus be "naive", argues Otto 
Mihaly (1991:3) "to expect that the autonomy of teachers will develop on pure 
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incantation, or even through teacher training". Professionalism is thus faced with 
a heritage of subordination of the status of teachers. This view was shared by 
Professor Varga (29-10-91) of the Technical University of Budapest and 
Professor Eva Szechy (29-10-91) of the Eotvos Lorand University, (Budapest), 
during interviews. 
There is a need therefore, to raise teachers' self-perceptions through upgrading the 
position of teachers. By April 1990, the political system had pushed them into 
virtually defenceless positions while the former government's education policy 
had kept teachers from political participation and withheld teachers from 
empowerment in market relations by dictating the terms whereby they could sell 
their labour power (Szechy 29-10-1991). The ambiguity of the reforms and the 
contradictory tendencies contesting the sphere which they inhabited, similarly 
blunted their capacity for involvement in the reform process, both at macro and 
micro levels. 
Teachers' inhibited positions have been further exacerbated by the contradictory 
demands placed on them (see Appendix 24). Certain politicians are pressurising 
educators to implement moral or religious education in schools, even though 
trained teachers, text-books and programs are lacking, while other politicians view 
the teaching profession with mistrust, accusing them of collaboration with the 
previous government and "mis-educating" past generations (Halasz 31-10-91). 
The campaign by teachers to improve their conditions and clarify expectations of 
them, has been undoubtedly strengthened by the establishment of professional 
associations and societies by education interest groups. The weight of the past, 
however, hangs heavily over such campaigns, so much so that in 1992, it 
continued to be political leaders and not educators who were determining the 
direction for education (Szebenyi 1992:26). Szebenyi ascribes this to the absence 
of teachers (and the society in general) in active opposition to the political system 
prior to 1989, in contrast to Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
The kind of challenges that teachers face are best exemplified by two events that 
occurred within the first year of the new democratic government gaining office: 
the appointment of headmasters and the role of headmasters in the reform process. 
In October 1990, a "witch hunt" was started, following a misunderstood statement 
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by Education Minister Andrasfaluy, urgmg teachers to identify headmasters 
appointed under the previous government in accordance to political, rather than 
professional criteria. The entry of political parties in this debate brought to an 
end the short era of less politicised education of the eighties (Halasz 1991:2). 
During this "witch hunt" many capable headmasters were forced to succumb to 
political intervention (Gyarmati 9.1991 :2). 
Also in 1990 a conflict evolved from the pre-1989 practice of appointing 
headmasters by means of consensus between the school staff and the local 
education authority. The staff had a veto right whilst the local authority had the 
power of appointing the principal and had to agree also on staff proposals for 
the post. This system, unique within the international context, appeared to 
work well according to Horvath (30-10-91 ), until the new government 
intervened. It then, however, led to increasing controversy between the school 
staff and the local authority, as both groups felt their interests jeopardised. 
When the matter was referred to judicial arbitration, in the latter half of 1991, a 
constitutional court ruled against school staff and awarded the responsibility of 
appointments of headmasters to local authorities. In its ruling, the court pointed 
to the absence of staff veto in Western democracies as a motivation for the 
decision. The irony, as a number of interviewees emphasised, was that the 
supposedly new democracy was scrapping a democratic feature dating from the 
communist period (Halasz 25-10-91; Horvath 30-10-91). 
A further and re-occurring subject bedevilling the struggle for teacher autonomy 
is the crucial role of headmasters (directors) in the future education system. 
The disposition of headmasters to the reform process continues to be the 
deciding factor in the implementation of innovative school programs. The 
inertia of headmasters has forced some research institutes to involve teachers 
through direct mail, setting out courses or programs available (Horvath 
30-10-91). The traditional role of headmasters is thus another aspect which 
needs to be enhanced within a new system of school autonomy. Since May 
1990, the headmasters' corps has been targetted by international exchange and 
co-operation programs to improve their management capacities. The eight 
week management course for fifteen Hungarian headmasters by the University 
of Amsterdam's School for Education Management is an example of the 
prominence of Dutch universities in this process (Reparaz 1991:6). 
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Pro-reform and innovation minded teachers face the arduous task of 
breaking through the ceiling of the traditionally orientated value system.Miksa, 
a reporter of the Hungarian Education Weekly, describing the conflict at a 
school in rural Koveskal, is an appropriate example. She remarked in an 
interview (Szunyogh 1991: 10) upon the defeat of pro-reform young teachers in 
their efforts to establish a school board. She felt bitter about what had 
happened. Eva Kovacs, spokesperson for the pro-reform group confirmed this, 
saying : "Mrs Gerencser (headmistress) has prevented the election of the school 
board .... .I've lodged a complaint because of the anti-democratic suffocation of 
the school board. I've submitted a protest on legal grounds which has been 
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answered by the municipality of Koveskal explicitly threatening me in a letter 
indulging in personalities" (Szunyogh 1991: 1 0). 
Teachers in dimension 4 (see page 110) who support democratic transformation 
of education through a process of decentralisation and modernisation, find 
themselves after two years of democratic government, more or less in the same 
powerless position as they were in the communist era. Channels of access to 
government education policy-making have certainly been opened but the 
research indicates the dominance of the "arena of power" by interest groups 
from dimension 1 who favour a single value system. At national policy-making 
level, the pro-traditionalist MDF-led government dominates the process while 
at local municipal level, former communists and traditional orientated 
headmasters and parents continue to obstruct initiatives by pro-modernisation 
teachers. The future power of teachers in dimension 4 will only be strengthened 
by the support of other groups (e.g. universities and research institutes) from 
within the same dimension and as a result of the increased influence of groups 
within dimension 2, as the economy recovers. 
4.2 Teacher Associations 
The period 1985 to 1989 was characterised by the proliferation of unions, 
political parties and teacher associations who had become distinct interest 
groups, as the transformation in the political arena gained momentum. These 
organisations began to lobby for influence in the educational policy making 
arena as teachers, parents and community groups became members (see 
Appendix 24). 
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There are two dominant professional teacher associations. For a long time the 
Union of Pedagogues (UP) was the only union which enjoyed official 
recognition in pre-1989 Hungary (see Appendix 21). It was well known for 
being on the one hand the mouth organ for central government, whilst on the 
other neglecting to act as a spokesbody for teachers in policy making. 
In March 1990, because of the UP's ties with the pre-1989 communist 
government, the 170 000 member Pedagogues Trade Union (PTU) came into 
being as a breakaway from the UP. The PTU, which is now the largest 
teachers' union (it actually dates from 1945), is campaigning as an organisation, 
fully autonomous from political parties and government. The most prominent 
issue which the PTU is lobbying against, is related to state financing and the 
Ministry's intention to withdraw itself, to a large extent, from financial support 
for schools. 
The Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union (PDTU), founded in November 1988 
and numbering 1100 members, came into existence as a direct result of 
opposition to the PTU and the former regime. The PDTU is seen as more 
militant and active than the PTU and as representing the professional interest of .,. 
pro-reform minded teachers. The PDTU was, for example, responsible for the 
first post-1945 teachers' demonstration, on December 19, 1988. Its secretary, 
Gabor Hom, ranked teachers' salaries, as the single most important campaign 
issue for 1991 and beyond. The association has moved away from its 
traditional trade unionist role to taking up issues within the teaching profession 
relating to macro policy. It is for instance, keen to promote the input of 
educators in national policy formation, and even more broadly, to reform the 
whole education system. Darvas (1991:245) comments on the POTU's program 
of action : "The Program of the PDTU, challenges the whole system of public 
education". It has made a point, however of presenting itself as an "apolitical 
and non-governmental" policy organisation. 
As the national education reform debate has gathered momentum, teachers are 
looking to their professional organisations, not only to safeguard their autonomy 
in light of the government's mood of centralisation, but to lead the way in 
demanding a living wage for economically impoverished teachers (Szechy 
20-10-91). The culmination of teacher frustration over low salaries and lack 
of significant funding for schools, led to a number of protest marches and 
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strikes (Gyarmati 9.1991:2). The largest protest action was organised by the 
PTU and POTU teachers' associations, which led to national rallies and a 
massive protest before Parliament in 1991. The scrapping of the proposed 30% 
raise in teachers' salaries and the use thereof for daily maintenance, were the 
main reason for the protests. The origin of the crisis can be traced to the 
bankruptcy of local municipalities which had, by the 1991 Local Government 
and Budget Act, been made responsible for the financial maintenance of 
primary schools. 
The interesting feature of the organised teaching profession is that although the 
Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union and Pedagogues Trade Union are in 
opposing dimensions (4 and 1, see page 110), their domination by the MDF 
government has led to their co-operation. This was evident in their joining 
forces for the 1991 teachers' protests. Their actions can be labelled 
"self-defensive power-seeking" as they attempted to use demonstrations as a 
channel of access to influencing government funding policy. It is clear that the 
ability of the pro-modernisation teachers corps to influence government policy 
would be greatly enhanced if the Pedagogues Trade Union were to successfully 
shed its "former communist image" and join in the pro-reform lobby in 
dimension 4. 
4. 3 Independent Schools 
I found six interviewees who agreed with a number of articles which stated that 
alternative schools were one of the major positive developments in education 
after April 1990. Parents were now given the choice to choose their child's 
school according to their needs and teachers were free to pursue innovative 
teaching methods. In an article entitled, Sorting out Priorities, Eva Gyarmati 
(9.1991:3) sketches a lucid picture of the new spirit of pluralism in education 
provision : "Meanwhile new developments in education have made it clear that 
what used to be an intellectual wasteland is a ferment today and heading 
towards unstrung diversity. The state has lost its monopoly in setting up and 
running schools ... ". She continued to remark upon growing parent support 
" ... with expectations of changes in organizational and teaching methods running 
high, alternatives and novel educational institutions are bound to provoke 
interest". The discussion on independent schools will show how dissatisfaction 
with public schools has encouraged this movement towards providing for the 
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societies' divergent interests. 
The amendment in 1990 to the 1985 Education Act abolished state monopoly 
and made possible the establishment and maintenance of non-state schools by 
individuals, organisations and churches (the Act was titled the 1990 Education 
Act). The rapid expansion of independent schools, which rose to thirty within 
the first year of legal status arose from parents' and educators' impatience with 
the rate of reforms with the education system's efficiency in comparison to their 
view of international standards (Mihaly, K 1991:3; Barret 1.91:21). The 
independent school movement includes private schools, commercial schools 
(e.g. Hungar Hotels School; Miller Food Chain School - Varga: 29-10-91), 
humanist co-operative schools, Jewish schools, Waldorf schools, vocational 
training and church schools, representing a variety of pedagogical paradigms. 
The question of state responsibility for subsidising independent schools has led 
to conflict between the government and the various interest groups managing 
alternative schools (see Appendix 24). Opposition groups view state subsidy as 
a civil right which should be guaranteed regardless of the type of school. Leftist 
critics see the government subsidy policy of independent schools as infringing on 
equal opportunities for all pupils and giving an unfair advantage to wealthy 
pupils who can attend the best schools. The granting of state subsidy - rightwing 
groups argue - is the main form of state supervision over education quality. 
Some members of the professional establishment subscribe to this opinion in 
their attempt to guard and substantiate their controlling function or power over 
schools (Horvath & Mihaly, 1991:4). 
The establishment of independent schools (dimension 4 - see page 110) can be 
seen as a form of "self-defensive power-seeking" as parents and educators 
attempt to ensure that their vision of pluralistic and differentiated education is 
concretised. The MDF coalition government (dimension 1) does have an impact 
upon independent schools, albeit limited to the Ministry's core curriculum which 
is a prerequisite for state subsidies. Independent schools in tum do not have a 
direct stake in national education policy-making other than their relationship 
with the government along the lines of 'tolerance' and 'co-operation'. The 
influence that independent schools do have on the "arena of power" is 
directly linked to the question of standards and excellence which will 
become the deciding factor for school-leavers seeking employment in business 
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sectors that are pushing for EC integration (dimension 2). The government may 
therefore end up, contrary to its traditionalist education, having to follow 
independent schools in introducing innovative programs. 
4. 4 Religious Interest Groups 
In Central Europe "real socialism" has been likened "to a huge refrigerator in 
which everything is frozen and now (1989) when this refrigerator begins to 
thaw, all problems reappear in the form they were put into it" (Czalczynska 
1991:1). 
The collapse of communism in 1989 saw the re-emergence of nationalist, 
ethnic-separatists and religious animosity from the "socialist refrigerator" (Gati: 
1991:130). In Hungary (similar to Poland and Czechoslovakia) the debates on 
education reforms were soon overtaken by the controversy of religious 
education as the Roman Catholic Church attempted to exert its influence in 
schools (see Appendix 24). During this controversy, religious interests took 
form as the public, parents, the various denominations and political parties 
became involved. I contend in this section that the issue of implementing 
religious education in schools and the Ministry's support thereof, forms an 
integral part of the MDF-led government's pro-traditional education stance. 
This policy can be seen as a direct effort to extend its own power and that of the 
Roman Catholic Church in education. 
Political developments prior to the first democratic elections had created an 
environment by January 1990, which enabled the Parliament to pass the 1990 
Education Act on religion which guaranteed religious rights in paragraph 17: 
"on the liberty of conscience and freedom of religion as well as on churches" 
(Szunyogh 1991:13). This act not only gave all denominations the right to 
establish and maintain schools, but made allowance for the tuition of religion in 
schools and set the scene for the first education crisis of national proportion. A 
debate was initiated by a speech of Education Minister, Bertalan Andrasfalvy, 
in September 1990 which caused great concern among parents (Gyarmati 
11.1990:35). It created the impression that religion would be introduced as 
compulsory for all state school pupils. Following the Ministerial order whereby 
religious education was to be introduced to schools as part of the curriculum 
and as a standard subject (Horvath & Mihaly 1991:4), levels of tension 
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escalated dramatically. This order sparked off a countrywide outcry, with 
people protesting that after four decades of official communist atheism, the state 
was now again introducing an ideology at school level. Parents, teachers and 
the press, including believers and non-believers, participated in the debate which 
raged in Parliament, churches, schools and the media. 
The first public opinion survey on educational expectations carried out since the 
1990 elections by the National Institute of Public Education found the majority 
of people opposed to the government's initiative (Halasz 1991:6- see Appendix 
12). The survey found, in reply to the question : "Religious education should 
be compulsory for everybody", that 15,7% agreed while 78,8% did not. The 
remaining 5,5% were undecided. This trend was confirmed in a follow-up 
statement which read : "Religious education should not be compulsory, it must 
be an optional subject in schools", with 72,7% respondents being in support and 
only 18,4% against. 
The Roman Catholic Church constitutes the largest denominational group, while 
the majority of people retain links with some religious denomination. Heinrich 
(198:xvii) estimates that 85% of the population is Roman Catholic, while Tomka 
(1991:66) contends that only 50-64% are religiously active. Non-Catholics 
were especially worried that their children would be discriminated against at 
school, as the state-sponsored religious education would be Catholic. The 
argument of Catholics, using historical justification, is that schools taught 
religion before the forty year atheist interruption. They claim that religion 
deserves an equal chance to re-establish its values among children of the third 
generation under an atheist government. 
It is of interest to note the findings of the Hungarian Observer, a socio-
economic journal published quarterly which, in a cover story, featured the start 
of religious introduction at school level (Gyarmati 11.1990:38). A Catholic 
priest of the 21st district, Jozsef Nemeth, relates how even under the anti -
clerical Kadar regime, large numbers of youngsters would attend church masses. 
Nemeth argued: "The churches are charged with being impatient and aggressive 
for trying to make use of our new gained liberty ... but now the children must 
have the right to learn about values other than Marxism-Leninism". It does 
appear, however, that the Church, in general, respects parental freedom to 
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choose religion for their children if they wish to. 
Analysis of the 1990 election trends by lldiko Vasary (1991:5), shows the 
majority of political parties adapting their campaigns to elicit the support of all 
denominations. A number of parties (e.g. Christian Democratic Workers' 
Party) added the label "Christian" to their party name. Major parties, such as 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum and Smallholders parties, incorporated 
traditional religious values in their election policy documents. The influence of 
the church on any future debate of national importance will therefore compel 
education interest groups to vie for the votes of the people associated with the 
church. 
The decree ·by the Ministry of Education on the subject of religion at school 
has, since the Minister's original ideas, been changed to a large degree in order 
to accommodate the various interest groups. The decision, at the end of 1991, 
to rescind the original decree to introduce religious education is directly linked 
by Horvath and Mihaly (1991:4) to pressure from schools, parents and the 
liberal and socialist opposition (see Appendix 11, No:15). The Ministry's new 
policy further confirmed that religious education was not compulsory and would 
not appear on school report cards. Religious education, will in future function 
as extra-curricular activity and the church solely responsible therefore. 
The agreement on religious education heralds the first post-1989 conflict of 
national proportion, to be solved by "collective wisdom", so termed by Melinda 
Potsubay (Gyarmati 1111990:38). However, there should be no doubt that even 
though the introduction of a dominant religion in schools had been halted, the 
label "truce" would be more appropriate to explain what had actually happened. 
While Hungary is undoubtedly politically more "stable" then many other 
Central European countries, it is situated in a region that borders on 
the former Yugoslavia where religion is a deeply divisive issue. One cannot, 
therefore, rule out a renewed attempt by the Roman Catholic Church or another 
denomination to gain control over education. 
It is within education that by seeking to introduce Catholic religious education, 
the MDF coalition government showed its desires to flex its muscle and thereby 
gain effective dominance in schools. Although this attempt by the MDF and 
Roman Catholic Church (dimension 1 - see page 110) has been successfully 
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opposed by interest groups from both dimension 1 and 4, the religious 
dominance of the Catholic Church and the MDF as champions of the Catholic 
faith, has remained unaffected. 
The impression that I gained from interviewees in dimension 4, was that they 
remained under threat and wary of the dominant Catholic policy-makers in the 
'arena of power' in a time of religious ethnic and nationalist 'restlessness' in 
the region. 
4.5 Parents 
Social circumstances in Hungary since 1945 have contributed to antagonistic 
relationships developing between parents, pupils, teachers and the schools 
(Bathory 1991:7). Within this environment of mutual blame for the state of 
education, school standards had deteriorated and with them the status of 
teachers, school ethos and school-community relations. The attainment of 
school level autonomy brought into sharp focus, the conflict of interests 
between the education establishment and the local community (see Appendix 
24). Gyarmati (9.1991:2) commented : "The 1990-91 school year will go 
down in the annals of education as the year of student, teacher and parent 
demonstrations". The origin of conflict can be traced to parent participation 
in school advisory boards and the financing of schools. 
The granting of school autonomy through the 1985 Act had by 1991 made the 
involvement of parents and other interest groups in devising school activities a 
reality. However, parents and interest groups as we discussed above, seemed 
reluctant to utilise their new freedom in participating in the management of 
schools (see Appendix 7, Question 20). The difficulty in getting parents to 
serve on advisory school bodies appeared to be that such bodies were seen by 
them as lacking sufficient decision-making power (Halasz 25-10-91). The 
Ministry has also been hesitant to devolve more authority to school advisory 
boards, as headmasters and staff viewed them with some suspicion. School 
management is also sensitive to parent involvement which, in a time of 
increased party political involvement in education, might result in parent 
political activism in schools. The challenge now facing schools is to get the 
local community and parents, who see the need for reforms (see Appendix 7, 
Question 2) to participate in school management while keeping out politics 
(Halasz 1991:10). 
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Schools where parental participation does occur, are typified by individual 
parents becoming involved, rather than collective parent participation (Halasz 
25-10-91). 
Schools have been hit hardest by the financial consequences of autonomy. The 
new 1990 Act on Communities spelled the end of state monopoly of education 
provision. Municipalities would, in future, take responsibility for the founding 
and maintenance of kindergarten and comprehensive schools. The Act also 
stipulated that villages were compelled to establish pre-primary (1-4 year old 
children) schools before villages would gain recognition. Communities and 
schools came under severe financial pressure in 1990-1991, as the new 
legislation burdened municipalities with half of schools budgets (Szebenyi 
1992:25). Lack of funds and teacher shortage have resulted in a number of 
pupil strikes such as the well-publicised ones at the Balato-Nalmodi Hungarian 
· English Secondary School in Budapest. Pressure from parents and local 
communities has also resulted in the foreign language state secondary schools 
increasing from seven in 1988 to forty in 1991 (Gyarmati 9.1991:11). 
Funding remains the weak link in post-1989 education reforms as schools are 
hamstrung by the lack of municipal financial support. Parents struggle to make 
ends meet whilst trying to ensure an education for their children. In spite of 
this strain on parents and staff, progress is apparent in the rebuilding of 
relationships between these two groups. It is evident from the literature and 
interviews that the full participation of parents and pupils in the process of 
renewing state education, given West European experience, is dependent on the 
legitimisation of pedagogical reforms through incorporating the interests of the 
clients. This sentiment was underscored during the June 1991 International 
Workshop on East-European Education in Frankfurt, with Bathory (1991:7) 
stating the pivotal need: "to allow for the clear-cut interests of clients in the 
internal processes of school, e.g. values, contents, methods", to ensure grass 
roots support for school and Ministerial reform initiatives. Horvath (1990:216) 
expressed optimism about greater parental involvement, given the first steps 
taken by society to regain control of education through parent participation in 
school boards and the emergence of a client-centered pedagogy : "It seems that 
following its long domination of education matters the state will happily retreat 
to a referee role. It may blow the whistle if somebody is violating the rules, but 
the rules will be based upon a broad consensus. The teams (schools) may play 
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the ball game in whatever style they wish". 
Parents are now found on the threshold of regaining a degree of control over 
their children's education, after four decades of being marginalised from the 
education process, by state ideological hegemony. Although school level 
autonomy had been attained through the 1985 Act, parents have only, since 
1990, become empowered through participation on school advisory boards. 
While the absence of conclusive data prevents 'parents', as an interest group 
being positioned inside the 'arena of power', pressure from this group has 
mounted. Parents and pupils have used demonstrations and strikes as a 'channel 
of access' to influence the loci of power, namely the MDF-led government 
(dimension 1. see page 110). In spite of the economically vulnerable position of 
parents and schools to control 'persuasive' power tactics which centre on state 
funding to schools, parents have sent a clear signal to groups within dimension! 
that unilateral policy decision-making will not be tolerated similar to the 
pre-1989 era. 
4.6 Media and Public Opinion 
The democratic elections and subsequent legislation guaranteed media freedom. 
But by the end of 1991 we find that numerous "critical gaps" (Zielonka 1991: 
112) remained in the establishment of a vibrant civil society. The most 
worrisome phenomenon for the survival of democracy was voter apathy in 
follow-up elections .(Breslow 1991:208). Another was the disintegration of 
public unity, as witnessed during the November 1989 protests, to the point that 
public opinion on social issues had all but been lost as a pressure mechanism 
to influence the government. A brief flicker of public cohesion was visible 
during the October taxi strike when striking taxi drivers blocked the streets of 
Budapest and forced the government to drop the announced doubling of petrol 
prices. The lack of forceful public opinion could be ascribed mainly to: public 
confusion in the face of over a hundred politicial parties mushrooming overnight 
and party politics that are depicted by what Zielonka (1991:112) refers to as the 
growing chasm between "high politics, them, the elites" and ordinary people or 
"us", who are concerned with bread and butter issues. The third contributing 
factor was the continued presence of nomenklatura (only 100 of the 700 
replaced, one year after the elections: Tokes 1990:61) and elites who use the 
media as a tool in the political struggle (see Appendix 24). This section 
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will elaborate on the "media-war"that has kept education issues from gaining 
prominence and comment on prevailing public opinion on educational 
expectations. 
In 1992, Mezes (1992:62) reported that the mass-media had since 1989 been 
embroiled in what he termed a "political media war". The ruling MDF felt 
obliged to create its own daily newspaper," Uj Magyarorszag 7 to counter the 
majority of printed media which supported the opposition. The "war" escalated 
as the government voted in 1992 to freeze the budget allocation to television 
since it was not "sufficiently in service of the nation". The influence of this 
struggle on education issues cannot be underestimated as the mass media cannot 
influence the formation of public opinion on education matters if it is 
preoccupied with party political power struggles. In acknowledging the 
potential power of the media to pressure the education authorities the question 
can be posed "How will the socialist media and old guard influence the 
education debate?" given: 
that "the old party hands had metamorphasised into the managers of the 
new companies"(Meze 1992:62) , a reference to the majority of foreign 
owned newspapers managed by former Communist Party leaders. 
that the largest national daily newspaper, the' Socialist Nepszabadsag," 
dates from the Kadar era and boasts a daily circulation of 315 000 
(Roskin 1991:88). 
At the time ofMezes' article in August 1992, the "media war" was described as 
an undecided tie with the political parties awaiting legislation to settle the 
dispute. In mid-1990, the National Institute of Public Education (Halasz 1991:5) 
carried out the first public opinion surveys since the democratic elections, on 
the educational expectations of the nation. 
The wave of public opinion and demonstrations which had been so successful in 
sweeping the communist government from power in 1989 had all but 
disappeared by the end of 1991. Effective public opposition to the dominant 
MDF-led government's policies had been adversely affected by low voter 
turnouts and public confusion faced with a confusingly large number of parties 
with few distinguishable features. The research shows that the media in its role 
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as 'watchdog' has been unable to get into motion due to the continued power 
and position of former communists in the media and local government 
(dimension 1 -see page 110). The only favourable indication to the formation 
of public opinion as an effective counter (in dimension 4) to government power 
in education, has been public pressure which had stopped the introduction of 
religious education and the results of the 1990 (Halasz 1991:5) opinion poll that 
indicated 38% of people supported equal parent representation on 
school-boards. 
4. 7 Higher Education and Research Institutes 
Rudolf Tokes (1990:54) reported that well before the Gorbachev era, the 
Hungarian "native brand of glasnost" had through journal articles and in, 
"samizdat" (underground newspapers), catapulted the young intelligentsia into 
the political arena. These young intellectuals, mostly university students from 
provincial towns and villages had been politically marginalised under the 
communist government. With the political transition and restoration of 
academic freedom this "young set" of intelligentsia, together with progressive 
researchers and lecturers, found themselves in the midst of a"power battle" in 
which they were fighting for the modernisation of existing institutions. They 
were also concerned that the institutions should reflect the democratic gains 
made in the political sphere. This discussion will focus on the clash between 
the emerging group of young intellectuals, and "pockets" of academic 
nomenklatura and traditionalists who oppose reforms (see Appendix 24). The 
conditions which necessitate a new higher education law and the problem of 
research funding will be put forward as a background to the debate on a future 
policy for higher education. 
Since the loosening of state control of higher education with the 1985 Education 
Law, the debate on the future philosophy of education has continued unabated. 
Educators have split into the progressive (pro-modernisation) and traditionalist 
camps. There is prevalent, according to Horvath (30-10-91), the phenomena of 
"collective amnesia" in certain education circles. The communist period has 
been "forgotten" by some pro-traditionalist educators who are campaigning for 
a revival of Hungarian education of the 1930's-1940's. It is precisely this 
"amnesia" which progressives fear. They argue that the present vacuum in the 
theory and practice will be filled by a return to systems of the 1930's-1940's. 
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Progressive educators point out that in the 1930's-1940's, Hungary had lagged 
behind West European education and that this lag was due to the traditional and 
conservative Prussian manner of education. The traditionalists, who are 
strongly represented in the government, lobby for the post-communist vacuum 
in education to be filled by a system of national Christian education. Their 
argument, summarised by Horvath (30-1 0-91), turns on the question of how to 
bring about "one single key attitude change in teachers". This is not an 
important issue for progressives. The instilling of pluralistic ideas as an answer 
to education problems is seen by them as a prerequisite for the emergence of a 
mature, but flexible, education system. Their approach calls for an acceptance 
of diversity; that alternative solutions exist for each educational situation 
(Horvath 1990:215). 
The political transformation has led to a financial crisis in educational research. 
The re-organisation of institutes, especially those along political rather than 
professional lines, coupled with budgetary cuts has resulted in instability within 
research. Educational research, however, now faces the paradoxical situation 
that the new political order, in spite of its pro-reform stance, shows less interest 
than the former government, in supporting research in the social sciences 
(Halasz 25-10-91). Research faces an arduous task, in adverse conditions, to 
restructure the public education system without sufficient state research funding. 
Hungary will have to rely heavily upon international co-operation in planning 
reforms. Bathory (1991:7) argues that the main benefits of joint research are 
not merely improved methodology and results of system-level analyses, but also 
contact with the West as a result of the so-called "window effect", breaking 
through isolation. The Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences is an appropriate example of an institute which has 
contributed to the development of the country's "gradualist" economic policy 
through international co-operation (Balasz 31-10-91). 
Law XXII of 1990 brought education legislation m harmony with the 
democratic constitution and restored independence to institutes of higher 
education. However, proper functioning of the. universities does not 
automatically follow the passing of laws. This reality is described by Bakos 
(1991:13), in a government publication, in which it is argued that "A radical 
transformation of higher education is necessary, along with its placing on new 
foundations". 
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In 1991, a new higher education law seeking to address both the effects of 
remnants of pre-1989 policy and other new challenges . was proposed by the 
government. State motivation for new legislation led to the formation of 
academic interest groups, with lines of connection to other social groups who 
are attempting to influence the coalition government. 
The most prominent arguments for a new higher education law can be traced tb 
the need to address a number of issues. One is the need for adaptation of 
university norms to those held by their counterparts in Western Europe, in line 
with EC unification developments from 1992 (Kozma 1990:389). Out of this 
need has grown a project envisaged to have a lifespan of ten years. This project 
is outlined in a government document entitled "A Programme for National 
Renewal" (Bakos 1991: 13). Another issue is financing and because of problems 
with the existing arrangements, a new system of financing and budgeting is also 
on the cards. It will replace the former state "hand out" policy with a 
competitive research fund allocation format. Universities faced with limited 
state budget allocations (0.7% of national budget) and cut-backs to "expensive" 
academic research, are now compelled to compete for state financing through 
academic lobbies (Szechy 29-10-91). 
A further issue at stake is the "catch 22" position that the government finds 
itself in, given the autonomy granted to universities. Kozma (1990:389) 
contends that tertiary autonomy has given some universities the ability to protect 
themselves from modernisation. Bakos (1991 :64,66) expresses the need for 
modernisation of universities, as these are: "fragmented organisationally and 
geographically, inflexible to larger student numbers, monopolistic and closed 
systems." 
Lastly, democratic rights of students in university management need to be 
re-defined following large scale student demonstrations in September 1991 
(Gyarmati 9.1991:2). In spite of financial constraints and opposition by certain 
institutions and individuals supporting the status quo, higher education has 
regained its pre-1945 autonomy from the state and has embarked upon a 
programme aimed at regaining its position in the European Community. In 
pursuing this goal, universities have joined numerous international exchange 
programs such as "Catching up with European Higher Education", Tempus 
(Trans European Mobility Program for University Students), Erasmus 
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(European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students), 
and Petra (Young People in Technical Training). These programs and joint 
ventures serve as a key exposure to West-European educational training, 
innovations, standards and can act as a gateway to EC unity in higher 
education. The process of joining the European Community could therefore be 
a catalyst for reforms as Kozma (1990:389) is of the opinion that : "European 
integration is the essential challenge that may pull our higher education out of 
its comfortable particularism". 
Hungarian research and . institutes of higher education have a tradition of 
co-operation with their international counterparts which dates from the 
communist era. These contacts have enabled most Hungarian academics and 
educators to be one step ahead of their neighbours in Central Europe following 
the events of 1989. The power of this pro-reform lobby, found in dimension 4 
(see p 11 0) is well illustrated by their success even in the communist era, in 
pushing through the 1985 education decentralisation Act. At the forefront of 
these groups in dimension 4 are the "young set" of intelligentsia, who are 
strongly supported by the pro-EC economic lobby from dimension 2. The 
. present political power of the ruling MDF elite and their 'persuasive powers' by 
means of state funding should not be underestimated. However, the research 
suggests that the balance of influence in the "arena of power" is slowly 
swinging towards the pro-reform lobby in dimension 4. This can be ascribed 
to the early indicators of a successful shift to a market economy which has 
strengthened the reformist groups' support from within dimension 2. 
Participation of interest groups in reforms; circumstances influencing 
development of interest groups 
A range of special circumstances define the basis on which interest groups have 
become involved in education. In this section, I briefly review these 
circumstances. 
Since the first fledgeling signs of school level autonomy, following the 1985 
Act, and given the Hungarian style of "communism with a human face" 
teachers in Hungary, in contrast to Poland and Czechoslovakia, have developed 
significantly as a professional group. However a clear distinction should be 
drawn between their participation and empowerment at school level and their . 
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input into national reform policy. In the school context, teachers have scored 
their biggest achievements since the political transformation by the freedom 
afforded within the new curricula and equal representation on school councils. It 
is mainly the disposition of headmasters which continue to be the deciding factor 
in the implementation of innovative school programmes in which they have been 
involved. In this regard, international exchange programmes by research and 
higher education institutes have contributed to keeping headmasters informed and 
versed in the latest education practises. In spite of such initiatives, the Minister 
of Education, Andrasfalvy, in 1991 confirmed the continued presence of "bad 
institutions" in reference to schools still clinging to outdated policies (Szunyogh 
1991:3). At a national level the absence of significant teacher participation in the 
political opposition prior to 1989 has resulted in the marginalisation of educators, 
as political leaders continue to wield power through their control of the process of 
education. The consolidation of teachers as a powerful interest body has been 
severely eroded by the precarious position in which the former Education 
Ministry's pOlicies have placed them. Teachers have been pushed to the lowest 
level of economic existence with a minimal standard of living. Teachers thus face 
the arduous task of attempting to secure better wage conditions whilst the new 
government continues to regard education as of secondary importance in its 
"gradualist" shift to a market economy. The attention of teachers has effectively 
been shifted from the question of reforms to economic survival as headmasters 
struggle with deficit budgets and at times even meeting staff salaries (Halasz 
1991:10). Teachers also find themselves besieged by contradictory parental 
expectations. On the one hand some parents pressure teachers to advance moral 
and religious education whilst others accuse them of collaboration and 
"mis-education" of past generations. 
In the prevailing economic climate teachers look to their associations to lobby for 
a living wage and to safeguard their autonomy in the light of the mood of 
centralisation amongst the power elites. The two largest teacher associations are 
in agreement that the single biggest problem with which the profession has to deal 
is teacher salaries and the financing of education. The school financing issue 
dates from the communist era and has been exacerbated by the Ministry's 
shifting of its school funding responsibilities to local municipalities which do not 
have the required resources. The Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union (PDTU) 
who have campaigned on behalf of the pro-reform teachers is the most active 
organisation in this regard as witnessed by the first post-1945 demonstration, held 
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in December 1988 (see Appendix 21). The former communist Pedagogues Trade 
Union (PfU) continues to attract more members (170 000) than the more 
progressive Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union (established 1988). However, it 
would be the salary dispute that would bring the former opponents to work together 
to oppose the ministries unilateral scrapping of a 30 % increase in teacher salaries. 
The massive joint rallies before Parliament in 1991 served to demonstrate the 
united power and the common cause both associations responded to, a reality that 
underscored the role of post -1989 teacher associations. 
The popularity of independent schools became evident in 1990, as thirty non-state 
schools were founded. The underlying reasons for the success of these schools 
were: the society's impatience with the states reform schedule; discontent with the. 
persistence of traditional communist education in certain schools (Horvath & 
Mihaly 1990:48); negative comparison of schools with international standards and 
the need for market orientated manpower. 
The proliferation of independent schools was seen by six interviewees, in the 
absence of radical education reforms (Halasz 31-10-91), as one of the major 
positive developments since April 1990. Alternative schools have also fulfilled to 
some degree the public expectation of reforms. The non-state school movement is 
slowed down to an extent by ongoing conflict over the subsidy criteria of the State 
Education Committee, with pro-independent school founders campaigning for 
subsidies to all school types as a civil rights issue. The independent school's 
movement is set to feature prominently as a powerful player in the future education 
system as there are predictions that its present (1991) five percent control of the 
national system is expected to reach twenty percent by 1994 (Mihaly, K 1991:3). 
The antagonistic relationship between parents, pupils, teachers and schools that 
has developed since 1948 poses a threat to the efforts of educators to legitimise 
reforms through community participation in schools as part of the democratic 
transition of the education system. The achievement of school-level autonomy 
brought into sharp focus the conflict of interests between the education 
establishment and the local community. Parents were reluctant to participate in 
school management while headmasters and staff were opposed to the allocation of 
more decision-making powers which parents thought were lacking. The outcome 
was, in many instances, parent, pupil and teacher demonstrations during 1990-1991 
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(Gyarmati 9.1991:2). The challenge facing educators is to get the community 
and parents who are at present only involved as individuals, to participate in a 
collective manner in school management. This hinges, as Bathory (1991:7) 
argued, on "the adoption of the envisaged client-centered pedagogy which 
would allow for the clear-cut interests of clients in the internal processes of. 
school, e.g. values, contents, methods". 
The sheer volume of public response to education issues, and indeed the 
sensitivity of politicians to public opinion, in reaction to the first expert 
committees education draft (which was made public in February 1991) firmly 
established the wider public as an interest group not to be ignored. In 
mid-1990, a public opinion poll on education expectations confirmed the 
existence of two opposing camps in the general public (e.g. traditional vs 
modem) dividing along party political lines (Halasz 1991 :5). However, since 
the conducting of the poll, public attention has been fixed upon "bread and 
butter" issues as witnessed in low voter turnout in subsequent elections. These 
issues of economic survival have had a negative effect on public opinion in 
regard to issues related to education. What is more, given the influence of the 
"old guard", doubt has been expressed on the mass media's ability or desire to 
raise education issues to further the process of education reforms. The end 
result has been the relegation of education issues in the minds of the public and 
with it public opinion as a means of pressuring the government to press on with 
reforms. 
Higher education is in a transition phase similar to secondary education. The 
successful transformation at particular institutes depends upon the power of 
either the pro-traditionalist educators, those pro-reform minded or the group 
that favours continuance of the status quo. Participation in reforms have also, 
undoubtedly, been affected by the phenomenon of "collective amnesia" 
(Horvath 30-10-91) which is prevalent in certain education circles. The 
communist period has been "forgotten" and a return to traditional conservative 
Prussian education is advocated by some educators. The road to reforms, this 
return to the past notwithstanding, has been led, to name but a few, by the 
Eotvos Lorand University, the Foundation for School Development (Budapest), 
the Hungarian Institute of Education Research and the National Institute of 
Public Education. 
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My analysis suggests three issues from the pre-1989 period that remain the 
focus of critique on higher education and inhibit the development of this interest 
group. The grassroots implementation of Ministerial policy or research 
institutions' proposals are subject to the approval of local interest groups; 
counter-selection hinders the brightest school-leavers from entering higher 
education and some universities remain "monopolistic and closed" to 
modernisation in an effort to cling to their former powerful position (Bakos 
1991:64;66). In spite of economic restraints and opposition by some 
institutions, higher education institutes are set to regain their position in the 
European Community, with international exchange programmes forming a 
crucial part of this goal. 
The introduction of religious education as part of school curricula in 1991, 
sparked off a broad based public outcry against the government's unilateral 
powerplay in education. Public reaction sounded a warning to religious groups 
that political freedom had brought with it the right of parents and the 
community to oppose central decisions on the education system. The 
participation of the various special interest groups in the issue of religious 
education served to: identify a number of known and emerging interest parties 
that were ready to oppose central power; and facilitated a process of 
reconciliation between the state, educators and the church. Agreement on the 
question of religion in schools also heralded the first post-1989 conflict of 
national proportion, one that was solved by "collective wisdom" (Gyarmati 
11.1990:38). 
As parents, teachers, believers and non-believers participated in the debate on 
religious education which raged in the press, churches, schools and Parliament, 
it became clear that their greatest fear was that it would lead to discrimination 
and social division, reminiscent of the country's Nazi era. The non-Roman 
· Catholic denominations were especially wary of the potential for discrimination 
at school level as instruction would be Catholic dominated. The Catholic 
Church uses historical justification in its claim to re-establish its values among 
children born in an atheist state. However, public opinion (Appendix 12) was 
opposed to the introduction of religion in schools which is seen by some as 
merely to strengthen their grasp on power through yet another ideology to 
replace the former state-sponsored atheist ideology. Religious interest groups 
seem set to increase their influence in education with: the appointment of 
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religious teachers to schools; the return of nationalised (1948) church property of 
which some presently house schools; and the majority of political parties 
adapting election policies to draw religious voters. 
5. CONCLUSION : ARENA OF POWER 
Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making Arena or "Arena 
of power" 
"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups) 
1. Business sector schools 1. Directors of former state 
e.g. Hungar Hotels School, companies fearing loss of 
Miller Food Chain schools. job/power due to 
11. Pro-EC unity economists privatisation e.g. government 
and private sector requiring goal to increase 
trained manpower privatisation from 8,3% 
ill. Institutes which support to 50% (1991 - 1992) 
international economic 
co-operation e.g. Institute of 
World Economics, Budapest. 
"I" AXIS (negative pole) 2 3 "I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole) 
4 1 
1. Pro-democratic transformation 1. Pro-status quo educators 
teachers ll. MDF Coalition Government 
ll. Pedagogues Democratic Trade lll. Roman Catholic Church 
Union 1V. Christian National Movement 
ill. SZDSZ Political Party v. Reform Communists e.g. 
1V. Independent Schools municipal authorities 
v. Pro-Modernisation research Vl. Academic nomenklatura 
institutes e.g. Foundation for Vll. Sector of media controlled 
School Development, Budapest. by former communists, e.g. 
V1. Pro-reform "Young set" of N epszabadsag - largest 
intelligentsia at Institutes national daily 
of Higher Education Vlll. Pro-Traditionalist educators 
Vll. Educators that favour European lX. Former Communists winning 
integration and globalisation local elections as 
of education. independent candidates 
viii. Hungarian Socialist Party X. Pedagogues Trade Union 
Xl. Progressive independent 
candidates winning local 
elections 
"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups) 
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The unique form of communism which evolved in Hungary and the education 
decentralisation process which started with the passing of the 1985 Act, have 
made clear how interest groups are located in the "arena of power" . This 
relatively liberal environment made possible the alignment of groupings according 
to an emphasis on either the economic or ideological function of education. With 
the progress of the education policy debate on an appropriate future education 
philosophy has come a marked division between groups in quadrants 4 and 1 as 
opposing dimensions. The demise of Marxist ideological hegemony in education 
has opened, ironically, the way for occupation of dimension 1, to groups that 
support the idea of a single value system, for example, the MDF coalition 
government's program of traditional Prussian type education. This dimension 
continues to feature reform or former communists and nomenklatura clinging to 
the status quo. The position of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), the former 
dominant workers party in dimension 4 is of particular interest. In contrast to its 
firm entrenchment in dimension 1 prior to 1989, the HSP, now lobbies in its 
education manifesto, against central control and for greater school autonomy. 
Dimension 3 continues to house the largest number of former communist directors 
of state enterprises that have either bought these companies with pre-1989 
privileged capital or are placed favourably to do so as the slow process of 
privatisation of state companies continues. The present strength of groups in 
dimension 2 is set to grow given the tradition of a pre-1989 secondary economy, 
the inflow of foreign capital through joint ventures and the positive outlook for 
the Hungarian economy compared to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The favourable 
status of Hungary in regard to negotiation for full EC membership bodes well for 
the groups in dimension 2. The collection of pro-modernisation groups in 
dimension 4 could also benefit from the "ripple effect" from growth in dimension 
2, as inflow of foreign capital and EC integration will reinforce the issues that 
they lobby for in education policy making. As newcomers to school boards, and 
as a result of the undecided outcome of the "media war", the parents and public 
opinion interest groups have not acquired a clear identity and thus I have not 
included them in the classification diagram. Similar to Poland, the research 
indicates that the "arena of power" in Hungary is dominated by interest groups 
from dimension 1, which favour a single value system. 
The data suggests that in pinpointing the loci of influence in the Hungarian 
education "arena of power", that political supremacy equals dominance in 
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education policy-making. Although the pro-reform movement, found in 
dimension 4, has widespread support within education, especially at school level, 
the political hegemony commanded by ·the MDF coalition government, is 
undoubtedly the central factor in determining the form and pace of reforms. 
Hungary is the only Central European country where the same political party 
which toppled the communists in 1989 has comfortably managed to retain political 
power. The result has been that the MDF, with the blessing of the Roman 
Catholic Church, has had a relatively "free hand" to entrench its tradition value 
system on education in the absence of any serious threat to its political power. 
Within education the broad reform movement, found in dimension 4, and led by 
the Pedagogues Democratic Trade Union and the pro-reform "young set" of 
intelligentsia have made substantial inroads into the Hungarian "arena of power". 
However, this research confirms that alliances between groups in dimension 1, 
particularly the MDF and Roman Catholic Church and Christian National 
Movement have effectively shut the door on the more far-reaching education 





This historical overview has as its point of departure the Prague Spring of 1968 
and tracks the development of the civic movement which culminated in the mass 
pro-democracy demonstrations of November 1989 (section 1). 
This chapter, structured according to the Bereday framework, reflects upon .the 
crisis in public education that prompted teachers to join the civic movement and 
the November 1989 protest marches. The revolutionary transfer of political 
power rever~ed almost "overnight" the roles of the dissident/pro-reform 
educators and the former communist education. The chapter also outlines the 
legislative reforms of the new government. This is followed by a discussion of 
the amended Act No 29 of 1989 which maps out the intended transition to a 
democratic education system and a review of the Ministerial reforms with 
respect to management and administration, curricula and teacher training. As the 
alignment of political groupings in Parliament after the free elections of 1990 
shows, ethnicity and political fragmentation are at the heart of tensions in 
Czechoslovakia (CSFR) (e.g. Slovak National Party and Moravian Party- both 
parties for full autonomy). These developments provide, arguably, pro-reform 
minded educators in what is today the Czech (9,8 million) and Slovak (4,9 
million) Republics with a stiffer challenge than that of their peers in Poland or 
Hungary, given the extreme centralist policies of the former Education Ministry 
in the CSFR and the fact that democratic transition could only be initiated after 
the 1989 revolution (Prucha 1991:1). Important as the issue of ethnicity is, this 
dissertation will, however, not consider this issue at length. It is the state of the 
country's economy which will command our attention. 
This focus arises out of my fieldwork in Central Europe. While I was in the 
CSFR, it became clear that although political and ethnic headlines featured 
prominently in the media, economic issues constituted the focus of public and 
teachers' attention. For educators it certainly is a grave reality with which they 
have to contend each day. It is for this reason that I include in my 
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discussion the significance of economic policy (section 2). A brief overview of 
the Ministry's education policy follows (section 3). 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the seven emerging education 
interest groups. These interest groups are teachers, teacher associations, 
independent schools, parents, religious groups, the media and public opinion, 
higher education and research institutes (section 4). 
Attention is given to both their participation in reforms and conditions that 
influence their development. The discussion of each interest group ends with a 
comment on its position within the sphere of education policy making, which I 
have called the "arena of power". This "arena of power" is illustrated in a 
diagram at the end of this chapter (section 5). 
1. POLmCAL TRANSFORMATION 
The 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia can be traced back to the political seeds 
of opposition planted during the uprising in 1968. Liberal and reform 
communist central committee members were disillusioned with the stagnant 
economy and monopoly of power by the conservative Novotny government 
(Corton:a 1991:323). At the beginning of 1968, the communist central 
committee voted Antonin Novatny out in favour of the liberal communist 
Alexander Dubcek. Dubcek took over the presidency in March and within five 
months, all conservative communist central committee members were replaced 
by liberal communists. An enthusiastic population rallied to support Dubcek's 
attempt to create "socialism with a human face". This revolt has popularly 
come to be known as the "Prague Spring". 
The scope of this popular movement was considerable. It led inter alia to a 
new economic model which included free-market principles. Equally 
significant, press freedom was re-instated, a product of which was the exposure 
of serious abuse of police power and poor economic management. The Prague 
Spring, however, was short-lived. Despite Dubcek's apparent volte face in 
proclaiming himself in support of the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, he had 
exposed his "vulnerability" to popular opinion. Neighbouring conservative 
communist leaders, fearing that the popular movement in the CSFR would spill 
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over into their own countries, convinced Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, to 
intervene. On 20 August 1968, tanks belonging to countries of the Warsaw 
Pact rolled into the CSFR, meeting with little resistance. Despite coming 
under a great deal of pressure from the Soviets, Dubcek, supported by 
two-thirds of the CSFR Communist Party, central committee and the majority 
of the nation, stolidly refused to renounce his government's reforms (Roskin 
1991:118). He was, as a result, replaced in April 1969 by the conservative, 
Gustav Husak, who launched a policy of "normalisation", which in effect 
removed from the party all reform and liberal communists who had supported 
the Prague Spring. 
Those who were politically harassed were to play an important role in the 
following decades. A large number linked up with dissidents to form the civil 
rights organisation, Charter 77, in 1977. Noteworthy is that 140 of the original 
242 Charter 77 signatories were Reform Communists. Charter 77 formed the 
mainstay opposition in the period prior to 1989 and from its ranks would come 
the leadership of the Civic Forum. And yet despite the growth of this reform 
pressure, interestingly the communist government installed in Prague held out 
the longest as Eastern European governments elsewhere (Poland, Hungary, 
Rumania, East Germany) succumbed to mass demonstrations. Spurred on by 
Gorbachev's non-intervention policy, however, and the successes of the 
pro-democracy movement in hardline East Germany, 10 000 Czechs and 
Slovaks held their first major demonstrations on 29 October 1989, in Prague, 
demanding the resignation of the communist leader, Milos Jakes (see 
Appendix 21). 
A key event was a student march on November 17 during which students threw 
flowers at police who retaliated by baton charging them. This show of state 
brutality united a disparate opposition consisting of students, workers, 
intellectuals and Charter 77 members to form two central organisations - the 
Civic Forum in the Czech Republic and Public Against Violence Party in the 
Slovak Republic and ignited countrywide demonstrations. What became known 
as the "Velvet Revolution" was in full swing (Di Cortona 1991:320). In the 
following days, demonstrations grew to a quarter million each day and saw the 
triumphant return of Alexander Dubcek to Prague. 
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Daily mass marches continued as the hardline Jakes clung to power. The 
discontent of protestors grew as the economy slumped with a +/- 200% 
increase in food prices amidst revelations that state mismanagement had created 
economic disaster areas in northwestern Czechoslovakia. A two-hour general 
country-wide strike on 27 November was the final blow, forcing Parliament to 
end the communist monopoly of power (Sullivan 1991:8). A non-communist 
cabinet was sworn in on December 10, upon which the communist president, 
Husak, resigned. The "Velvet Revolution" was complete by the end of 
December 1989 with Alexander Dubcek elected speaker of Parliament and the 
popular playwright and Charter 77 spokesperson, Vaclav Havel, elected 
president of Czechoslovakia. 
In the June 1990 democratic elections for both Houses of the Federal Assembly, 
the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence parties attained a majority of one 
hundred and seventy seats in the 300 seat assembly. (See Appendix: 13). The 
largest remaining parties : Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Christian 
Democratic Union Party, won forty-seven and forty seats respectively (Di 
Cortona 1991:322). 
The election outcome enabled the Civic Forum to form a non-coalition cabinet 
and Havel was elected President. In spite of the moderate support attracted by 
the Communist Party, it would be the tendency to regionalism and ethnicity that 
would pose the greatest threat to the Civic Forum and political stability. In the 
Czech Republic, the Catholic Moravian region endeavoured to attain local 
autonomy, while Slovak nationalism assured thirty percent of the Slovak vote 
going to the Slovak Nationalist and Christian Democrats parties who 
campaigned for Slovak national determination (Zielonka 1991:107; Royen 
1991:82). As we know now, the Civic Forum was unable to hold together the 
variety of political views within the party, not least of which was those between 
Christians and secularists in Czechoslovakia. The CSFR broke up in December 
1992 following a referendum in both republics in mid-1992 during which 
Slovak voters came out in favour of full automomy. Czech public opinion had 
throughout constitutional negotiation been in favour of maintaining the· 
federation (Bohanes 7.1991: 8). 
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2. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
The post-event euphoria of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia lasted only 
until the June 1990 elections when the average citizen began to experience the 
effects of macro-social and macro-economic change (Sullivan 1991:8). In this 
change, essentially that of de-nationalising, light industries were initially 
targeted and later heavy engineering works were to follow. It was into 1990 
that the dramatic effects of this shift to a market economy began to be felt and 
the pace of economic reforms began to be questioned in Parliament and the 
mass-media (see Appendix 5 & 21). The Prague government became unsure of 
itself with respect to the speed of marketisation and whether it should follow the 
Polish example of "shock therapy" or follow a more gradual transition. This 
indecision was fuelled by a growing awareness of the negative results of the 
Polish experiment, an inflation rate of 30% in the CSFR itself and food prices 
rocketing by plus minus 200%. The government found itself in a deadlock 
between the Finance Minister, Vaclav Klaus (pro-freemarket), a cautious 
President and a "go-slow" cabinet in 1990 (Roskin 1991:185; KLC 6-11-91). 
In spite of having the lowest foreign debt in Eastern Europe, (2.5 billion US 
dollars- 1988), national inflation was expected to continue at 20-30% for two 
to three years with salaries showing a mere 15% annual increase by 1991 
(Roskin 1991:128). 
The economic outlook survey released by the EC in December 1991 confirmed 
the bleakness in the Eastern European economic picture. This was especially so 
for Czechoslovakia. The report highlighted the increasing strain between the 
Czech and Slovak Republics; of particular issue was the 30% unemployment 
figure lying unevenly between the parts of the country. Slovakia was carrying 
twice the unemployment levels of the Czech Republic. Helena Hromadkova 
(13-11-91), a Charter 77 spokesman, contended that the economic deterioration 
of 1991 could be traced back to the period 1968-1989 when, "human capital 
was seriously damaged", with the exodus of expertise after the failed "Prague 
Spring". 
How these challenges were to be and are confronted is by no means clear. In 
addition to experiencing a substantial decrease in the former-Soviet market, 
access to the EC trading block seems set to continue in the short term until the 
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CSFR gains EC membership. Although analysts expect the EC to deny 
membership in the short term- to the CSFR, Poland and Hungary, "realpolitik" 
in order to avert mass migration is seen as a likely reason for the Eastern 
European countries to be accepted by the EC. 
What is clear is that this failure of the CSFR,s new economic policy has 
unleashed reaction from across the societal spectrum. In the Slovak Republic, 
the Slovak "separatist" movement, led by elements of the old guard, was 
bolstered as political support grew for a mixed economy (free market economy 
with certain socialist sectors) in contrast to the Czech Republic,s policy of a 
full transition to a free market economy. 
The re-emergence of this former political elite was accompanied by 
considerable opportunism. It exchanged its "political assets" for "economic 
assets" by using its capital and political connections from its previous life in 
government to buy newly privatised companies. Szelenyi & Treiman 
(Vecernik 1991:297) describe this phenomenon as the "reproduction and 
circulation of elites". 
3. EDUCATION POLICY 
Interest groups were effectively kept from participation in education after the 
CSFR underwent its paradigm shift to Marxist ideology in 1945. This 
discussion briefly outlines the main characteristics of education in this 
communist era leading up to the events of 1989, when teachers and the society, 
faced with a crisis in education, broke the oppressive mould in which they were 
encased and demanded that education reflected changes taking place in the 
political arena. 
In 1948,. the CSFR broke its traditional education links with Western Europe as 
the communist government led by Prime Minister Klerunt Gottwald came to 
power through the "Prague Coup'! The new government passed the Act on 
Comprehensive Schools, which orientated the direction of educational policy 
towards Moscow (Roskin 1991:4). The advent of communist rule thus 
reversed the trend towards the comprehensive school which had been in motion 
since the 1930,s (Burjan 1991:1). The new govemmenCs political and 
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ideological motivation for changing the education system was that education 
had to create new socialist workers who supported Marxist ideology (Cerna 
1991:3). The revised education system sought in its fight against class 
"elitism" to remove all forms of differentiation, including the comprehensive 
school system, in favour of the "unified, uniform school", with all children 
from six to fifteen attending the same type of school (Burjan 1991:1). 
Reform-minded as this legislation might have been, it initiated the gradual 
decline of the once progressive comprehensive school model as new rigid 
curricula were introduced which were intolerant to alternative thinking and 
different interests (Walterova 1991:4). 
The failure of the "Prague Spring" in 1968, moreover, entrenched this decline. 
It brought to the surface a political backlash which further weakened the 
capacity of the educational system to deal with diversity in thought. This led to 
the period of "normalisation" (purges) under Soviet occupation which witnessed 
renewed centralisation policies in education, more severe than in either 
Hungary or Poland (Kalous: advisor to the Czech Deputy Minister of Education 
15-11-1991). By the 1970's, education had been wrung dry of vitality. Even 
the education reform launched in 1976, the Project of Further Development of 
the Czech and Slovak Education System (PFD), which would stay in place until 
1989, could not stem the tide as education lost cultural status and social 
credibility (Walterova 1991:4) (see Appendix 20). Botlik (1991:1) goes as far 
as describing the last four decades of uniform curricula as effecting "the results 
of school activities more destructively than any other influences". Because of 
its attempts to homogenize individuals and to marginalise their personal 
interests and social needs (Havlinova 1991 :7), the former uniform education 
system came to be seen as "inhuman" and education found itself out of step 
with the societies' political aspirations. 
Concurrent with the rumblings in the general political sphere, discontent in 
education was persuasive. Teachers, mired for decades in demoralisation, 
shook off their oppression and amidst the most adverse conditions, formed, in 
the mid-1980's, the Teachers Forum (TF). Finding allies in the wider society, 
the TF, together with the Academic Forum and the Forum of Scientists came to 
work closely with the leading pro-democracy Civil Forum political party in 
Prague and the Public against Violence Party in Bratislava. Open reaction 
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to central state education policy grew as the teaching profession became more 
organised. By the late 1980's, further implementation of the 1976 PFD 
education project was met by mass dissatisfaction of teachers, the public and 
the media (Ondrejkowic 1990:13). Failure by education authorities to react to 
criticism, contributed to spontaneous civil demonstrations after 17 November 
1989, during which teachers, students and the youth played a leading role. The 
effect of these demonstrations, as we saw earlier, was to bring into power new 
organisations. The problems in education were not, however, eradicated or 
diminished by these developments. The incumbent government was, therefore, 
to find itself confronted with a full-blown public education crisis by June 1990. 
One of the new government's first responses to these problems was to initiate 
legislative reforms. For many in the new government, education was clearly a 
critical arena in which change was to play itself out. A new Education 
Ministry, had come into being, with the new government. Many dissidents 
and oppositionists to the former Ministry suddenly found themselves in the 
unique position of being given the task to· create an education policy to fulfil the 
needs. of a society experiencing substantial changes in all spheres (e.g . 
. economy, culture). One month prior to the June elections the Proposals for the 
Innovation of the Law No. 29, 1984 of the System of Primary and Secondary 
Schools, was passed. In both the May legislation and in the agreement on the 
Rights of the Child, ratified in September 1990, the former education goals of 
"ideological political education, education for socialist and proletarian 
internationalism" were replaced with the "principles of patriotism, humanism 
and democracy" (Barret 2.1991:8, Szebenyi 1992:21). Four areas were 
specifically targeted for reform in these Acts : management and administration; 
curricula and teacher training. Significantly, these areas were to become the 
focus of attention for dissatisfied interest groups. To comprehend the 
significance of these reforms in the process of transition, it is necessary to 
spell out what they contained. 
In the sphere of administration, the new government acted swiftly to rid the 
state management and education apparatus of its strict 3x3 model (municipal, 
regional, Parliament) of centralised Communist Party-state organs. The triad 
administration model (similar to those in Poland and Hungary) was replaced by 
a two-level structure of municipalities and Parliament embodied in the Slovak 
Act of State Administration on 26 November 1990, and The Act of the Czech 
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National Council on the State Administratio,:t of the Education and School 
Based Management, passed in December 1990 (Barret 1.1991:11, Prucha 
1991:5). 
The acts removed the power of Parliament to determine centrally the municipal 
boundaries of small settlements; these settlements were dissolved as 40% of 
now autonomous villages voted to form their own municipalities (Szebenyi 
1992:28). The government retained seventy five administrative units 
provisionally, to prevent disorder with sudden elimination of local 
administrations. Municipal autonomy brought with it the burden of 
responsibility for provision of education. Secondary schools became 
autonomous legal entities by the end of 1990, but the majority lacked financial 
independence with economically strained communities in reality having to take 
care of schools. Communal resources were expected to come under renewed 
pressure m 1994 when government intended reverting maintenance 
responsibility of primary schools to communities themselves. 
In the Czech Republic, the December 1990 Czech Education Act introduced the 
principles of school-based management through the establishment of district 
school boards and at community level, municipal school boards. This increase 
in independence of the individual school and local . authority was further 
enhanced with the school boards and municipalities given control of the 
finances allocated to them by the central government. This Act also confirmed 
the rights of teachers and parents, as the elected local school boards were 
intended to consist of three groups, the municipal councils, teachers and parents 
( Christenko 5-11-91 main speaker at Bratislava workshop on Slovak education 
reforms). 
In Slovakia, a weakened education administration and conflict in the various 
levels of management in the period 1989-1990, had created an urgent need for 
new legislation (Ondrejkovic 1990:95). The lack of integration of the various 
types of schools and the problem of transferring innovations and information 
from the Ministry to the school were cause for concern at Ministerial level. 
Years of top-down Ministerial decisions had fuelled resistance at ~chool level 
which, given schools' new found freedom, resulted in teachers in particular 
deciding on how fast they would implement the reforms (Ondrejkovic 4-11-91 : 
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deputy director Institute of Information and Prognosis of Education, 
Bratislava). The Slovak Act in November 1990 sought to address the 
discontent within education management through (Barret 1.1991:11) : giving 
headmasters more powers; establishing school self- management (or 
school-based management boards) bodies; and setting up Local Education 
Authorities (LEA). The LEA's were to be the only link between the Slovak 
Ministry, schools and all other bodies. Their central concerns were the 
establishment of new schools in consultation with self-management boards and 
the allocation of central funds to headmasters. The LEA directors which were 
appointed by the Ministry, were also charged with informing the public, parents 
and all other education bodies of problems and the general situation of schools 
within its area. 
The challenges of a transitional education system have compelled educators and 
researchers to take a renewed interest in curricula development, a research area 
all but marginalised prior to 1989, as a vehicle for a "human core curriculum" 
(Walterova 1991: 16) 
The 1990 Education Act gave the go-ahead for curricula freedom. The 
Education Ministry and pro-democracy teachers immediately followed the 
popular Central European progressive trend of establishing a "minimal core 
curriculum". The most important implication for schools was recognition of 
the principle of "tuition freedom". This principle left 30% of teaching time to 
the teacher's initiative and discretion. Examples of this "free time", given to 
the writer by the headmistress of the V azovova Gymnasium Secondary State 
School in Bratislava, were: a special class with extra lessons for geography and 
history enthusiasts, compulsory Latin and a choice of seminar topics (Klaskova 
6-11-91). According to Nenckova (6-11-91), head of the English department, 
Vazovova Gymnasium, Bratislava, this new "tuition freedom" enabled schools 
to specialise in certain subjects (e.g. foreign languages) in order to attract more 
pupils and build upon their reputations. 
Structuml changes have not been of a radical nature though. Primary school 
grades were increased from eight to nine years. Compulsory schooling at the 
secondary vocational level has decreased- from ten to nine years. The popular 
pre-1945 8-grade academic gymnasium secondary school has been 
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re-introduced on an experimental basis (in order to gauge parental support) 
alongside of the existing 4-grade gymnasium (Von Kopp 1991:101) (see 
Appendix 15). 
The debate on education reform has brought into question the system of teacher 
training. In particular there are concerns over the standards of pedagogical skills 
and knowledge provided for teachers at various school levels (Cerna 1991:7). 
While Parliament had passed legislation to reform higher and secondary 
education, it remained up to the institutions whether actual changes would occur 
in training student teachers and in staff development programs. Initiatives at the 
twenty-five higher education institutes have taken place on two levels. At one 
level international exchange programs (e.g. Tempus) have focused on teacher 
training. In 1990/1991, for example, 500 teachers from Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, were studying in the European Community country (Barret 
7.1991). At another level, students, teachers and academics returning from Joint 
European Projects are required to plough back what they have learnt to ensure 
that education faculties at universities remain abreast of the innovations in teacher 
training. 
The effect of these educational reforms on the emergence of interest groups and 
their access to the arena of policy making will be analysed in the following 
section. 
4. EDUCATION INTEREST GROUPS 
As we saw earlier in our discussion, interest groups who had largely been absent 
from the educational landscape, began to make their presence felt shortly before 
the events of 1989. After the revolution, teachers, teachers' associations, 
parents, independent schools, media and public opinion~ religious groups and 
institutes of higher education became clearly distinguishable as emerging interest 
groups in Czechoslovakian education. Of these, undoubtedly, parents and 
religious ·groups have proved to be the most influential. 
In the sections which follow, I will outline the context in which interest groups 
work and the development of each group in the "arena of power". 
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4.1 Teachers 
The loss of community faith in teachers as a result of their participation in the 
communist education system, where as many as one in four were Communist 
Party members, led to a breakdown of teacher-parent relations (Cermakova 
12-11-91). Ideological intolerance in education in the period leading up to 
1989, had instilled in the educational environment mutual distrust and fear in 
teachers and parents. Teachers were never sure how parents would react to 
their work. In some instances, parents reported teachers for not towing party 
policy, while in others they blamed teachers for forcing Marxism-Leninism 
upon their children (Klaskova 6-11-91). This no-win situation in which 
teachers, particularly non-communist, found themselves was, howeyer, by the 
late 1980's significantly reversed. In the groundswell period leading up to 
November 1989, teachers actively aligned themselves with the reform process, 
and managed to fashion a new image for themselves. 
As the reform process gained momentum, so the profile of teachers changed. 
Central to this change was the perception that teachers were pivotal in the 
process of re-educating the Czechoslovakian people. Not altogether 
unexpectedly, however, the weight of almost forty years of communist rule was 
to assert itself constantly in the process of reform. Teachers were able to make 
several gains, but found a society with long memories and were thus always 
vulnerable to controversy. With wide public support and aid by the Public 
Against Violence Party and the Civic Forum, they were able, for example, to 
succeed with their demands that they themselves elect academic officials and 
headmasters. However, the system could not be transformed as swiftly as the 
government, and the level of conflict within secondary education rose sharply 
as the various interest groups jostled for power (see Appendix 24). 
Epitomising this was the question, on the one hand, of the rehabilitation and 
re-instatement of the (estimated) 20 000 school teachers dismissed for political 
reasons under the old government and on the other, of the prosecution of 
functionaries of the old system (Von Kopp 1992:110). The aftermath of the 
democratic revolution was marked by often "wild" purges of teachers and 
headmasters, instigated not by the Ministry, but mostly by parents (Von Kopp 
1992: 111). Their memories of the past were close to the surface. 
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Teachers undoubtedly face a daunting task, called upon not only to endure the 
drawbacks of the profession, they have to withstand public criticism. The most 
common criticism expressed by parents and pupils is their anxiety about the 
former Communist Party teachers' ability to teach objective history 
(Cermakova 12-11-91. According to Botlik (12-11-91), consultant to the 
Czech Ministry of Education for School Reconstruction and Technology, while 
the majority of teachers are knowledgeable on new international education 
literature, analysts have criticised their ability to foster the innovations needed 
in the future. 
But the reforms had undoubtedly opened a space for teachers. They were now 
able, supported by their associations, to become more active in pursuing their 
interests and in opposing unpopular Ministerial actions. They took to the streets 
in a major rally in Prague in January 1991, to protest against the lack of 
Ministerial "concepts" and guidance for future development in schools. This 
rally was the first sign of a revitalised teachers corps. The minister 
responded by acknowledging that no new curricula and text-books had been 
prepared. Sufficiently motivated and qualified teachers should, however, he 
pronounced, be able to manage without equipment and textbooks (Rude Pravo 
1991: 1). In February, teacher discontent again flared up, as demonstrations 
were staged outside the Ministry of Education, in a protest against the 
Minister's presumption in making a public apology to the children of the 
CSFR, on behalf of the teachers, for their role in teaching Marxism under the 
former government. The Education Ministry's unpopularity was further 
fuelled by the government's strict economic policy. While the policy had 
successfully curbed inflation, education was forced to bear the brunt of cuts to 
ward off a deficit in the national budget. In practice, this meant that the 
education budget and expenditure remained at the same level for 1990 and 
1991 (Kalous 15-11-91). Teachers' salaries remained at 1990 figures in a 
society with a rapidly rising rate of inflation and living costs (Kalous 
15-11-91). According to Jan Herber (15-11-91), director of the Bratislava 
Institute of Pedagogy, low teacher salaries and funding of schools remain the 
archilles heel of education in the CSFR (see Appendix 23). Low teacher 
motivation, inability to initiate prescribed reforms, lack of specialisation (for 
example, available technology such as computers), feminisation (in primary 
schools 82% of teachers are female and 50% in academic gymnasiums), 
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and inability to use travel freedom, are all ascribed to the lack of funds 
(Potucek 8-11-91 and Cermakova (12-11-91). Ondrejkovic (4-11-91) gives the 
example of wage comparisons between steel industry workers earning 
3800-4000 crowns per month whilst average teachers earn a maximum of 3300 
crowns. Teachers, these conditions notwithstanding, have emerged very much 
more empowered. 
Within this process of reforms, headmasters were the group most profoundly 
affected within education. Sutcliffe (1992:22) put the number of headmasters 
who had to re-apply for _their post as 6300 at primary schools, 484 at secondary 
vocational and 357 at gymnasium schools. Only one tenth re-secured their 
former position. The majority of newly elected headmasters support the new 
Ministerial management and reform policy, though they continue to struggle to 
keep pace with implementation schedules through shortage of funds, the 
unstable personnel situation and lack of management experience (Vary 5-11-91, 
Christenko 5-11-91). The degree of compliance with Ministerial reforms at 
school-level continues to depend upon the attitudes of individual headmasters. 
This situation is best exemplified by Nenickova's (6-11-91) comment: 
"Finally, the principal is democratic and responsible. It depends 
on the principal and on his/her morality, whether he/she 
wants to discuss the matter with the staff or vice-principal. 
The personal view of our principal is that it is better 
when teachers decide, themselves decide, what to do, as 
then they do it better. They have the feeling it is their responsibility 
and they are more active". 
And yet, regardless of the sweeping changes in education, the daily reality of 
pro-reform teachers, especially in those conservative rural areas, according to 
Szomolanylova (6-11-91), is that teachers are vulnerable and at the mercy of 
the local community and politically recalcitrant headmasters. 
In evaluating the position of teachers, one needs to comprehend the complex 
mixture of activist and passivist elements within their midst and in their 
collective makeup. While pro-reform teachers (dimension 4- seep 147) have 
rid themselves of the hegemonic yoke of the communist era and their position 
126 
of 'subjugation' in the 'arena of power' with their participation in the "Velvet 
Revolution", the research shows, however, that their new found freedom and 
access to power at school level through schoolboards' participation, is under 
threat from conservative headmasters and reform communists from within 
education and at various levels in the government (dimension 4). Their 
achievements have been noteworthy all the same. Although the 1989 
revolution and ensuing economic policy had brought economic hardship to 
teachers, their greatest victory lay in the establishment of 'channels of access' 
to the power elite, not only in the form of schoolboard representation but the 
right to pressure government policy-makers by means of demonstrations (e.g. 
the January and February 1991 protests). This access to the 'arena of power' 
was most evident in teachers successful lobbying for the re-election of all 
headmasters. 
4.2 Teacher Associations 
Early participation by teachers in the pro-democracy movement, which evolved 
into the Czech Civic Forum and Slovak Public Against Violence political 
parties, guaranteed a determining role for teacher associations in the process 
of negotiations. 
The Teachers Forum was established in both republics as the teaching 
profession strove to represent their interests and separate their professional 
goals from party political issues (see Appendix 21). The Teachers' Forum, 
drawing on large support from teachers, accounting for 8,3% of the total 
workforce in Slovakia alone, has been influential in the rapid solution of 
long-standing educational management problems. It won support especially in 
its campaign to re-instate teachers who had been dismissed on political grounds 
and in its efforts to keep public scrutiny focused on problematic education 
issues (Ondrejkowic 1990:14). For example, a number of professional groups 
of experts, attached to the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, rallied to 
support the Teachers Forum. These groups of voluntary educators co-operated 
closely in the restructuring of existing education structures and in preparing 
new legislation. 
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The major associations in Czechoslovakia are the former communist Teachers 
Trade Union, the Pedagogical Union and the Teachers Forum of Slovakia (see 
Appendix 24). The Communist Teachers' Trade Union (CTIU) was the only 
legal organisation prior to 1989. Following the revolution, this union broke 
into about sixty splinter groups. The largest group, numbering approximately 
300 000, formed the Teachers' Trade Union (TIU). The TIU is the most 
powerful of the teachers' organisations because of its retention of CTIU capital 
and buildings, and the active, well-organised participation of its members and 
strong and pragmatic leadership. In these times of economic hardship, the TIU 
is especially attractive to teachers, as it is able to pay for study travel abroad, 
etc. The TTU's dependance, however, on the leadership of one or two 
personalities is described by many, for example, Jaroslav Kalous (15-11-91) as 
a potential weaknesses. 
The second organisation, the Pedagogical Union (PU) grew from the School 
Committee in an effort to cut ties with the Civic Forum and Teachers Forum, 
and to embark upon a professional programme. The PU consists of about thirty 
co-ordinating groups from all types of schools. The efforts of this pro-reform 
and innovation-minded group, according to Kalous (15-11-91), are hindered by 
inexperience and lack of finances. Unity in the PU, it would appear, is a 
further problem. 
In Slovakia, the Teachers Forum of Slovakia remains the largest association, 
with 3240 members (Herber 164-1992). This organisation evolved from the 
broad civic movement of 1989 and supports the democratic transformation of 
the education system. 
Teacher associations have made tremendous strides in the first two years of a 
"levelled political playing field" in safeguarding their professional interests. 
Of particular significance have been a number of "spontaneous actions" such as 
non-formalised, non-institutionalised demonstrations. An example of this was 
the Prague 9 (suburb of city) teachers' demonstrations in February 1991. 
Nonetheless, Szebenyi (1992:30), Szomolonylova (6-11-91 : leading figure in 
Public Against Violence Party; lecturer University of Comecuis, Bratislava) and 
Hromadkowa ( 13-11-91) warn against complacency as prevailing 
socio-economic and local political conditions place a growing number of 
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progresSive teacher/activists from 1989, "at the mercy of incompetent 
municipalities" and "reform communists". Alena Hromodkova commenting on 
the post-1989 role of the civil rights organisation, Charter 77, said: " .... all the 
ex-communists (reform communists) are in government and now I am 
corresponding and in communication with suppressed, depressed and desperate 
Charter 77 people who have the same troubles they used to have as before: 
[They may now be] without communist harassment, but [their] daily existence 
[is no different because of the continued role ofj ex-communists and [the] 
economic conditions". 
The organised teaching profession in the CSFR that supports democratic 
transformation and modernisation in education, like their colleagues in Poland 
and Hungary, finds itself up against powerful opponents amongst reform 
communists in positions of influence from Ministerial to municipal levels. 
Both the Teachers Forum of Slovakia and the Pedagogical Union (dimension 4 
-seep 147) which relied on support from the ruling elite, found their influence 
in the 'arena of power' diminishing in direct relation to the loss of political 
power of the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence Parties (dimension 1). 
As the influence of the pro-reform political parties in dimension, declined, 
power in the policy making arena shifted within the same dimension to the 
reform communists and nationalist groups. Although teachers' associations 
have made use of demonstrations to access the 'arena of power', their future 
position seems vulnerable if the transition to democracy is not consolidated. An 
anti-reform government can again easily 'subjugate' educators, given the 
present economic climate, through the use of state funding as a form of 
'persuasion'. 
4.3 Independent Schools 
The "Velvet Revolution" had scarcely run its course, at the beginning of the 
1990 - 1991 school year, when the first independent schools were established 
(see Appendix 24). The elimination of state monopoly, by government decree, 
gave impetus to the alternative education movement. Where in early 1990 
there were nine independent schools (Von Kopp 1992:107), by the end of 1991 
there were 130 (Sutcliffe 1992:22). In December 1990, the earlier 
government proposals were legislated through the amendment of Law No. 29, 
1984 on the System of Primary and Secondary Education. The Act was 
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favourably received by the education establishment who saw it as the first 
attempt by the Ministry to initiate administrative decentralisation and pluralism 
in education since 1948. It is interesting to note the remark by Kalous 
(15-11-91) that the legislation on independent schools was the outcome of a 
"funny coalition between central bureaucrats and school teachers". The 
schools were given independence but central power (Education Ministry) was 
given even more power as the old communist school committees and parent 
bodies were removed and in their place was brought "a straight line now from 
the Ministry to the schools .... the paradox of revolution is that there is now 
more centralisation". In spite of this reserve towards the Ministry's 
centralisation tendencies, the space afforded to independent schools is viewed 
by many parents and progressive educators as the most visible and essential 
component in the transformation to a democratic system (Steffl 14-11-91 : 
principal and founder ofRealne Gymnasium, Prague). 
A further benefit of the new approach is the financial support provided by the 
government. The only pre-requisite for this support is that they maintain 
curricula and standards at public school level. The most attractive features to 
parents and pupils are the small classes (+I- 25 pupils to 30-35 state schools) 
and the supplementation of the curriculum with English lessons ( Christenko 
15-11-91). 
The significance of independent schools in the future education system, 
warrants a brief discussion of the "Prvni Obnovene Realne Gymnasium" 
(PORG or Real· Gymnasium), the first independent high school in the CSFR. 
The founding group of the PORG consisted of teachers and academics, led by 
Dr. Ondrej Steffl, who had declined an invitation from the Ministry of 
Education to oversee the reform process (Weiss 1991:37). The non-sectarian, 
apolitical PORG project was launched in January 1990 and classes began in 
September 1990. During my visit to the PORG in November 1991, the 
reasons for starting the school became apparent. The founders said that they 
had been unwilling to wait the decade or more that it would have taken to 
reform state education (Burgr 1991:3). Prominent objections to state education 
included dissatisfaction with inadequate state text-books and curricula for 
modem education and the continued presence of former loyal communist 
teachers. The school also grew from the need to break from the monopolistic 
hold of the state and in response to parental demand (Stefl 14-11-91). The 
overriding motivation seemed to be the establishment of the PORG as a 
possible model for other educators and communities to follow. 
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Noteworthy aspects of the school are : a concerted effort to keep tuition fees at 
an affordable level to ensure access to all families, and not to become an elitist 
institution (tuition fees for 1992 will represent about two-and-a-half months of 
the average Prague family income); as a reaction to years of communist school 
propaganda, a determination not to teach "civics" (political science) classes or 
allow a "student government" (reminiscent of the communist youth 
organisations) at the school (Mitter & Weiss 1991:39); participation in 
international exchanges and visits, with the U.S.A., Netherlands, Germany, 
France and England. 
The active support of the Ministry for independent schools can be attributed to: 
an attempt to reach a "golden mean" between state education and the 
"privatisation" of education (Szebenyi 1992:24); using such schools as a testing 
ground for alternative models; and as a political response to lobbying from the 
increasingly influential Association of Private Schools (APS) which was 
founded in Apri11991, with seventy member schools. 
Independent schools, are in many cases the "showcase" of the pro-reform 
movement in Czechoslovakian education and the one interest group, 
represented by the APS (dimension 4 - see p 147) which seems relatively 
"immune" to the political power struggle. The APS does not have direct 
influence in the 'arena of power'. However the standards attained, comparable 
to West European education, have seen such schools used as testing grounds 
and models by the Education Ministry. The outcome of the power struggle 
following the breakup of the CSFR and the rise in nationalist sentiment in 
Slovakia will, however, be a factor in the direction taken by independent 
schools. In so far as independent schools are dependent on subsidies they will 
have to retain good relations with the political authorities. The best possible 
scenario for the future of independent schools, is the strengthening of groups 
in dimension 2 and EC integration which will neccesitate maintenance of 
standards to ensure adequately educated manpower for a market economy. 
4.4 Religious Groups 
The Christian tradition in the CSFR has in the communist era, played a crucial 
defensive underground role ever since the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and 
131 
the suppression of religious activities after 1948 (Potucek 1991:4). Opinions 
vary on the estimated number of practising Roman Catholics in the population. 
Santema (10-9-91: former theology lecturer, University of Amsterdam) put the. 
figure at 49% of the roughly fifteen million population (CSFR), while Potucek 
(1991:4) puts it at 58%. However, Chermakova (12-11-91) reckoned that the 
period of state sponsored atheism had taken its toll on the church : "In the 
Czech Republic, plus/minus 70% of the population is Christian, but not rigid 
Roman Catholic, and only 10% are actively in Church." Whatever the size of 
the Catholic community it is a fact that this group is firmly entrenched as an 
interest group (Christenko 15.12.1991) (see Appendix 22). 
The December 1990 Act specifies that schools should guarantee religious 
education. This provision in the Act led to heated debates as the Minister of 
Education strove to change the socialist education system to a Christian system. 
As the Minister, who was described in personal communication to be a "big 
Christian activist", attempted to fill the normative vacuum created by the 
collapse of communism, opposition formed rapidly from teachers, teachers' 
associations, parents and pupils. Cermakova (12-11-91) described parental 
feeling in the following terms : "The majority of people do not want the 
children influenced by another ideology, like obligatory religious instruction". 
In the debate between the Minister and opponents of religious instruction, it 
became apparent in September 1990 that the government had backed off. The 
government conceded that religion would not be included in the curricula and 
would be presented after school hours (see Appendix 24). Szomolanylova 
(6-11-91) remarked, however, that in spite of the government "backing down" 
on its introduction of religious education, that: " ... the dogmatic approach of 
the Roman Catholic Church has led sections of the population to send pupils to 
less rigid Protestant gymnasium schools, which are run by the church, 
and which provide good, open, professional schooling". 
Following the 1990 elections, religious values, suppressed by Communism 
resurfaced, not without opposition though. Traditional differences between 
Catholics, Protestants, secularists and other ethnic groups q:uickly became 
apparent as the communist threat abated. Historic religious tensions between 
the Czech and Slovak republic, for example, became problematic. These can be 
traced to their very distinct religious and cultural backgrounds. The Czech 
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Republic has a historical tendency to a secular humanistic worldview and an 
orientation to Western European democracy and its liberal culture. In the 
Slovak Republic on the other hand, religion has early links to Eastern spiritual 
traditions with a strong present-day Catholic following, interwoven with Slovak 
nationalist sentiment. These differences have been visible in the post-1990 
scene where religious undercurrents have emerged in the Civic Forum, with 
President Havel representing the secular Catholic faction, and the Foreign 
Minister, Dienstbier, the traditional Catholic party element (Roskin 1991:173). 
This has had profound implications for education, particularly over religious 
education in Slovakia, given the strong Catholic and nationalist tone of the 
leading political parties. The possible power of these parties to influence the 
debate on religious education was evident in the success of a nationalist 
demonstration in 1990 at the Bratislava Parliament, which forced the 
government to legislate Slovak as the only official language, ignoring the 
vernacular of Slovaki's 600 000 Hungarians. 
The Roman Catholic Church, (dimension 1 - see p 147) as the dominant 
religious interest group, was the first to make its presence felt in the 'arena of 
power' as the church 'persuaded' the government to introduce religious 
education. This attempt by the Catholic Church and ruling power elite, 
witnessed the one occasion in education that opposing groups from dimensions 
4 and 1 temporarily "joined forces" to oppose this 'traditionalist' grasp at 
power and implementation of a single value system. In spite of the success of 
opposition to religious education in 1990, the research indicates the combination 
of Catholic and nationalist sentiment as prevalent amongst a large segment of 
the population, which raises the probability of a renewed "onslaught" by these 
groups on the 'arena of power'. 
3.5 Parents 
Under the socialist government, parents had no rights in education and were 
caught in "a crisis of the absolute horizon" as man "disintegrated into the 
anonymous roles of consumer, patient, pupil and parent" (Vaclav Havel in 
Walterova 1991:3). The present Ministry of Education has launched 
a completely new strategy to "take into account the existence of groups of 
different interests" (Obdrzalek 1991 : 1). This democratisation project has not 
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only seen the legal sanctioning of parental participation in schools, but the 
active "courting" of the Ministry and schools to elicit the active support of 
parents to legitimise the process of transformation. 
Herber (5-11-1991) (see Appendix 23) confirmed that since the December 1990 
Act, parents, in terms of their participation in Municipal School Boards (Czech) 
and Secondary School Councils (Slovak), have changed from a mere "novice 
group" to a highly influential interest group (council/board composition: equal 
representation from municipal council, parents and teachers). Cermakova 
(Barret 1-91:11) describes the role of the councils as being of immense 
importance, given the parameters of their powers, e.g. assessment of schools, 
local community and local state bodies. School councils also serve as a 
platform to promote parent and teacher interests and as a public control 
mechanism over local school decision-makers (see Appendix 24). 
The development of parents as a strong interest group in all schools is still in its 
early stages, mostly due to their inexperience and the short lapse of time since 
they were given rights for participation. At the end of 1991, Cermakova 
(12-11-91) remarked, "parents are not organised and speak only as individuals, 
they cannot oppose school decisions, while state school parents may propose 
something and staff may or may not accept". The position of parents has 
further been weakened by the dissolution of pre-1989 parent-teacher 
associations. Szomolanylova (6-11-91) also voiced her concern, following the 
re-election of a number of former communist .headmasters in Slovakia after 
1989 : "People (teachers and parents) were not ready for freedom and to use it 
properly . . . . parents are not ready to take initiative in their hands, change is 
already visible but it will take some time. The education system is the most 
damaged resource of the country". 
Consultations at the Czech Ministry of Education, during November 1991, 
confirmed, consistent with Poland and Hungary, that financing of education was 
the biggest "headache" for the new Ministry. Oldrich Botlik (12-11-91) 
remarked upon the goals of the Ministry : "Our aim is to have a lot of diverse 
schools. The major obstacle to this development is the system of financing, 
allocation of state subsidies to schools". He continued to describe a possible 
change of the financing system that was being researched at the time. The 
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proposed voucher system would : " .... establish rules to allocate funds, as a 
result of the money which will follow the pupils as the parents (having been 
given education vouchers) chose the school". Although this voucher system 
was still in the research phase, early indications were favourable for its passage 
through Parliament, given the strength of the ruling Civic Forum. The 
implications of the voucher system would appear to be far-reaching for parents 
as an interest group. Parents would enrol their children at the school which 
they chose. Botlik (12-11-91) emphasised the enormous potential influence and 
power it would give parents : "Control could be shifted from the Ministry to 
the parents and pupils as consumers". 
Parents have been assured a 'channel of access' to the 'arena of power' at 
school level, with equal representation on school boards and school councils in 
both republics of the CSFR. The ability of parents to have a meaningful 
influence on the education process is also set to have a broader impact if the 
proposed voucher system of school financing is passed by Parliament. The 
effect of parents on the 'arena of power' becomes evident when considering 
their ability through the voucher system to support schools of their choice, 
thereby deciding in reality the "survival" of only the best schools. 
Furthermore, a 1991 parent opinion poll, (Appendix 14) describes 50% of 
parents as being pro-reform minded (dimension 4 - see p 147 ~ thereby 
suggesting that a large segment of pro-reform schools will be supported by 
parents at the expense of schools who are intransigent in implementing 
reforms. 
4.6 The Media and Public Opinion 
Powerful images of the power of public opinion, expressed in the March 1988 
Candlelight Demonstration (Bratislava) and November 1989 student 
demonstrations in Prague, were etched in the minds of the international 
community, as the Czechoslovakian nation demanded democracy. Ironically, 
it was to be the Central European country where public opinion (manifested 
through the mass media, demonstrations, petitions and opinions of the "silent 
majority" category), had been most severely suppressed, which would 
demonstrate the immediate effectiveness of mass discontent. The success of the 
bloodless "Velvet Revolution" epitomised this most potently. The swiftness of 
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the revolution, unfortunately, carried its own price. Inherent in it were 
negative impulses as the turbulence spilled over into the new democracy. 
The removal of totalitarianism could not construct a fully functioning and 
mature democracy, as numerous political parties, numerous special interest 
associations and pressure groups only began surfacing after the revolution. In 
coming to light, what is more, these groups were adversely affected by a lack 
of experience and rapidly changing social conditions which continuously 
strained their relationships with their support bases. Educators intent on 
winning public support for education issues had to contend with a complex 
array of socio-economic and political interest groups (see Appendix 24). 
By late 1991, political disarray seemed the order of the day as the broad civic 
movement (pro-democracy movement with support from, for example, Charter 
77, teachers, politicians and people from across the societal spectrum) which 
won the June 1990 elections split to form several minority parties (eight parties 
in the Czech Republic and seven parties in the Slovak Republic (Diner 
8-11-1991: Director Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of 
Sociology). Leading figures in the Velvet Revolution and the democratic 
movement lost popularity after the June 1990 election. In Slovakia, the Public 
against Violence Party's support dropped from 29.4% to 2.4% (Potucek 
8-11-91) while the Czech Civic Movement (Remnant of the Civic Forum) slid 
to a 6% voter support percentage (Bohanes 7.1991 :2). Personal communication 
with interviewees attributed this decline to "tentacles of invisible mafias"; 
President Havel, in August 1991, put the situation down to "the burden of the 
totalitarian heritage" (Bohanes 7.1991:8). Havel pointed the finger at the 
former communists who retained key positions at all levels of the 
administration and in state enterprises. While reform communists, through 
their support for Charter 77 (human rights organisation) and the civic 
movement, have gained office, their support for real democratic reforms has 
been questioned in light of their "nominally anti-communist" stance 
(Hromadkova 13-11-91). 
As in Poland and Hungary, the trend to voter and public apathy to national 
issues is apparent in Czechoslovakia where it became clear that subsequent 
elections were decided on "bread and butter" issues. Public pressure groups 
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such as the ecological movement and the environmentalists, to which the public 
rallied prior to the revolution, had lost support (3 .4% to under 2% Potucek 
1991: 12). This confirmed the trend of voter apathy, with about 30-50% of the 
population appearing to be politically undecided in November 1991 (lllner 
8-11-91). 
The shift in societal priorities is most striking when evaluating the ten most 
important problems given by respondents in answer to a 1991 opinion poll 
question : "What social problems are necessary to be solved first" (Potucek 
1991:6). The poll conducted one and a half years after the revolution, 
concluded that concerns about the standard of living (for example, 
unemployment and economy) had replaced initial public concerns about 
a "moral crisis" and "social deviations" in reference to the ecology, education 
and family values. Where, for example, there had been public pressure on the 
new government in both republics to introduce re-election of headmasters and 
deputies through secret ballot in the December 1989 to January 1990 period, 
public enthusiasm soon waned with the deteriorating of the economy and 
attention shifted to political and "bread and butter" issues (KLC: 6-11-091: 
journalist at Narodna.Obroda, Bratislava daily newspaper). Kalous (15-11-91) 
ascribes the lack of public interest in education to the Parliamentary and 
societal debates, which at the end of 1991, were dominated by the dispute over 
the continuance of the federation as Slovak nationalists called for an 
independent state. Although only 16% of the population supported an 
independent Slovakia in July 1991, the July 1992 election outcome resulted in 
a breakup of the CSFR federation on 31 December 1991 (Bohanes 7.1991:1). 
The mass media is internationally acknowledged by government, Parliament 
and the majority of people to be the key public control mechanism of education 
policy. The mass media and the numerous political newspapers which appeared 
after 1989 have taken up the plight of the average and below average income 
citizens and have demanded that education, along with clothing and housing, 
should be seen as basic human rights in the new democracy (Bohanes 7.91:9). 
The transition to press freedom has not been without incident. Potucek 
( 1991: 1 0) documented the appearance and suspected work of "professional 
demagogues", former secret police and journalists selected during the 
communist era, who manipulated the mass media to incite socio-economic 
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uncertainty. The post-1989 society has been characterised by the meteoric 
appearance of the so-called 'money-hunters' (for example, pornography 
magazines and small poor-quality daily newspapers) which use press freedom to 
enrich themselves, whilst not contributing to the debate on social issues 
(Eggenhuizen 16-9-91: Utrecht School of Journalism). This means that public 
opinion has been open to numerous influences. There is the example, possibly 
adverse, of a monopolised paper such as "Rude Pravo" (the official former 
Communist Party mouthpiece), being taken over by organisations with certain 
vested interests (Hromadkova 13-11-91). Another problem has been the 
withering of the vibrant "Samizdat" (underground pre-1989 newspapers) 
tradition, such as student newspapers (for example, "Studentske Listy", 
Prague), which played an invaluable role in directing public attention to critical 
issues. Critically in 1991 active student support for "Studentske Listy" 
declined steadily (Zacek 14-11-91: editor of "Studentske Listy"), reflecting the 
trend of public apathy for political issues. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, public opinion in the new democracy has 
been established in its watchdog role, through its sensitivity to changing social 
conditions. In spite of the re-emergence of communists and communist/ 
conservative sentiment, analysts are optimistic that sufficient "islands of 
positive deviation" (or IPD, agents who carry through the critical amount of 
systematic changes in totalitarian systems) exist with reform-minded people in 
key societal positions (Potucek 1991:28). The IPD had formed the pre-1989 
opposition to the communists and included environmentalists, independent 
Catholics, students, artists, scientists and Charter 77 signatories. It was the 
participation of these groups in the civic movement that eventually culminated 
in the "Velvet Revolution". Within the new politically-free environment, the 
future of democracy (and reforms in education) rests upon the hope that the 
"islands of positive deviation" could transform themselves into "islands of 
positive innovators" (Potucek 1991:28). 
The society which had demonstrated the power of public opinion through the 
Velvet Revolution, however, had by the end of 1991 retrogressed to a state of 
the "silent majority". Economic hardship and political apathy ensued, 
following the fragmentation of the ruling political parties and the impending 
breakup of the CSFR. The force of public opinion that brought about the 
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popular demand for re-election of headmasters had been spent by late 1991. 
Those newspapers (dimension 1 and 4 see p 14 7) who are for and against 
reforms and basic rights such as education continue to publish their views but 
the research shows that education is no longer a societal priority. Public 
opinion as a method of influencing policy, will depend on the success of the 
so-called "islands of positive deviation" (dimension 4) being established in 
society in order to counter the "comeback" phenomenon of reform communists 
in Central Europe. 
4. 7 Higher Education and Research Institutes 
The restoration of academic freedom and the institutionalisation of democratic 
principles, brought with them wide ranging changes to higher education and 
research institutions. These institutions were free to jettison the Marxist 
ideology and structures of the former communist government. Although 
academic nomenklature resisted dismissals, 1991 saw universities and research 
institutes in a state of flux. Data forthcoming from my research will show that 
there was a feeling of job uncertainty in academic circles which was 
compounded by financial restrictions. The government decreased subsidies, 
research grants were allocated on academic (and not political) merit alone and 
implementation of reforms became problematic. 
The leading role which students played in the revolution, more so than in 
Poland and Hungary, mandates a brief discussion of their influence. Actions of 
the student body had the direct consequence that higher education was the first 
to experience the popular demand for democratisation. On 4 May 1990, the 
new 172/1990 Higher Education Act restored academic freedom through the 
establishment of new self-governing and autonomous bodies at higher education 
and research institutions (Slovak Republic Statute book 1990:3). The influence 
of students was evident in their success in gaining 50% representation in the 
academic senate at a number of universities, including the prestigious Charles 
University in Prague. The inroads made by students in the ruling bodies of 
higher education institutes are acknowledged to have been the first product of 
the revolution (Kalous 15-11-91). In line with the post-revolution sentiment of 
public participation, the higher education draft bill had also undergone scrutiny 
in public debate, underlining the future public accountability of academic 
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governing bodies (Barret 1.1991:12). The 4th May 1990 Act paved the way 
for the decentralisation of higher education, and the democratisation of its 
administration and study programmes. 
The Higher Education Act included changes in the financing of higher 
education, but the short time lapse between the passage of the Act and the 
drawing up of the 1991 budget, mandated the use of the traditional model. 
Only 10% of the budget allocation was derived from evaluation of conditions 
at specific institutions (Botlik 12-11-91). The Ministry of Education, in 
co-operation with foreign experts, especially from the Netherlands, had 
prepared a new system of financing for 1992, but the 1991 budget continued to 
operate in line with the restrictive economic policy. 
Those higher education governing bodies and faculties who launched reforms 
had to do so by giving attention to the negative characteristics that had 
developed since the 1960's (Rupnik 1992: 148). Central amongst these 
negative characteristics were restrictive admission policies; the influence of 
ideology in the "normalisation" period following the 1968 Soviet invasion; 
centralised administration; "the serious brain-drain" to the private sector; and 
the promotion of academics through party political affiliation. Although 
Rupnik ( 1992: 148) confirmed the initial difficulties of altering tuition 
programmes (for example, humanities) due to the lack of qualified lecturers 
and the staff's lack of familiarity with new subject content, the author 
witnessed the success of : foreign language bridging classes for secondary 
school leavers; the appointment of lecturers after a professional competition 
and the success of student and staff mobility programmes. Trans-European 
mobility in higher education is funded by the EC (European Community) 
through the Tempus, Cornett (Community Action Programme for Education 
and Training for Technology), Erasmus and Lingua projects. In 199111992 
alone, 700 students from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia undertook 
studies in one EC member country (Barret 7.1991:11). Rupnik (1992:150) 
made a strong plea against unnecessary "intellectual tourism" and argued for 
the educating of university educators and the expansion of university entrant 
numbers through programmes such as Tempus and the support of the new 
Central European Universities in Prague and Budapest. 
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At the time of my research in the CSFR, research institutes were locked in a 
process of organisational transition. The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences 
(CSAS) is the umbrella body for eighty institutions and by the end of 1991, 
20-30% of its 12 500 strong staff would have been dismissed and 85% of its 
directors replaced in an open competition (V alachovic 1991:3). The primary 
reason for the dismissals was that many former appointments had been 
politically motivated. However, after 1989 economic pressures and inefficient 
staff also contributed to the ongoing process of rationalisation. 
The education system was, and still is, adversely affected by the transition in 
research institutes. To some extent, however, this dislocation in the research 
institutes was compensated for by the use of expatriate expertise. This 
arrangement also expedited the working relationship between the research 
institutes and the Ministry as a number of Western educators, including former 
exiled dissidents, and internally-banned researchers were appointed as advisors 
to the Education Minister (Botlik 12-11-91; Kalous 15-11-91). At certain 
universities the continued presence of former communist supporters and 
lecturers, who are opposed to pro-democracy changes in society and education 
in particular, has resulted in the governing bodies opting for a strategy of 
restaffing whole faculties (Von Kopp 1991:111) or establishing additional 
institutes at the universities (Potucek 8-11-91; Szomolanylova 6-11-91). At the 
Charles University in Prague, the new Institute of Educational and 
Psychological Research has been attached to the Faculty of Education, whilst in 
Bratislava, an as yet unnamed research group, in addition to the existing 
Department of Sociology, has been founded at the Comenius University. New 
structures such as these will have the all-important task of transmitting 
international education research and innovations into Czechoslovakia. 
The re-establishment of academic freedom in May 1990 brought into sharp 
focus the divide between opposing interest groups in research and higher 
education institutes. A number of institutes (dimension 4- seep 147) embarked 
upon democratic reforms, modernisation and sought to support government 
reform efforts in education policy making. In stark contrast to these institutes, 
academic nomenklatura (dimension 1) and conservative traditionalist academics 
attempted to entrench their positions of power secured under the communist 
government. Early indications in the research are that the large number of 
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trans-European higher education exchange programs, inflow of international 
funds to pro-reform institutes and possible EC integration will swing the 
balance of influence in the 'arena of power' to the institutes in dimension 4. 
Participation of interest groups in reforms; circumstances influencing 
development of interest groups 
Interest groups have played a central role in the reform process. The 
discussion on interest groups is opened with the argument that teachers have 
borne the brunt of the pressure in the educational arena in the transition period 
due to the contradictory expectations they faced. Teachers have the pivotal 
role of not only implementing reforms, but attempting to reverse the 
breakdown of teacher-parent relations as a result of loss of community faith in 
teachers during the pre-1989 years. At the same time they carry the stigma of 
having collaborated with the old system and remain suspect in the eyes of the 
public, particularly parents. Although teachers have generally welcomed their 
new freedom within the curricula, the profession remains dogged by low 
motivation and working conditions, and primarily by poor salaries. These 
conditions continue to adversely affect teachers' attitudes to the enactment of 
change at school level. 
In 1990 nine tenths of headmasters, now democratically elected, were new to 
the position. These leaders were confronted by the full and complex range of 
factors constituting the heritage of communist education. While the majority 
supported Ministerial reforms, they were unable to implement these because of 
a lack of funds. It was, as a result, apparent from interviewees that the 
principle of democratic decision-making within schools conferred by the Act, 
was observed only in part, depending heavily on the attitudes of individual 
headmasters. Nenickova (6-11-91) commented that: "Finally, the principal 
(in reference to their school) is democratic and responsible. It depends on the 
principal and on his/her morality, whether he/she wants to discuss the matter 
with the staff or vice-principal". The vulnerability of pro-reform teachers 
again resurfaces as it emerges from the literature and interviews that, especially 
in conservative rural areas, teachers in reality remain at the mercy of the local 
community and headmasters, who have retained their power at local level. 
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Teachers have, these conditions notwithstanding, played a heroic role in the 
process of change in Czechoslovakia. The Teachers Forum was the driving 
force in the pr<Hiemocracy movement, which strove to broker a determining 
role for teacher aspirations in the process of political power negotiations (see 
Appendix 21). Backed by the victorious political parties in both republics, the 
Teachers Forum won support for having solved a number of pre-1989 
management problems in the education system and securing the re-instatement of 
teachers, who had been dismissed for their political beliefs. Teachers, backed 
by the public, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence Party were in the 
forefront of demanding the dismissal of headmasters and a process of democratic 
election. The power of the teachers' lobby became apparent as only a tenth of • 
former headmasters were re-elected (Sutcliffe 1992:22). Teachers' response to 
unpopular Ministry policies was demonstrated in protest marches in Prague 
during January and February 1991. The organisational context in which these 
developments have taken shape is crucial to understand. Prior to the 1989 
uprising, the most important organisation was the Teachers Trade Union (TTU). 
Similar to Poland and Hungary, the former communist Teachers' Trade Union 
remains the most powerful teachers' association, having retained its pre-1989 
capital and attracting teachers through its economic means, thereby ensuring its 
influence in the transition process. In the Czech Republic the smaller 
pro-reform Pedagogical Union has made impressive contributions to innovative 
school programs but has been hindered by a shortage of funds and a lack of 
experienced members. In Slovakia, the biggest association remains the Teachers 
Forum of Slovakia (TFS). However, it is too early to report how the 
splintering of the organisation's parent political party, the Public Against 
Violence Party, will affect support for the TFS. From the Teachers Forum, 
which had the support of many pro-reform appointees to the new Ministry of 
Education, evolved the Pedagogical Union as teachers sought to sever their ties 
with political parties and form a teacher's association with a professional 
program. The sentiment can be echoed that the organised profession faces a 
similar "threat" to their interests as do individual teachers. This comes at a time 
when socio-economic and local political conditions place a growing number of 
progressive teacher/activists from 1989 subject to the decisions of "incompetent 
municipalities" and "reform communists" (Szebenyi 1992:30; Szomolanylova 
6-11-91; Hromadkowa 13-11-91). 
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Teachers have also taken the lead in the private school movement. The 
removal of the state's monopoly on education provision was followed by an 
unprecedented growth in independent schools, from nine ( 1990) to one hundred 
and thirty within a year. Independent schools such as the Real Gymnasium in 
Prague, established by progressive educators, many coming from state schools, 
would take the lead in providing models for the education system. The reason 
put forward by founders of independent schools and parents for enrolling their 
children there, is that the state is unwilling or unable to change education in the 
short-term. They are also opposed to the presence of former loyal communist 
teachers in state schools. Some of the "teething problems" that the non-state 
school movement has had to contend with are: labels of elitism, lack of initial 
funds, difficulty in obtaining premises and equipment and the possibility of 
disruption as nationalised buildings are returned to the churches. Success in 
overcoming the day-to-day obstacles in "privatising" education has seen 
non-state schools progress to form the increasingly influential Association of 
Private Schools. 
The church is a major actor in the process of change and has provided an arena 
within which interest groups have operated. It has by itself, though, been 
instrumental in shifting the discussion along. The crucial underground 
defensive role which the Roman Catholic Church played in communist 
Czechoslovakia enabled church leaders to convince the incumbent government, 
many of whom were church members, to push for religious education in 
schools. The very factors, however, which prevented the success of such a 
policy (of having religious education) will in future also, it appears, inhibit its 
capacity to resurface. Forty years of state atheism and secular teacher training 
have reduced active support of the Catholic Church to possibly as low as ten 
percent (Chermakova 12-11-91). Following the "Velvet Revolution", parents 
and the public were quick to oppose new ideological monism in the form of 
religious education. But two years later, preoccupation with the economic 
crisis and poor support for fragmented political parties and election tum-outs, 
raises the question whether a renewed attempt to religious education and 
extension of the church's power would be met by the same public opposition. 
Consistent with trends in the rest of post-communist Central Europe, religion 
has become a criterion to distinguish opposing groups in education. The 
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controversy on the merits of introducing religious education in schools not only 
rekindled traditional differences between Roman Catholics, Protestants and 
secularists, dormant during forty years of communist education, but re-drew the 
dividing line between the Czech and Slovak republics and split the ruling Civic 
Forum cabinet. Although the government gave into public pressure and religious 
classes were changed to a voluntary after-school activity, a renewed effort by the 
church cannot be ruled out given its support of an estimated forty-nine to 
fifty-eight percent of the population and the strong traditional nationalist Slovak 
separatist party in Slovakia. 
Parents have gained limited power at school-level and access to the 
decision-making process through serving on school councils, but this step alone is 
not enough. Cermakova (2-11-91) elaborates that at state schools: "Parents are 
not organised and speak only as individuals, they cannot oppose school decisions, 
while parents may propose something, staff may or may not accept." The 
uppermost concern of educators on the subject of parents has been to elicit the 
participation in school structures (after four decades of absence) and supJX'rt for 
the reform process. This has not been easy. Parents, however, have emerged as 
an important pressure group. The presence of parents within the education debate 
was first encountered as they joined teachers to pressurise the new government in 
calling for democratic re-election of headmasters. By contrast, however, at school 
level parents have remained inexperienced, and uninvolved, largely due to having 
been kept out of school decision-making and empowerment at school level for four 
decades. Interestingly, nonetheless in some instances, parents, undoubtedly a 
"novice group" (Herber 5-11-1991) have, within a short space of time in gaining 
equal representation on school councils, moved to realise their potential as a vested 
interest group. The pre-1989 teacher-pupil relationship had reduced pupils to "the 
position of a passive object" (Ondrejkovic 4-11-91), a situation that both parents 
and teachers need to counter through the creation of a classroom ethos of pupil 
creativity that could make reforms meaningful at classroom level. 
Within the sphere of public opinion what counts at present are issues pertaining to 
the communist era. These have captured public emotions and the headlines of the 
media, thereby distracting public attention and influence from matters that plague 
the democratic transformation in education. The 1991 public opinion survey 
clearly shows a shift from education to political issues with the society apparently 
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preoccupied with the debate on the future of the nomenklatura and unity of the 
CSFR. The media also reflects a mood of societal uncertainty, preoccupied as it is 
with the country's past. Evident in this preoccupation is the heavy and often 
manipulative presence of individuals and organisations linked to the former system. 
It is in the domain of higher education and education research where not only most 
changes have occurred, but paradoxically, also the stiffest resistance from scientific 
nomenklatura been encountered. The sweeping dismissals of 85 % of research 
institutes' directors were counterbalanced by certain university faculties with 
anti-reform proclivities using their new autonomy to ward off changes, clinging to 
their powerful positions and in so doing forcing university authorities to create 
duplicate structures to accommodate returning or internal dissident academics. It 
was evident to me during the study tour that education research institutes and 
higher education institutes were undergoing far-reaching changes simultaneous to 
the education system which it is supposed to serve. Therefore the contribution of 
research and the preparation of the "new" generation of teachers were initially 
subordinate to staff and policy changes. 
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5. CONCLUSION : ARENA OF POWER 
Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making arena 
"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups) 
i. Economic sector supporting 
E C Membership 
1. Former political elite 
exchanging political for 
economic assets. 
n. Directors of state enterprises 
awaiting privatisation. 
"I" AXIS (negative pole) 2 3 "I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole) 
1. Independent Schools & 
Association of Independent 
Schools 
ii. Pro-democracy teachers 
iii. Former dissidents in government 
iv. Pedagogical Union (Czech Republic) 
v. Teachers' Forum of Slovakia 
vi. Parents - Czech Republic 
vii. Media e.g. Studentske Listy-
Prague student newspaper, former 
samizdat underground newspapers 
& "islands of positive deviation" 
viii.Pro-Reform Institutes of 
Research and Higher Education 
e.g. Charles University 
Education Faculty; CSAS 
Institute of Sociology. 
4 1 
1. Civic Forum & Public 
Against Violence parties 
n. Roman Catholic Church 
iii. Slovak National Party 
iv. Former communist teachers 
v. Teachers' Trade Union 
Vl. Media, e.g. journalists 
selected· in communist era; 
former communist 
mouthpiece - Rude Pravo 
vii. Reform Communists in 
government 
viii. Academic Nomenclature 
lX. Reform communists 
in local municipal 
management 
"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups) 
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In Czechoslovakia, similar to Hungary, the orientation of interest groups to a 
particular philosophy of education, decides the position of these groups on the 
Ideology "I" axis. Although the ruling Civic Forum and Public Against 
Violence parties (in dimension 1) hold a number of pluralistic views in 
common with educators in dimension 4, their attempt to introduce religious 
education (Catholicism) in schools, keep them in this dimension of groups, 
lobbying for a monolithic value system in education. Groups within 
dimension 1, such as the Slovak National Party and reform or former 
communists from government to local municipality level,, not only threaten 
transition in education, but given voter apathy, pose a real danger to the future 
unity of the CSFR. In spite of the Teacher's Trade Union (TIU), severing ties 
with its communist past and advances made by the organisation to change to a 
non-political professional body, the dominance of former communists in its 
ranks, mandate its position in dimension 1. However, the ITU seems likely 
to join dimension 4 under its present leadership. The broad pro-democracy 
civic movement dating from the Velvet Revolution, form the bulk of 
dimension 4. This group ( 4) opposes attempts by groups in dimension 1 to 
impose any brand of education monism and generates pressure on the 
government to provide differentiated education. Parents who favour education 
reforms appear in dimension 4 (absent in the classification diagram of both 
Poland and Hungary), regardless of the present trend of public apathy to both 
political and education issues, following the only public opinion poll found 
directly gauging this interest group (Appendix 14). The main antagonists in 
dimension 2 and 3 are respectively the emerging business sector, closely 
following the "gradualist" shift to a free market economy, and managers of 
state companies awaiting and resisting the government program of 
privatisation. A group in dimension 3 whose power and influence should not 
be underestimated, is the former political elite which, according to the theory 
of circulation of elites (Szelenyi in Vecemik 1991:297) have merely changed 
their political assets for economic assets and will continue to play an influential 
role in any future education system in which reforms are dependent on 
economic factors. 
In the 1989-1991 period, the Civic Forum (CF) and Public Against Violence 
parties (P A V) were at the forefront of education policy-making in the 
Czechoslovak." arena of power". However, the fluctuating fortunes of the CF 
and PA V, increasing success of the separatist parties, such as the Slovak 
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National Party and the break up of the CSFR in December 1992, has left the 
post 1992 "arena of power" in a state of flux. In the Czech republic, the Czech 
Civic Movement (remnant of the Civic Forum), led by president Vaclav Havel, 
continues to be a force in government, but it is too early to say how the 
influential group of reform Communists in government will influence the 
"arena of power". The Slovak "arena of power" also remains in a state of flux 
as the impact of the Slovak National Party on education policy-making 
remained unclear at the end of 1993. This research has confirmed the influence 
of Roman Catholic Church on education, but it is less of a force than in 
Hungary and especially in comparison to Poland. Although a number of issues 
· and future role-players in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republics "arena of 
power" remain open-ended, the research gives a strong indication that 
policy-making power will remain with interest groups in dimension I. The 
probable future alliances will consist of on the one hand, the Czech Civic 
Movement (Czech Republic) and Slovak National Party (Slovak Republic), 
supported by the Roman Catholic Church and on the other hand, the revitalised 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This research had as its focus, the role of secondary education interest groups 
in Central Europe, in the period 1989-1991. I examined the research 
questions pertaining to the circumstances influencing the development of 
interest groups, how they had emerged, and evaluated their participation in 
reforms. A classification of interest groups in the education policy-making 
arena, labelled the "arena of power", and a discussion thereof in regard to the 
balance of power concluded the chapters on Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. In this final chapter I will start by briefly resketching the 
political landscape of the region. This will be followed by a summary of the 
features common to the seven interest groups identified for this study. I will 
then offer ·a classification of interest groups based on the view that 
education functions. as a transmitter of ideology or in service of the 
economy. This chapter will conclude with a brief review of the channels of 
access, tactics and future of education interest groups in Central European 
power politics. 
The picture that emerges from this research on the political changes in 
education in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia is that transformation is 
an extremely complex and often unsatisfactory process. The attempt by 
these countries to re-establish ideological pluralism and multi-party political 
systems, is undermined, as the research shows, by a multiplicity of factors. 
The most important of these are ideological naivete, impoverished economies 
and undoubtedly central, the question of political power. We have seen that 
the replacement of communist orthodoxy does not, and has not meant that the 
terrain upon which policy is formed has been levelled. Far from it, it 
remains marked by potent political forces seeking to stamp new or revived 
orthodoxies on the education scene. 
Strategies built around ideas of pluralism and democracy have sought to bring 
into being policies aimed at enlisting the participation of the 
"client-community" and giving increased autonomy to local municipal and 
school level authorities as part of a process of decentralisation of 
decision-making. However, the relative ease with which new democracies 
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appeared to replace the former socialist education system - particularly with 
the passing of new legislation espousing the principles of democracy, 
humanism and liberty - belied real difficulties which showed how tenacious 
'old realities' (some even from a distant past as we see with the church's 
revivalist stance) were.Reforms'proveddifficultto implement as the post-1989 
euphoria was forced to make way for the stark socio-economic and political 
realities of everyday life. The real threat that education in Central Europe 
faces in the attempt to establish democratic education systems, is undoubtedly 
going to be found in the awareness that the outcome of party political 
struggles ultimately determine the future of education. Already by December 
1990, President Vaclav Havel of the CSFR, in his speech to the Federal 
Parliament, warned against the dangers to the new democracy and cautioned 
that the day would come when the 1989 events would be referred to as the 
"gambled away revolution" (Von Kopp 1992:101). Embedded in this 
warning was Havel's awareness of the fragility of transformation 
experiences. Every gain for democracy was hedged by a multiplicity of 
conditions which threatened to reshape the character of the reform process. 
Harden and Battiata (Zielonka 1991:107) sounded a similar warning in 
1990: "The fervour of freedom that spilled into the streets last year and 
fuelled the 20th century's most remarkable round of democratic change has 
run low. In its place, there is a dark awareness of freedom's costs, 
destitution and demagoguery. " It is crucial to this research that the political 
backcloth is clearly sketched in order to comprehend the delicate condition 
in which educational change finds itself. 
In summary, I found the data emanating from this project and specifically 
from the research questions, to indicate the replication of certain conditions 
in all three countries under discussion. 
1. Teachers face contradictory expectations as they attempt to insert 
themselves into the transformation process as legitimate players with 
voices of their own. In all three countries, teachers had been cowed 
into silence by several years of centralised authority. Not only were 
they disempowered but they were marked by the signs of "Judas". 
Levels of suspicion against them were high. As a result, they 
struggled to repair the breakdown of teacher-parent relations which 
151 
had occurred under the former system. The central criticism related to 
their former role as transmitters of state Marxist ideology. This 
problem is compounded by evidence which shows that conservative 
local interest groups, many who had gained power under the former 
government continued to have the power to dictate the pace of events. 
The active involvement of teachers in the reform process and actual 
implementation has been negatively affected by erosion of their 
status, poor salaries, shortage of funds to implement changes and the 
perception that as before 1989, they still lack the ability to influence 
Ministerial education policy. 
Of the three countries, Hungary is possibly the best situated for 
allowing the role of teachers to change. This can directly be ascribed 
to the relative stability of democratic government and national reform 
initiatives, the power of independent pro-reform municipalities and 
school-level autonomy that can be traced back to the 1985 Education 
Act in Hungary. 
n. The role played by Solidarity in Poland and the Czech and Slovak 
Teacher's Forums in the initial stages of the political transformation 
ensured the representation of teachers' interests at Ministerial level. 
However, the data indicates mounting frustration in the organised 
profession as reform initiatives have been thwarted or slowed down by 
former communists or reform-communists from Ministerial level to 
Parliament, municipality and school level. It is also significant to note 
that the teachers' associations that evolved from the former 
communist associations, namely the Polish Teachers Association, 
Pedagogues Trade Union (Hungary) and Teachers' Trade Union 
(Czech Republic) remain the largest organisations and continue to 
wield influence as they attract underpaid teachers through economic 
incentives. 
m. Independent schools and independent school associations are leading 
the reform movement in all three countries not only at local level but 
the data shows that these schools are used by the Education ministries 
as "social laboratories" and "testing ground" for innovative 
programmes and reform policies. 
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1v. Religion had throughout socialist Central Europe, with the exception 
of Poland, been suppressed for forty years. In this period, a 
generation of adults, parents and teachers had been socialised in a 
society of "state-sponsored atheism". This socialisation, not 
unexpectedly, produced people who had developed different attitudes 
to religion. Amongst them were those who felt strongly about schools 
propagating particular religious beliefs. The new governments' 
attempts to re-introduce religion in schools during 1990, therefore, not 
only sparked off the first education crisis of national proportions in 
Poland and Hungary (to a lesser extent in the CSFR), but redrew a 
sharp dividing line, in the first instance, between the traditional 
opposing religious groups and secularists, but in the second awakened 
nationalist sentiment in regions such as Moravia and Slovakia in 
Czechoslovakia. The split on the question of religion could also be 
witnessed in certain political parties, adding to their fragmentation. 
The transition in education has further been complicated by the 
ongoing debate on the restitution of church buildings nationalised 
after 1948, which have been turned into schools since then and which 
now face possible disruption. 
v. The literature and interviews confirm two obstacles pre-dating 1989 
which hinder prospects for a democratic transtition in education. The 
first is that teachers, in seeking to restore sound teacher-parent 
relations as a pre-requisite to legitimising the reform process, face a 
challenge in overcoming the non-participation of parents in schools. 
Vl. Public opinion as a pressure mechanism to fix attention on education 
issues was largely absent in socialist Central Europe. In the early 
months of 1990, prior to the first free elections, the mass media 
enjoyed new-found press freedom and featured education much 
more prominently than had been the case before. Public opinion polls 
. reflected this rise in the prominence of education as a public priority. 
However, by the end of 1991, public opinion on education had 
become overshadowed by : concerns in Poland over the effects of the 
"shock therapy" economic policy; the fragmentation of political parties 
and economic matters. In Hungary, moreover, the media is engaged 
in a battle for control by the political parties. Questions on the 
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influence of former Hungarian "old-guard" members in this 
"media war" have been raised while public focus in the CSFR centre 
upon the heated debate on the future of the remaining 
nomenclature, pace of marketisation and unity of the federal state. 
vn. Higher Education and Research Institutes form an integral part of the 
transition process in education, providing, most visibly, teachers 
who are arguably now better equipped for the task (given the 
inflow of local and international innovative educators and 
practises) and also research which sheds light on the reform processes. 
The information provided by this research points to sweeping staff 
changes brought about in higher education and research institutes 
following in the wake of the new governments. In spite of these 
changes, the data confirms that higher education continues to be 
inhabited by vestiges of scientific nomenklatura and anti-reform 
minded academics, using newly-gained institutional autonomy as a 
means to hold off reforms. 
Following the work of Halasz (1986:123) on pre-1986 Hungarian education 
interest groups, I propose a classificatio~ that reflects the societal changes in 
socio-economic and political life that Central Europe has experienced since 
the events of 1989. 
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Classification of Interest Groups in the Education Policy-making Arena 
or "Arena of Power" 
"E" ECONOMIC AXIS (positive pole; external groups) 
i. Sector of economy supporting 
E C Membership and integration 
11. Foreign joint business ventures 
"I" AXIS (negative pole) 
1. Independent schools 
ii. Pro-reform teachers 
iii. Pro-democracy & freemarket 
opposition minority parties 
iv. Pro-reform teachers' 
associations 
v. Public opinion (Czech Rep.) 
vi. Pro-modernisation institutes 
for research and higher 
education 
vii. Former dissidents from 
government to local and school 




1. Directors of former state 
enterprises awaiting 
privatisation 
11. Former political elite 
changing political assets 
for present economic assets 
and influence 
m. Reform communists and 
central economic planners 
returning to government 
'"I" IDEOLOGY (positive pole) 
1. Ruling political parties, e.g. MDF 
Solidarity, Civic Forum 
and Public Against Violence 
11. Roman Catholic Church 
m. Former communist teachers' 
associations 
1v. Ethnic nationalist parties 
v. Reform communists in 
government 
vi. Academic nomenklatura 
vii. Media- nationalistic and 
former communist-owned 
viii. Former communist teachers 
pro-status quo 
lX. Local municipalities 
dominated by former 
communists 
"E" AXIS (negative pole; internal groups) 
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The classification of post-1989 interest groups that I propose differs from the 
Halasz classification which represented a policy-making arena with the state 
as the only "gatekeeper" in the communist era. The Halasz classification 
was comprised of economic planners (external groups) and educators 
(internal groups) whose actions were confined to the boundaries imposed by 
Marxist hegemony upon education. Mass demonstrations and the first 
democratic elections in Central Europe swept aside Marxist ideology arid in 
its place came the opportunity for the incoming governments to establish an 
education system based upon the principle of democracy and pluralism. The 
events of 1989 not only mandated a change to the Ideology "I" axis of the 
original Halasz classification but also to the Economic "E" axis, as these 
countries embarked upon the hazardous road to a free-market capitalist 
economy. The dominant ideology for four decades had been discarded and 
replaced by a debate between the various interest groups on an appropriate 
future philosophy of education. The label of the Ideology "I" axis was 
retained in the light of the serious attempt by the new ruling power elite to 
either unilaterally introduce a "traditional type Catholic education" or, in the 
case of the other ethnic, nationalist groups, to seek the installation of a single 
value system, rather reminiscent of earlier communist monism in education. 
The classification that I put forward also caters for the proliferation of 
education, economic, religious, public, ethnic and nationalist pressure groups 
that have emerged who seek to influence the government's policy making, 
given the new era of open access to education. 
In my classification the opposing camps of interest groups are found among 
the Ideology "I" axis, with the positive pole representing the monistic groups 
that "resist" the democratic transition in education. The groups at the 
negative pole of the "I" axis lobby for a pluralistic and differential education 
system with a strong following for modernisation and cooperating with 
Western Europe. I have included public opinion in dimension 4 at the 
positive pole of axis "I", underplaying for the moment present voter apathy, 
given the overwhelming pro-democracy support that swept Central Europe 
and in spite of data substantiating this observation only available from the 
Czech Republic. 
The dominant role of economic matters in shaping the structure of post-1989 
education and the success of reforms dependent on economic recovery, 
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form the motivation for keeping Halasz's Economic "E" axis. Contrary to 
Halasz's dimension 2 and 3 which were dominated by central planners and 
economists tied to the state, my post-communist classification, reflecting the 
move from a centrally planned economy to a market orientated capitalist 
economy, exhibits a range of new economic interest groups at the positive 
pole of the "E" axis. Dimension 2 has shown particularly rapid growth as 
foreign investment poured in and the question of EC membership gained 
support from local businessmen. However, groups in dimension 3 have 
shown a certain persistence in seeking to make their presence felt. This is 
manifested in former communists or reform communists, either continuing to 
manage former state companies or using their pre-1989 political assets and 
privileges to gain economic assets "cheaply", especially in the period of state 
privatisation. The return of former communists, eg. in Poland, to positions 
of power will, in future, strengthen groups in both dimensions 3 and 1. The 
growth of groups in dimension 2 will depend largely upon the rate of 
economic recovery as Central Europe moves to a free market economy. 
Positive signs in the Hungarian economy and the progression of the 
transition process in education have already become evident in the 
strengthening of dimensions 2 and 4 in Hungary. In contrast both Poland and 
Czechoslovakia seem to have stalled in the transition to democracy and 
pluralist education, as groups in dimension 3 and 1 appear to have bolstered 
themselves. This can be ascribed to increasing voter apathy and confusion 
with a multitude of new parties, the pre-occupation with "bread and butter" 
issues and the resurgence of former communist groups. 
In briefly looking at the types and sub-types of political power which are 
'coercion', 'inducements', 'persuasion' and 'authority', one can identify 
several examples within the Central European context which will be dealt 
with in detail later in this research. Within the sphere of education, 
'inducements' are employed by Education ministries, linking financial 
support to compliance to central "reform" initiatives, from school to 
university level. 'Persuasion' and its sub-type, 'indoctrinational' were the 
accusations by opponents levelled at the effort by Central European 
governments to introduce Roman Catholic religion to schools. Numerous 
examples of 'authoritive' political power and specifically the sub-types 
'charismatic' and 'traditional' are evident in Central Europe. The 
'traditional' power of the Roman Catholic church continues to be a dominant 
influence in Poland while pro-Catholic sentiment is also found in the Civic 
Forum (Czech Republic) and the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum. The 









would catapult Solidarity and the Civic Forum to the ruling power elite, the 
first over a period of nine years, the latter a period of three months. 
The channels of access used and tactics employed by education interest 
groups in interacting with the power elite have taken the form of public and 
teachers demonstrations; lobbying by school boards (with parent 
representation) at municipal level; informal contacts with decision-makers; 
submissions to education commissions and public propaganda campaigns, for 
example, through the media. The impact of these interest groups upon 
political power has largely depended upon how the power elite perceived the 
group's level of representativeness and support base and so on. It is this 
reality, given the relative late-comer status of most education interest groups 
that has kept the balance of power in Central European education firmly in 
the grasp of the ruling political powers. The success of education interest 
groups, however, is not solely dependent on the power play within the sphere 
of education. The parallel and simultaneous transformation experiences in 
both education, the economy and the macro-political process have placed the 
future of education interest groups in Central Europe under a much greater 
threat. The outcome of the struggle for the consolidation of the fledgling 
democracies - by the experiences of the last three years - casts a shadow 
over emerging education interest groups and necessitate elaboration. I would 
like to make some concluding remarks regarding the future position of 
interest groups in Central European secondary education. 
The totalitarian 'communist' ideology was rejected by the majority of people 
in this region in favour of democratic capitalism. In the transition period we 
find the re-establishment of civil society in this societal vacuum of public 
non-participation, dating from the pre-1989 period (Skilling & Griffiths 
1971 :22). Civil society consists of the various non-state institutions such as 
associations, interest groups, youth movements, civil rights organisations and 
is the realm in society which is not regulated by the state. In totalitarian 
systems, the state absorbs and controls all these organisations (Sorenson 
1993: 157). Sociologically interest groups are of social significance as their 
establishment and disappearance reflect the changing values of a society. In 
this case the emergence of interest groups marks the re-establishment of civil 
society in Central Europe and the empowerment of new groups in education. 
The power of social groups, as in education, therefore serves to facilitate or 
hold back transformation. 
In Central Europe the new governments in Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia came from the ranks of the broad civic movement and had 
engineered the downfall of the communists through mass anti-government 
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demonstrations. The civic movements successfully showed through popular 
dissent that the communist governments no longer had the legitimate power 
and authority to govern the countries. The democratic elections in Central 
Europe during 1990 firmly entrenched a political process that envisaged a 
society with pluralistic views. Within this space between the state and 
society emerged various interest groups, including those in education, who 
sought to represent a multitude of views and in doing so, to influence the 
government in order to satisfy the goals of their particular constituency. 
The ousting of the communist governments in Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia has been followed by radical attempts by the new post-1989 
governments to break with their past and initiate processes, during a period 
of transition, to attain democracy and market-orientated economies. This 
transition phase has been characterised by the re-construction of civil society 
with the establishment of various organisations, political parties, associations 
(social, cultural, professional) and education interest groups (Bernhard 
1992:309). My experience "on the ground", conducting interviews in these 
countries, the data emanating as summarised in this chapter and opinions in 
education literature all point to the position of education interest groups as 
subject to the new governments successfully negotiating the present 
"intermediate stage between revolutionary turmoil and democratic stability" 
(Breslow 1991:209). 
Although all three countries have embodied the principles of democracy, 
humanism and liberty in legislation on education, the full implementation 
envisaged for the reforms of respective education systems remain "hostage" 
to economic improvement. Therefore the transition in education and full 
participation of all interest groups are interconnected with the problems of 
economic and political transformation, each influencing the success of the 
other. This brings me to the paradox of the anti-communist revolution which 
the new Central European governments face. In contrast to the pre-1989 era, 
in the new era "everything may happen, yet little can be done" (Bauman 
1992:130). As political, economic and educational freedoms have been won, 
economic realities have placed a severe restraint on these activities. With the 
fall of communism came the collapse of the centrally planned economy, state 
subsidised industries, farms and mass unemployment ensued. 
·In many instances the former dissidents in the new government could not, 
similar to their predecessors, satisfy the majority of the peoples interests. 
The end result has been loss of voter support and the fragmentation of the 
Civic Forum and Public Against Violence (Czechoslovakia) and Solidarity 
(Poland), victors in the 1989 elections. It is essential to understand that the 
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future development of education interest groups and the hard-won reforms in 
education can be threatened if a particular country is unable to complete the 
transition to democratic capitalism. Przeworski (1991 :93) reminds us that 
"religion and nationalism, not democracy, were the driving forces against 
communism, democracy is not necessarily the outcome sought by those 
challenging the communist regime". Rose (1993:156) sounds a similar 
warning: "dictatorship has lost and freedom has won . . . but that does not 
mean that democracy has won". 
During the completion of this research, Czechoslovakia was the first country 
to succumb to nationalist aspirations as the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic split into two autonomous countries in December 1992. In the 
national referendum the majority was gained by pro-separatist Slovak 
nationalists. In Poland, on 19 September 1993, the ousted former 
Communist Party, campaigning as the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), 
gained a 20.6 percent vote and more than one third of the 460 seat lower 
house (Cape Times 1993:7). This enabled the SLD to form a coalition 
government after pushing The Democratic Union (formerly Solidarity) to a 
third place with 10~7 percent. The return to power of the former 
communists, four years after being swept from office has confirmed the 
continued influence of communists as was also expressed by a number of 
interviewees in Poland. It is only in Hungary that the 1990 parliamentary 
political parties have remained unchanged and no new challengers to the 
ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum have appeared (Korosenyi 1993:104). 
The political stability in Hungary is an indication of the probable 
consolidation of democracy and with it the most likely full transition of 
education reforms envisaged by the government. 
In conclusion, I feel that moderate optimism can be expressed on the 
successful establishment of well-functioning democratic education systems in 
Central Europe, given the broad-based participation of emerging interest 
groups. It is appropriate to end with a quote from Kozakiewicsz (1992: 100), 
to illustrate the challenge that education interest groups face: 
"To sum up these inevitably sketchy remarks on recent changes in Polish 
education, I wish to stress that this is a report from a battlefield. The battle 
is fought on various fronts, not only in education. It is a battle for the future 
of Poland, for her independent and democratic shape. Within our struggle 
many ideas will appear. It is too early to say which or how many will 
prevail." 
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This research within the South African context 
Although the scope of this study does not allow for analysis of education 
interest groups within .. the South African context, 1 wish to comment 
briefly on some striking parallels to the data emanating from Central Europe. 
I am well aware of the inherent dangers of comparing conditions between 
geo-politically diverse countries. Indeed, this is a widely debated issue in the 
comparative research field. However, lengthly interviews with a broad 
spectrum of educators in Central Europe have confirmed a number of 
common issues which reformers in Central Europe and South Africa face 
during the period of political transformation. 
The most prominent are : 
that the character of the political transformation - from a hegemonic to 
a multi-party political order - in both contexts is marked by a heritage 
which did not cater for diverse education interest groups. The 
establishment of democratic or pro-democratic structures in society 
are, for the first time, giving interest groups channels of access to the 
education policy-making arena or "arena of power"; 
that in both Central Europe and South Africa, the former political 
elite, with historic roots, positions of power, (nomenklatura in the· 
former), remains a force to be reckoned with, where many merely 
exchanged political for economic power, in the latter, political 
negotiations have left those with political influence, particularly in 
positions of authority; 
while South Africa for the present is confronted with the added 
challenge of economic transformation, like Central Europe, it is 
vulnerable in the sense that opposing religious, ethnic and separatist 
forces are constantly asserting, through land, language and other 
claims, their rights in ways which are placing strain on the reform 
process. 
In conclusion I would like to remark that the data emanating from this study 
and my "grassroots" research has served to underline that putting in place a 
democratic political system does not guarantee democratic reforms in 
education, as the implementation thereof remains subordinate to political and 
economic conditions. Central Europe has shown that the inability of the 
political parties, victorious in the 1990 elections, to consolidate their 
power-base, has with the exception of Hungary, threatened the democratic 
process in education. 
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APPENDIX: 1 (p.45) 
Relation 
Relation between the 
between job appearance 
Teachers' roles satisfaction and of stress and Valorization 
and responsibilities the assessment the assessment index 
of the of the 
realization of realization of 
responsibilities responsibilities 
Tau-B Tau-B 
Work with colleagues on the ' 
well-being students .164 -.019 .183 
Work with colleagues on the 
evaluation of students' progress .151 -.032 .183 
Reading professional periodicals .132 -.042 .174 
Counselling individual students .119 -.054 .174 
Study for professional 
.146 development -.008 .154 
Share in the guidance system .130 .000 .130 
Work with colleagues on 
curriculum development .167 .040 .127 
Contacts with parents .109 -.014 .123 
Induction of new teachers .116 .004 .112 
Share in school management .108 .012 .096 
Work on schoo~community 
relationships .067 .040 .027 
Professional responsibilities perceived by secondary school 
teachers in Poland listed with the decreasing valorization 
index (N=936). 
NASALSKA (1991:31. POLAND) 
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APPENDIX 2 (p. 30) 





























* There are 19 other parties represented in the Sejm, tncluding the German Minority with 7 seats, 
Christian Democracy (5), Christian Democrats' Party (4), Labor Solidarity (4), Party X (3), 
Union for Realpolitik (3). 





























APPENDIX 3 (p.36) 
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STRUCTURE OF THE POLISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
MIEZALSKI (1992:21. POLAND) 
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APPENDIX: 4 (p.61) 
What are your main life aims and aspirations for the next 5-10 years? 
(the surveyed population was between 15 and 44 years old) 
l9n 1281 ~ 
%of 
Aims difference 
and aspirations %of rank %of rank %of rank between 1977 and 1986 answers answers answers 
Connected with 
education 78 1 49 4 42 4 - 36 
Family and 
personal 53 2 51 3 60 1 + 7 
Accommodation• 42 3 58 1 56 2-3 +14 
Other material 35 4 55 2 56 2-3 +21 
Connected with 
work 33 5 31 5 27 5 - 6 
Status - prestige 8 6 6 6 9 6 + 1 
Self-improvement 3 7 1 8 3 7 0 
Sociocentric 1 8 2 7 1 8 0 
a We have distiguished between the goals connected with accommodation and 
other material goals, because of their common character and importance 
among other social aspirations. 
b The data base is currently being established and errors ca. + 1 per cent may 
occur. 
Wisniewski (1988: 126. Poland) 
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APPENDIX: 5 (p.31,117) 
% 1989 1990 1991 
POLAND 
Gross domestic product - 0.2 - 12 -3.7 
Industrial production - 2.5 -28.8 -5.7 
Inflation 251 684 80 
Unemployment% 
of workforce 0.3 6.1 7.3 
CZECHOSWVAKIA 
Gross domestic product 1.4 -3.1 -9.8 
Industrial production 1.0 . -3.7 -4.5 
Inflation 1.4 15 40 
Unemployment % 
of workforce 0 1.0 2.8 
HUNGARY 
Gross domestic product - 0.2 3.5 - 6 
Industrial production - 1 - 10 - 12 
Inflation 17.5 28.2 36 
Unemployment% 
of workforce 0.5 1.6 2.9 





















APPENDIX 6 (p.86) 
Higher education (2 to 6 years) 
i i r-- i r Trade school . 
(3 grades) Academic I Vocational 
secondary 
I ~(2grades) I secondary 
school I school Vocational Special 
I training trade ------- t--1.-------- --------- - Vschools I school 
[4 grades) I 14 grades. V' (2 grades) 











(8 grades divided into: I+ t--Children 
- lower section: 1st to 4th grades not 





STRUCTURE OF THE HUNGARIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM 
SZUNYOGH (1991:5. HUNGARY) 
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APPENDIX: 7 (p. 84, 89, 1 02) 
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON EDUCATION EXPECTATIONS : 
1990 
The distribution of answers to the following question : "Now I will read out 
twenty-two pairs of statements. The statements in each pair contradict one another. 
Please indicate the statement with which you agree. Perhaps it will be difficult to 
give a definite response to some of the pairs, but try to show stands closest to your 





Nowadays a person can only get on in life 
if he has been educated at school. 
A talented person can get on in life regardless 






After so many experiments and reforms, schools 
are very much in need of calm. 






Children should be sent to a school which is appropriate 
for their abilities and knowledge as early as possible. 
Independently of their particular knowledge and abilities, 






The schools of today overload the children and the demands 
they face are too big. 
The schools of today do not place enough serious demands 






These days one cannot expect the family to teach children 
good manners and proper behaviour; this is primarily 
the task of the school. 
Good manners and proper behaviour should be taught within 
the family; one cannot expect the school to carry out this task. 
No answer 






















Special skills and knowledge are not needed in order to 
educate children and any sensible adult is capable of doing this. 
The education of children requires serious professional 
knowledge and thus only a well-trained, well-prepared teacher 






Parents should have the right to send their children to 
the school which they consider to be the best. 
All parents should send their children to the school which 
serves the local area in which they live otherwise the privileged 






It would be best if each school chose its own textbooks and 
its own teaching methods. 
It would be best if all schools used centrally prescribed 






Parents have little time and opportunity for dealing with their 
children, so schools should have a greater responsibility 
for a child's personal development. 
Families ought to give more attention to their children, and the 
schools should not take on this responsibility. 
No answer 
QUESTION : 10 
1. The primary task of the schools is to prepare pupils for good, 













them with a general education. (47.1 %) 
-2. The primary task of schools is to give the children a thorough 
general education and not to prepare them for a job or profession. (45.9%) 
3. No answer ( 7.0%) 




There is no place for religion in state schools. 
The chance to receive religious education should be 






(Appendix 7 /Continued) 




Men and women have different tasks in life and therefore 
they should be given a different education. 
In a modem society the education of men and women 
should not be different. 
No answer 




Minorities and nationalities have a right to have 
their own schools. 
Children belonging to the same minority groups and nationalities 
should attend the same schools as Hungarians. 
No answer 




Special schools should be established for talented children, 
because only in this way can they fully realize they natural 
abilities. 
Special schools should not be established for talented children 
because this offends social justice. 
No answer 




Schooling should be free for everybody. 
Families which can afford it should contribute to 
the cost of schooling. 
No answer 




Schools should demand serious learning from children 
at an early age. 
Schools should not expect serious learning from 






Most of the current problems in education can be solved at the 
local level within the schools themselves. 






















(Appendix 7 /Continued) 




Besides teaching, schools should guarantee the provision of 
meals and other daily requirements. 
Schools should occupy themselves with teaching matters; 
the provision of other services is not their concern. 
No answer 




Schools should be more strict and ought to demand 
greater discipline. 
Instead of being more strict and demanding greater discipline, 
teachers should pay more attention to pupils and be more tactful. 
No answer 
QUESTION : 20 







and what to teach; parents should not interfere with this process. (65.1 %) 
2. Parents should also have the opportunity to say something about 
what is taught in schools and how it is taught. (30.5%) 
3. No answer ( 4.4%) 




At present teachers' pay is lower than it really ought to be. 
Teachers' pay is appropriate for the work which they do. 
No answer 




Education in state schools should be neutral with regard 
to any kind of world outlook. 
Education in state schools cannot be neutral, because successful 










APPENDIX: 8 (p. 15) 
HALASZ'S SPHERES OF INTEREST 
(OR INTEREST GROUPS) 
(1) Ideologically committed educational groups: 
relatively homogeneous, with an idea of .the educational system based on 
a theory of unified polytechnical training, which would develop an almost 
unified educational provision obligatory for every body up to the age of 
18. 
(2) Ideologically less committed groups of economic planners : 
·concerned with the long-range planning of the national economy, and 
linked with the institutional networks of economic planning. Since the 
education service had to provide a labour force for a relatively backward 
economy, these groups urged the development of a system which would 
tum out most young people at 16 for simple manual work. 
(3) Ideologically committed vocational groups: concerned with the 
development of vocational education and its integration into a traditional 
school system so that education would take precedence over merely 
vocational training 
(4) Ideologically less committed education groups :growing stronger since 
the mid-1970s, trying to work out the rational theory of society and 
taking account of the fact of socio-economic development. These groups 
think in terms of a differentiated school structure and wish to preserve 
the secondary school in its existing form but do not exclude some 
possible extensions. 
Howell (1988:125. Hungary) 
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APPENDIX: 10 (p. 105) 





















OF EDUCATION LEVEL 





The developm. of individual abilities 9.2 
Development of intellectual capacities 9.8 
Moral education, education for honesty 6.9 
The teaching of mother tongue 3.7 
Education for a good profession 7.2 
Education for discipline and order 7.4 
Preparation for further studies 9.3 
The teaching of foreign languages 11.3 
Care with affection 9.9 
The teaching of scientific knowledge 11.7 
The teaching of national traditions 11.1 
Education for patriotism 10.5 
Sports, physical education 11.8 
Education for cooperation with others 12.3 
Meals, day-care 12.3 
Religious education 12.0 
Development of collective values 14.0 
Leisure, playing 15.2 
Sexual education 16.7 
Political and civic education 17.7 



































































APPENDIX: 11 (p.101) 
RANK ORDER OF EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS THE SCHOOL 
IN FUNCTION OF POLITICAL ATTACHMENT 
(1 = HIGH RANK, 20 • LOW RANK) 
Those in favour of 
Governm. 
(N=310) 
Education for a good profession 8.9 
The development of individual abilities 8.0 
Moral education, education for honesty 6.9 
Development of intellectual capacities 7.7 
Education for discipline and order 7;9 
The teaching of mother tongue 8.5 
Preparation for further studies 9.7 
The teaching of foreign languages 9.9 
The teaching of scientific knowledge 11.1 
Care with affection 10.5 
The teaching of national traditions 11.1 
Education for patriotism 10.8 
Education for cooperation with others 12.0 
Sports, physical education 11.5 
Religious education 12.6 
Meals, day-care 13.0 
Development of collective values 13.3 
Leisure, playing 15.0 
Sexual education 16.2 
Political and civic education 17.5 














































APPENDIX : 12 (p. 92, 100) 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF DIFFERENT OPTIONS 
FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
(n=979) 
Religious education should be 
compulsory for everybody 
Religious education should not 
be compulsory, it must be an 
optional subject in schools 
The introduction of religious 
education would be discriminative 

















APPENDIX: 13 (p. 73,116) 
THE COMPOSITION OF EASTERN EUROPE'S 
NEW PARLIAMENTS 
Date of Election 






March 25 and April 8, 1990 
386-member single chamber (including 8 deputies 
coopted after voting to represent national minorities). 
A complicated system of district, regional and national 






Socialists (ex -Communists) 

















Date of Election 
Type of Legislature 
Election Mode 
Civic Forum and 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
June 8-9, 1990 
The Federal Assembly contains 300 seats 
divided into two chambers : 
the House of People (with 150 members, 101 from 
the Czech Lands and 49 from Slovakia) and the 
House of Nations (with 150 members, 75 from each 
republic). Also elected were the republican 
parliaments, that is, the Czech National Council 
(200 members) and the Slovak National Council 
(150 members). 
All seats were elected from party lists on the 
basis of proportional representation. A minimum 59% 
of the poll was required to win representation in the 
Federal Assembly and Czech National Council; and a 
3% minimum was required for the Slovak National 
Council. 
House of the People 
National Czech Slovak Seats 
percentage 
46.6 53.2 87 32.5 Public against Violence 
13.8 Communists 13.6 13.5 24 
Christian Democrats 12.0 8.7 19.0 20 
Moravian and Silesian 
autonomists 5.4 5.4 11.0 9 Slovak Nationalists 3.5 6 
Coalition of minorities 2.8 8.6 4 
.Other 16.1 16.7 15.1 





APPENDIX 14 (p.140) 
TYPOLOGY OF PARENTS ACCORDING TO ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHANGES IN EDUCATION 
(representative sample of Czech parents, N = 1 ,216) 
Type of parents Ofo of parental Attitudes to changes in Willingness to pay school fee 
population education· 
liberal 34 positive : 750/o of this group 
wish private schools 
yes (750/o willing to pay) 
radical 16 asking radical changes, 
decentralization, private 
yes (830/o willing to pay) 
schools 
socialistic 12 negative: against private no (1 QQO/o requesting 
schools non-paid education) 
centralistic 15 supporting centralized no 
school system, accepting 
only "cosmetic" changes 
. non-interested 23 not appreciating education 
as a primary value 
partially yes 











































APPENDIX 15 (p.l23) 







































STRUCTURE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK EDUCATION SYSTEM: 1 SEPTEMBER 1990 
ONDRFJKOWIC (1990:28. CZECHOSLOVAKIA) 
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APPENDIX 16 (p. 14,22, 40) 
SEMINARS 
Cultural Week - Hosted by Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs & Stigtings 
Studiefonds Voor Zuid-Afrikaanse Studenten. Amsterdam. 14- 18 October 1991. 
Lecturers: 
Prof. J. Berting, Department Sociology, University of Rottendam. 
Prof. G. Schutte, Department History, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. 
Dr. C.E. Choenni, Bureau Racismebestryding, University Utrecht. 
Prof. S. Couwenberg, Law Department, University Rotterdam. 
Prof. P. Nijkamp, Department Economy, Vrije University Amsterdam. 
Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs. Briefing by Under-secretary of African Affairs in 
regard to Dutch policy in Southern Africa. The Hague. 16 October 1991. 
International Seminar: "Law and Practice". Legal acts concerning higher education and 
research in Central and East-European countries. Warsaw .. November 18 - 20 1991. 
National Quarterly Meeting. NES NSZZ Presidium. Members were interviewed prior 
to meeting. Warsaw. 22 November 1991. (Translator: I. Okraska) 
Slovakia Workshop. Primary and Secondary School Reforms. Institute of Information 
, "' and Prognoses of Education. Youth and Sports. Chairman: Dr. S. Christenko . 
. European Forum of Freedom in Education, Slovak Branch. Fromer USSR education 
researcher. Bratislava. 5 November 1991. (Translator: I. lvanovova). 
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APPENDIX 17 (p. 22) 
ORIGINAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Gabor Halasz (1986) distinguishes the four major "spheres of interest" affecting 
Hungarian secondary education policy as follows : 
1. Ideoloa-ically committed education groups : relatively homogeneous, with an idea 
of the educational system based on a theory of unified polytechnical training, 
which would develop an almost unified education provision obligatory for 
everybody up to the age of 18. 
2. Ideologically less committed groups of economic planners: concerned with the 
long-range planning of the national economy, and linked with the institutional 
networks of economic planning. Since the education service had to provide a 
labour force for a relatively backward economy, these groups urged the 
development of a system which would turn out most young people at 16 for 
simple manual work. 
3. Ideologically committed vocational education groups : concerned with the 
development of vocational education and its integration into a traditional school 
system so that education would take precedence over merely vocational training. 
These groups urged the preservation of the existing education system as a 
pre-condition for the expansion of vocational education. 
4. Ideologically less committed education groups : growing stonger since the 
mid-1970's, trying to work out a rational theory of society and taking account of 
the fact of socio-economic development. These groups think in terms of a 
differentiated school structure and wish to preserve the secondary school in its 
existing form but do not exclude some possible extensions. 
D.A. Howell (1988) 
In the questions that follow, the Halasz classification will be used as a model for 
examining the dynamics of the "spheres of interest" in education, within the societies 
under focus. (It is important to note that the Halasz classification is only one way of 
understanding who the interested parties in the process of education are and that there 
are a number of others). 
QUESTION 1: 
QUESTION2: 
Is the Halasz classification a useful one for describing what is 
happening in your country? 
In your opinion, what "spheres of interest" (educational interest 









QUESTION 9 : 
QUESTION 10: 
With regard to the 1989- 1990 political transformations, were 
those groups present before 1989? If so, in what form? 
Comment on the relationship between the spheres of interest with 
regard to their (a) dominance, (b) decline and (c) realignment or 
(d) alliances formed and (e) possible future importance in the light 
of the 1989 - 1990 events. 
Howell (1988) refers to the continuing relative decline of the 
ideological spheres of interest, and its effect on Hungarian 
educational policy making, which continued from 1978 into the 
1980's. Is this trend reflected in your country? If so, can you 
suggest the possible cause of this trend? 
Indicate (a) the immediate (and possible future) impact of the 
government's economic reform policy, to which the education 
system has to adapt and (b) the effect thereof on the spheres of 
interest groupings? Have these issues led to the emergence of 
post-1989 interest groups? 
To what extent do nationalist, ethnic and minority issues (a) play a 
prominent role in educational policy making and (b) feature on the 
agenda of the spheres of interest groupings? Have these issues led 
to the emergence ofpost-1989 interest groups? 
Lukacs (1989) points to the emergence of a regional interest group 
and anti-market group in Hungary. In Poland, Kozakiewicz (1990) 
distinguishes between opposing interest groups of Minimalists 
(satisfied with the traditional system and in favour of slight 
modernisation) and Maximalists (who call both the values and 
objectives of the existing system into question, and are in favour of 
radical changes). 
Comment on the possible appearance of spheres of educational 
interest groupings in your country, which fall within these 
descriptions or which can be added as post-1989 phenomena. 
Elaborate with regard to the emergence, dominance or decline of 
present or new spheres of educational interest groups, against the 
background of the most likely socio-economic and political 
scenario of your country, in the foreseeable future. 
With reference to your answers in question 1 and 2, describe 
briefly a model or classification which would be (a) an addition or 
extension to the Halasz classification or (b) a more suitable way of 













APPENDIX 18 (p. 35J 
POLAND: EDUCATION ACTS 
Date Administration Curricula Teacher Other remarks 
and management training 
(A & M) 
6.6.1990 2 x 2 A & M model Common Core Foreign Philosophical and 
languages Religious Freedom 
introduced 
1990 49 Autonomous Basic Curricula School Autonomy 
Regions Guidelines through school 
councils 
9.1990 Institutional Autonomy Academic Freedom 
restored 
-----------------------~~--
APPENDIX 19 {P.76J 
HUNGARY: EDUCATION ACTS 
Name of Date Administration Curricula Teacher Other remarks 
Act and management training 
(A & M) 
Education 1961 Three track Secondary First post-1945 attempt 
Reform Law Education system to modernise education 
Education Act 1985 Decentralisation of School level Autonomy 
A&M 
Law XXII 1990 Institutional Autonomy Academic Freedom .....,, l 
,T .. 
.. 
Education Act 5.11.1991 2 x 2 A & M model Core Foreign languages Philosophical and 




Name of Act 
Project of Further 
Development of 
the Czech and Slovak 
Education System 
Law no. 29 
System of Primary & 
Secondary Schools 
Slovak Act of State 
Administration 
Act of the Czech 
National Council on 
State Administration 
Higher Education 
Act No: 172 
APPENDIX 20 (p. 119J 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: EDUCATION ACTS 
Date Administration Curricula Teacher Other 
and management training Remarks 
(A & M) 
1976 Centralised A & M Uniform 
Curricula 
1984 Comprehensive - Uniform 
School Policy Curricula 
5.1990 Minimal core International Exchange Philosophical & 
Curricula & Staff Development Religious 
Projects · Freedom 
26.11. 1990 2 x 2 A & M model 
12.1990 2 x 2 A & M model 
4.5.1990 . Institutional Autonomy Academic 
Freedom 
APPENDIX 21 (p. 28, 31, 43, 65, 72, 74, 92, 107, 
TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS & POLITICAL EVENTS 117, 127, 143) 
TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS POLITICAL EVENTS 
PRE-1989 r POLAND: Polish Teachers Association ,. 
(ZNP - communist) 
Poland : martial law 8.1980 
Teachers Solidar~ 
(TS - undergroun Polish round table talks 1988 
Gorbachev's "glasnost & perestroika" 1989 
HUNGARY: Union of Pedagoges 
Hungary: pro-democracy rallies 3-6.1989 (UP - communist) 
Pedagogical Democratic Trade Union Hungarian open border policy 5.1989 
(POTU) Fall of the Berlin Wall 9.1989 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Communist Teachers Trade Union Poland : partially free elections 6.1989 
(CTTU) "Velvet Revolution• pro-democracy 
Pedagoges Democratic Trade Union demonstrations. CSFR : 10.11.1989 
(POTU) 
Poland : introduction "shock therapy" 1.1990 
Teachers Forum Hungary & CSFR : "gradualist" 
(TF) . economic policy 1990 
1990 POLAND: ZNP 
Hungary 1st democratic elections 4.1990 (former communist, now non-aligned) 
Solidarity National Education Section 
Antall : Hungarian Prime Minister 3.1990 
(NSZZ - umbrella body to the TS) CSFR: 1st democratic election 6.1990 
HUNGARY: Pedagoges Trade Union Havel : CSFR president 6.1990 
(PTU - former UP) Walesa : Polish president 11.1991 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Pedagogical Union 
(PU - former TF - Czech Rep.) 
CSFR break up into two republics 12.1992 
Teachers Forum of Slovakia 
(TFS) 




CZECH REPUBLIC : CTTU 
PU 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC : CTTU 
TFS 
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APPENDIX 22 (p. 13f) 
Dr. Sergej Christ.enko~ Pieninska-6~ 05201 ~ Spi~ska Nova Ves, 
Czechoslovakia. 
Spi~ska Nova Ves, 
15.12 .. 1991 
Dear Hr.Oosthuizen 
Hr. Henning Oosthuizen 
University of Cape Town 
I hope you already in your country ~iter temporary stay in 
Europe. Because you gave me materials about your research I must 
answer to you any way. 
At this moment I can<t to do more than send to you some 
materials of European Forum of Freedom in Education. Maybe later~ 
after two - tree months I would like send to you my own opinion 
about your answers. For this ·moment you can have some opinions of 
other persons in documents, which was with this letter. 
Maybe after your stay in Czechoslovakia~ Poland and Hungary you 
already anderstood that classification of groups of interest by 
Halas is very old and no useful in this time. 
For example in Czechoslovakia we have the following (I think) 
groups of interest : 
catolical church (and political groups on this base), 
two - tree groups of liberal thinking teachers, politicians, 
- "new" communist party (diferent groups of this one). 
That<s all (by my opinion naturally). 
Parents and other parts of Public are too indiferent (except 
newspapers of course). 
I decided to find some workplace as a teacher of Russian in any 
from american schools and stay there 1 - 1.5 years. It will be 
very good for my still very bad English and for my effort know 
more about the education in demokratic country. I hope I will be 
successful after some problems (evaluation, certification 
proces). 
I have more information about the program America 2000. I 
translate those documents now, but I can send to you a copy of 
them if you want. 
Maybe after sometime I<ll be have some problems as Rusiian here 
but I hope no. 
I wish to you success in your research direction. 
Sincerely, 1 ( 
/l~}i1tttt 
Dr. Sergej Christenko 
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APPENDIX 23 (p. 125,·134) 
INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
Ku~likova 17, 852 55 BRATISLAVA 
CZECHO~SLOVAKZA 
Bratislava 16 April 1992 
Mr Henning Ooslhuizen 
14 Garrison Road . 
Claremont 
Phone: +427-828 304 
FaM: .+427-821 584 
7700 
CAPE TOWN SOUTH AFRICA 
Dear Mr Ooslhuizen, 
lhank you very much for your leller of 22 March 1992. I answered 
.mosl of lhe questions and ilems in your question - sheel and il 
vas posled in January 1992, sorry so lale. · 
The answers lo your questions: 
a> The 1arqesl teacher association in Slovakia is "Teacher Forum 
of Slovakia". Il is member of WCOTP. il has 3240 members. 
Adress: Moyzesova 44, 040 01 Ko§ice, CSFR, lei and fax no.: 
0042-95-426955 
b) In lhe lasl year 1991 lhe school boards were established. 
Parents play leading role in lhe board. In ·addition lhere are 
qualerly lhe classroom parents meetings where lhe parents can 
express lheir opinion and wishes lo lhe school manaqmenl. 
Generally ve can say lhe silualion has improved in lhal field. 
c> I believe lhe mosl of headmasters 
manaqmenl policy. Bul lhey suffer 
nonslabil personal silualion. 
prefer reforms and new 
from lack of funds and 
d) As a biqqesl change al school level since 1989 ve can consider 
removing ideology from lhe schools, decentralization of school 
managmenl, struggle for introducing democracy and humanism lo 
lhe schools. The bigqesl problems are heavy and lo much 
conlenl for sludenl lo learn, lack of inleresl and enjoy of 
sludenl and pupils for school, lack of funds for facililalinq 
of schools and teacher salary as veil .. 
I wish lhe besl in your sludy and lo your wife. 
Yours sincerely 
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APPENDIX 24 ~.18,39,43,51,54,56,59,89,91,94,95, 98,100,106,124,128,129,134,136) 
CONTEXT FOR PARTICIPATION IN REFORMS 
COUNTRY INTEREST CO-OPERATION OBSTACLES 
GROUP (versus protest) TOLERANC'E, DOMINATION ELIMINATION OTHER 
POLAND Teachers through school councile of parents and ministerial Ministry by network of old 
reform a principals "house-cleaning' in 1989 
Teacher Associations by NSZZ on Education 
Commi88ion 
~ Education Ministry 
aeeociatlons 
of ZNP in organised prof888ion 
Independent Schools with Education Minietry 
ae 'change agents' 
Religious Groupe with Ministt, and by Ministry of non- attempt by Catholic Church through 
Catholic So ole Catholic Schoole religious education introduction 
Parente through school councils innovative programs 
at echools 
Media & Public Opinion by the government Party political newspapers 
attempt to Influence the public 
Higher Education & pro-reform academics by Ministry of 'academic academic nomenklatura 
Research Institutes eupport Ministry reforms middle claes' 
HUNGARY Teachers though school advisory by headmaetere; Ministry through demonstrations and 
board a 'witchhunts' & headmaeter apple strikes 
Teacher Associations POTU pr888ure Ministry by Ministry of Associations of PTU in organised prof888ions 
for reforms 
" 
Langua%' echools Independent Schools with Ministry by Ministry and local 
government meet pu lie demand 
Religious Groupe between Ministry and 
Catholic echools 
by Ministry of non-Catholic 
schools 
attempt by Catholic Church through 
religious education Introduction 
Parente participation in echool 
advisory beards 
Media & Public Opinion government tolerate free press attempt by politiclal parties 
In "media war' · 
media reflect pr888ure 
from parents and public 
Higher Education & between pro-reform by Ministry of 'young set' academic nomenklatura 
Reeeerch Institutes academice and government intelligenteia resist change 
CSFR Teachers through school boards/ of critical parents by Ministry through Demonstratione and 
counoHs 'wild purges' strikes 
Teacher Aeeoclatlons PU and TFS co-operate by Ministry of 888oclations of TTU in organised profession 
with &tate reforms 
Independent Schools 'testing ground' for Fulfill need of 
Ministry reforms pro-reform/parents 
Religious Groupe between Ministry and by Ministry of non-'Catholic Ministry atte~t through 
Catholic Schools schools introduction religious education 
Parente on Czech School boards 
and Slovak school councils 
Media & Public Opinion government tolerate press rvlitical parties attempt power media are forum for 
critielsm y own newspapers parent & public pressure 
Higher Education & 
Reeeerch Institutes 
by &c>n~form institutes 
& AS 
Academic nomenklatura attempt 
to retain power 
NOTB : REMARKS ON NBXT PAGE 
•.· .. ' 
REMARKS (p.189) 
This diagram is read by starting with a particular interest group and 
following the "context within which it participates in reforms" through 
studying the horizontal flow of sub-headings. 
If the teachers' interest group in Poland is taken as an example, then under 
the subheading "co-operation (versus protest)", the data indicates that this 
group participates in reforms "through school councils". 
Firstly, under the subheading "obstacles", the category "tolerance" indicates 
(i) the groups which teachers have to be tolerant of, for example, Polish 
teachers tolerate empowered "parents and ministerial reforms", and (ii) also 
which groups are now obliged to tolerate emerging interest groups, for 
example, Polish teacher associations are tolerated by the "Education 
Ministry". The second subheading "domination" refers to interest groups 
which attempt to dominate a particular interest group, for example, Polish 
teachers continue to be dominated by remnants of the "network of pre-1987 
headmasters". 
The subheading "elimination" is empty as the practice of eliminating 
opposing interest groups, as witnessed under the pre-1989 governments, 
has stopped since the democratic revolutions. 
The last heading "other", makes allowance for activities of interest groups 
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